



The Development of Essentialist Reasoning about Religion Categories 
in Northern Ireland.     
 
 






Kirsty Christina Smyth, BSc 
Supervisors:  Dr. Aidan Feeney & Prof. Rhiannon Turner 
 





Social essentialism refers to the overarching assumption that members of 
certain social categories share a common, objective underlying reality or 
essence.  The belief in a category essence can lead individuals to view 
members of particular social categories as more similar to each other than 
they really are, as well as encouraging individuals to view membership of 
particular categories as naturally occurring, stable and innate.  This can lead 
to stereotypical thinking about social categories, as well as prejudice and 
even discrimination.   
Prior research has found that social/cultural context constrains the 
development of social essentialist reasoning; the most highly emphasised 
and socially meaningful dimensions stressed within a particular social or 
cultural context are usually the most strongly essentialised social dimensions.  
The present research is based on a case study of ethnic essentialism in 
Israel and aims to examine the development of social essentialist beliefs in a 
previously unexplored cultural context: the development of essentialist 
reasoning about ethno-religion categories (Catholic and Protestant) from 6-
11 years of age within different educational contexts (de facto segregated 
and integrated schools) in Northern Ireland (NI).  Based on the Israeli 
findings, it was expected that ethno-religion essentialism would be early-
emerging within NI, it would decline in strength across childhood, and 
attendance at an integrated school would be associated with an earlier 
decline in ethno-religious essentialism.   
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This research consisted of a series of three inductive inference studies 
(Studies 1-3) measuring essentialist beliefs about the inductive potential of 
religion-, gender- and control categories in NI, one exploratory inference 
study examining essentialist reasoning about these categories in the United 
States (US) (Study 4), a questionnaire study examining children’s 
endorsement of social essentialist beliefs (Study 5) in NI, and a meta-
analysis of the NI studies contained within this thesis.   
The main findings suggested that ethno-religious essentialism 
emerges at 8 years of age in NI, and the emergence of essentialist beliefs 
about the categories Catholic and Protestant is associated with attendance at 
a de facto segregated school.  Exploratory inference data from the US 
showed a different pattern of reasoning from NI, with US children showing no 
increasing preference for religion categories across childhood.  Different 
indices of social essentialism used in this research suggested that different 
aspects of essentialist thinking underpinned children’s reasoning about 
religion and gender categories.  Children appeared to essentialise ethno-
religion categories more strongly along the dimension of entitativity, while 
they essentialised gender categories more strongly along the dimension of 
naturalness.     
Future studies should expand the age range and demographics of the 
participants taking part in social essentialism research in NI.  Research 
should examine how essentialist beliefs about religion categories are 
transmitted to young children in NI.  Further research should also investigate 
essentialist reasoning as one potential cognitive source of stereotyping and 
ethno-religious prejudice in NI, with a view to exploring how challenging 
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essentialist beliefs about religion categories might be useful in forming the 
basis of a prejudice-reduction intervention, or in supporting current ongoing 
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1.1. Introduction:  What is Essentialism? 
In the movie ‘1408’ based on the short story by Stephen King, the main 
character is asked at one point, “You do drink, don’t you?”, to which he 
replies, “Of course, I just said I was a writer” (di Bonaventura & Hafstrom, 
2007).  This response suggests that the protagonist has essentialist beliefs 
about that category ‘writer’.  By ‘essentialist beliefs’, I refer to the theory that 
individuals are biased towards the assumption that certain categories – such 
as dog, fish, man or writer – possess a deep underlying essence that makes 
members of those categories what they are (Gelman, 2003; Haslam, 1998; 
Medin & Ortony, 1989), and on which many of their properties depend.   
 According to Medin and Ortony (1989), the assumption of a category 
essence does not necessarily mean that people know what constitutes an 
essence; it can be a blank placeholder in people’s concepts of categories.  In 
other words, people just assume there is an underlying reality, glue or 
substance to certain categories that connects all of the entities in that 
category, without knowing what exactly the essence of, for example, being a 
writer, is.  This kind of thinking is the subject of the research presented in this 
thesis.   
Essentialism is a topic of great interest because, like many features of 
our cognitive architecture, an essentialist bias has both the potential to help 
us simplify the world around us and can lead to an erroneous way of thinking 
about the world.  This is because the inherent assumption that certain 
categories have a natural, objective reality encourages the human inclination 
to engage in categorisation and to use categories to make inferences (see 
Murphy, 2002).  This inclination is helpful when it comes to sorting and 
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gathering new information about the natural world (e.g., about plant or 
animals, see Gelman, 2003), but not when it is extended to reasoning about 
our social world (Haslam, 1998).  When people treat particular social groups 
(e.g., Immigrants, Women, Conservative Voters, Writers) as having an 
objective, underlying reality, this supports inferences based on social 
category membership, which can lead to stereotyping of these groups, as 
well as prejudice (see, Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Diesendruck & Menahem, 
2013; Leyens, Cortes, Demoulin, Dovidio, Fiske, Gaunt, Paladino, 
Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres & Vaes, 2003; Pauker, Ambady & 
Apfelbaum, 2010; Prentice & Miller, 2007).  Thus, as one potential source of 
stereotyped thinking and prejudice, it is important to study the development 
of essentialist thinking about social categories.  However, before doing so, 
the current chapter will provide a review of the literature on psychological 
essentialism, beginning with a more detailed discussion of essentialist beliefs 
in the next section.  
 
1.1.1. Essentialist beliefs  
 
With the assumption of a category essence comes a number of beliefs 
that people hold about essentialised categories.  Assuming that categories 
have a shared essence permits inferences about other characteristics of the 
category, such as:  the stability of category membership across time and 
superficial transformations, the existence of category boundaries that cannot 
be crossed, the heritability of category membership, and the similarity of 
category members, thus conferring stronger inductive potential of that 
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category (Gelman, 2003; Haslam, 1998; Medin & Ortony, 1989).  Because 
there are a number of different aspects of essentialist thinking, there is no 
single way of measuring essentialism – research in this area focuses on each 
of the different types of beliefs when attempting to measure individuals’ 
essentialisation of categories (Gelman, 2003).   
Each of these beliefs have been used to measure the degree to which 
categories have been essentialised.  Of particular interest is the belief that a 
shared essence makes category members similar, and in this way provides a 
strong basis for making category based inferences.  Such inductive 
reasoning occurs when individuals use their prior knowledge to make 
predictions from the known to the unknown (Feeney & Heit, 2007; Goswami, 
2011; Murphy, 2002).  For example, if given a scenario in which an elephant 
suddenly presented symptoms of a previously unseen novel virus in 
elephants, individuals might be likely to infer that all other elephants may be 
equally susceptible to it – “elephant flu” – based on their knowledge that 
elephants share many other biological commonalities.   
Research using category-based inference tasks has been one of the 
most common ways that essentialism has been studied in the literature on 
cognitive development (e.g., see Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006; Gelman, 
2003).  The rationale for this work is that if an individual essentialises a 
category, such as ‘dog’, then information about shared category membership 
should be a stronger basis for inferring that two dogs share an unfamiliar 
property, even if one of them is perceptually more similar to a cat than a dog. 
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 The study of essentialist reasoning about social categories is an 
important line of research because essentialism constitutes one cognitive 
source of stereotyping, prejudicial attitudes, and discrimination towards 
others (Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Bigler, Liben, 2007, Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 
2011; Leyens, Demoulin, Vaes, Gaunt & Paladino 2007; Prentice & Miller, 
2007).  One consequence of social essentialism is that individuals tend to 
view certain social categories as more inherently and objectively real than 
others.  Seeing the existence of certain social groups in this way (rather than 
as social constructs), can have pernicious consequences, such as the 
exacerbation of stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination, and even persecution 
(Bastian & Haslam, 2006; Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Keller, 2005; Morton, 
Haslam, Postmes and Hornsey, 2009).  A real world example of essentialist 
beliefs in action would be Nazi ideology in the third Reich (for a review see, 
Evans, 2008), which spread the essentialist perception that members of the 
category ‘Jew’ were of a distinct and inferior race compared to other social 
groups.  
Such essentialist reasoning about social categories is the focus of the 
subsequent research studies reported in this PhD thesis.  Specifically, this 
thesis focuses on children’s essentialist reasoning about such categories in 
Northern Ireland (NI) – a subject that has not previously been explored in the 
literature.  Given this particular context, religion categories are the main 
categories of interest in this research.  This first chapter of the literature 
review will discuss the different perspectives that scholars have taken on 
essentialism, before focusing on early work in this area on cognitive 
development, which examined children’s essentialist reasoning about the 
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natural world and artifacts, as well as considering challenges that 
psychological essentialism has faced. 
 
1.1.2. Theoretical underpinnings of essentialism 
In this section of the literature review, I will discuss the various 
theoretical approaches towards essentialism that researchers in psychology 
have taken.  However, in the interest of providing background to the concept, 
it should first be noted that the concept of essentialism has a longer tradition 
in philosophy and biological science than it does in psychology (see, Gelman, 
2003; Haslam, 1998; McQueen & McQueen, 2010).   
 
1.1.3. Background in Philosophy 
 
Essentialism has a long tradition in philosophy and can be traced back 
to philosophers such as Aristotle (see discussion, Matthews, 1990) and 
Locke (Locke, 1689/1975) in their theorising about the nature of entities in 
the world.  Essentialism received particular attention in the 1970s after Kripke 
(1980) and Putnam (1975) revisited Locke’s (1979) assertion that an essence 
is the underlying structure of a thing that causes it to be what it is (what 
Locke termed ‘real essence’).  Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975; 1988) 
added to this definition, sparking new debates, by maintaining that it is 
possible to go beyond Locke’s idea of a vague internal structure and actually 
discover the identity of a category’s essence, due to modern scientific 
advancements (e.g., the discovery of DNA).  They also treated the exact 
naming of things as an important issue, maintaining that a category name 
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should have the power to denote an entity and its properties in all possible 
worlds in which it could exist (i.e., a nominal and sortal view of essentialism). 
Definitions of essentialism continue to be a central debate in 
philosophy; scholars argue about whether it is possible to know what an 
essence is (e.g., Kripke, 1980; Lowe, 2006; Putnam, 1975), and whether it is 
necessary for our understanding of categories to know what it is (e.g., Lowe, 
2008; Naraniecki, 2014; Oderberg, 2007; Shalkowski, 2008).  Another central 
concern in this literature is the question of which categories possess an 
essence and which do not (i.e., Ellis, 2001; Hare, 1979; Kripke, 1980; Lowe, 
2006; Putnam 1975).   
Scholars such as Lowe (2006), Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975) 
believe that all classes of entities existing in the natural world (i.e., natural 
kinds1) possess an underlying essence, and some are even willing to extend 
this to social categories (e.g., Boyd, 1991; Pratten, 2012; van Brakel, 1998).  
Others such as Ellis (2001) are more conservative in their view and believe 
that category essences can only exist in the realms of chemistry and physics. 
This is because variation can be found within biological kinds (e.g., different 
types of birds), but changes to a chemical substance, such as H2O, 
transforms it into an entirely different kind (Stalnaker, 1979).   
Biological scientists have also taken this view (see, Mayr, 2001); many 
believe that the existence of a stable category essence is incompatible with 
                                                          
1 To clarify, the term ‘natural kinds’ in philosophy, biology and 
psychology refers to any living or non-living, biological entity that exists in the 
natural world – for example, a tiger, a tree, a rock, water (McQueen & 
McQueen, 2010).  In other words, natural kinds exist independent of the 





Darwin’s theory of evolution (Stalnaker, 1979), which posits continual change 
within species over time (others believe the two theories can be compatible if 
an essence is located in the behavioural properties of a species, not the 
genes, e.g., Devitt, 2008, Okasha, 2002; Sober, 1980).  
With regards to the social realm, some anti-essentialist philosophers 
object to the view that social groups can possess an essence because (for 
reviews see, Mallon, 2007; Pratten, 2012) groupings of humans are an 
arbitrary phenomenon (e.g., Harre & Madden, 1975) while others object to 
the application of an essentialist lens to the social world because they 
maintain it is harmful to view social groups in this way (e.g., Stone, 2004).    
Regardless of the position that various philosophers have taken on 
essentialism, the common themes running through their debates centre on 
the extent to which category essences really exist in the world, how useful it 
is for our understanding to think about categories in this way, and which 
categories it is sensible to view as possessing an essence.  In contrast to 
essentialist philosophers, psychologists are unconcerned about the question 
of whether essences tangibly exist in the world; rather they are interested in 
people’s belief that they do and the effect that this has on their reasoning and 
perception of the world (see Allport, 1954; Haslam, 1998; Medin & Ortony, 
1989).    
    
1.1.4. Emergence in Psychology 
In psychology, essentialism was first alluded to by social psychologist, 
Gordon Allport (1954), in his seminal work ‘The Nature of Prejudice’.   He 
pointed out how people often treat social categories as having an objective, 
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underlying reality.  An example he used was treating membership in the 
category ‘Jew’ as conferring members with a unique ‘Jewishness’ or essence 
that makes those people inherently members of that category.  The 
attribution of a category essence arises from the need for categorization; 
people need to create categories in order to reduce the complexity of the 
information about the world around them, and these categories support short-
cuts in thinking, such as inductive inference.  
Essentialism was alluded to again in 1989 by cognitive psychologists, 
Medin and Ortony (1989), who coined the term ‘psychological essentialism’.  
They used it to explain why individuals often privilege category information 
over perceptual similarity when judging the similarity of animals and non-
living things in cognitive tasks.  They maintained that when a category is 
strongly essentialised, individuals treat a shared essence as conferring 
greater similarity between two entities, than how similar they are in 
appearance.   
This position emerged from the failure of traditional theories of 
categorization to explain why children and adults do not always categorize on 
the basis of perceptual similarity (see Murphy, 2002 for a review of traditional 
theories). Traditional theories were based on the assumption that 
categorization of an object is based on its perceptual, surface characteristics 
(i.e., the classical view, prototype theory, exemplar theory).     
 The main issue with the traditional theories of categorization is the 
idea of having a checklist of necessary perceptual features to use for 
categorization, as this does not explain how we form the concepts of 
categories that we have.  For example, individuals distinguish between 
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flowers and weeds as separate categories, even though they are 
perceptually very similar – they have roots, stems, leaves, and some weeds 
even flower (e.g., Dandelion) – but we view them as conceptually distinct and 
this affects our actions; cultivating one and killing the other. 
Furthermore, when dealing with an atypical instance of a category, 
such as an animal like a whale that looks more like a fish than a mammal, 
children and adults correctly categorize it as a mammal, overriding 
perceptual similarity (e.g., Gelman & Markman, 1986).  This led to the 
emergence of the theory-based approach to categorization, which maintains 
that individuals do not rely only on surface features; they also have intuitive 
lay theories about what defines category membership, which guides their 
categorization and can be more salient than surface appearances (Medin, 
1989). 
This shift to a theory-based approach to categorization was influenced 
by the work of Susan Carey (1985).  Carey’s experiments on children’s naïve 
biology were the first to suggest that children hold lay theories about the 
natural world.  In her research, Carey (1985) explored how children aged 4 to 
10 years of age, reason about biology by giving children an inference task, 
and examining their projections of novel or unfamiliar properties from humans 
to animals, and from animals to humans and other creatures (such as 
insects).  The results were important because they showed that children were 
more willing to project from a human to other animals, than from animals to a 
human (with this tendency decreasing across childhood).  It seemed that 
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children’s reasoning centred around ‘human’ as the prototype2, even though 
a human and, for example, a dog, are both mammals and it would be 
reasonable to expect children to be as willing to project in either direction.  
This highlighted that children possess theories about the biological world, 
which inform their reasoning; it is not just adults who look beyond 
appearances.  Cognitive developmental psychologists believe that when 
children begin categorizing and reasoning about the world, they are already 
equipped with an innate, essentialist bias towards viewing certain categories 
as possessing an objective reality (Gelman, 2003, Keil, 1989).  In the next 
section, the possible origins of essentialist reasoning will be discussed 
further.     
 
1.1.5. Underpinnings of Psychological Essentialism 
A review of the psychological literature about the underpinnings of an 
essentialist mode of thinking reveals that there is no clear agreement 
between psychologists on what exactly essentialism is and how it arises (i.e., 
Cimpian & Salomon, 2014; Gelman, 2003; Keller, 2005; Bloom, 1996). 
The earliest research exploring psychological essentialism emerged in 
the domain of natural kinds (e.g., Gelman, 2003, Keil, 1989), which lends 
itself well to essentialisation because natural categories - such as flower or 
tiger - have richly clustered, biological properties that invite the perception of 
                                                          
2 However, it has since been shown that the ‘human-as-prototype’ 
phenomenon in young children’s naïve biology can be specific to urban 
samples.  The amount of exposure that children have to the natural world can 
influence their biological reasoning (e.g., see Medin, Waxman, Woodring & 
Washinawatok, 2010), with children living in rural areas, and being more 




a causal essence.  Other kinds, such as artifacts, which are man-made and 
not richly structured, do not lend themselves so readily to essentialisation, 
but it has been found that people do also apply an essentialist framework to 
reasoning about artifacts (Barton & Komatsu, 1989; Bloom, 1996; Gelman, 
1988; Keil 1989; Rothschild & Haslam, 2003).  The difference between them 
is that the essence of a natural kind tends to be seen as something innate 
and biological in nature, while the essence of an artifact, such as a chair or a 
famous painting, tends to be conceptualised in terms of the artifact’s function 
(e.g., Barton & Komatsu, 1989), the intention of the creator (e.g., Keil’s, 1989, 
transformation of a coffee pot into a bird feeder), or the artifact’s history (e.g., 
Bloom, 1996, an original Van Gogh is valued more than a replica).  Further to 
this, research has extended the study of essentialist reasoning beyond these 
domains to include reasoning about personality traits (Gelman, Heyman & 
Legare, 2007) and social categories (Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006; 
Rothschild & Haslam, 2003).  
 
1.1.6. Cognitive psychology: Domain theories 
In keeping with people’s tendency to essentialise biological kinds more 
strongly than other domains, theorists, such as Gil-White (2001), Atran 
(1998) and Barrett (2001), propose that essentialism is the product of an 
evolved ‘living-kinds’ module in the brain, which causes people to attend to 
regularities among living things in their environment, and gradually extends to 
other domains in the mind.  The adaptive function of this module is in 
supporting quick generalisations that could maximise the odds of survival – 
for example, Gil-White (2001) believes that the brain once processed racial 
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categories in the same way that it processed different species; to alert people 
to the fact that a newly encountered person or group is ‘different’ from them 
and may pose a threat.  
Other theorists, such as Keil (1994) and Leslie (1994), propose that 
psychological essentialism is not as specific as this; rather than emerging in 
a domain-specific way, essentialism is a domain-general mode of thinking 
that comes to be invoked differently within various domains, such as in 
biology, artifacts, and social categories.  
The main problem with these theories about the origins of essentialism 
is that they do not propose any mechanism as to how exactly an essentialist 
module or mode of thinking arises.  However, other perspectives in cognitive 
psychology do describe such a mechanism. 
 
1.1.7. Other cognitive perspectives 
In her work, Gelman (2003) argued against a domain perspective, and 
proposed that psychological essentialism is the by-product of at least five 
other cognitive processes working in conjunction.  These are: 1. The ability to 
distinguish between appearance and reality, leading to the search for 
nonobvious properties; 2. The tendency to make inductive inferences, thus 
assuming members of categories may share many commonalities; 3. The 
belief in causal determinism (that there is a cause for everything), leading to 
the search for causal properties; 4. Being able to track identity over time, 
which causes preoccupation with an entity’s origins; and 5. Deference to 
experts, leading to the acceptance of exceptions to the typical category 
‘rules’, as well as the acceptance of labels and the influence of culture. 
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These cognitive processes translate into the different aspects of 
essentialist thinking, causing people to view certain aspects of the world 
through an essentialist lens.  Gelman, Heyman and Legare (2007) explored 
the idea that essentialism is not a unitary construct, but is the result of 
different aspects of essentialist thinking converging across development.  
Gelman and colleagues conducted questionnaire studies with children and 
adults, exploring how different essentialist beliefs about psychological 
characteristics inter-correlate, and found that essentialist beliefs began to 
cohere at 9 years of age, and this was more pronounced in adulthood.    
An alternative view to the idea that essentialism consists of a number 
of different strands of thought that converge over development, is the theory 
that essentialism evolves from a bias towards inherence based reasoning.  
Cimpian and colleagues (Cimpian, 2015; Cimpian & Salomon, 2014) have 
put forward this view in which they propose that children and adults possess 
an ‘inherence heuristic’, which biases them towards automatically searching 
for internal properties to explain a pattern.  For example, girls like pink 
because they are female, and pink is a feminine colour.   
The authors theorise that this focus on inherent explanations may be a 
precursor to psychological essentialism because it motivates children to 
search for non-obvious, causal properties, innate potential, heritability, stable 
boundaries and inductive potential in categories.  To date, Cimpian and 
colleagues have explored this in research (i.e., Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014; 
Salomon & Cimpian, 2014) demonstrating children and adults’ preferences 
for inherent explanations for patterns over external explanations, finding that 
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a preference for inherence based reasoning in adults predicted their 
endorsement of essentialist beliefs.   
Similar to the theory that a preference for inherence based 
explanations may be the foundation of essentialist thinking, other theorists, 
such as Keller (2005) have claimed that beliefs in biological and social 
determinism (i.e., looking for inherent explanations, such as genes or culture) 
are the basis of essentialist reasoning about social categories.  
 
1.1.8. Social psychology: Biological determinism, social determinism 
and strategic essentialism 
Genetic (or biological) essentialism refers to the views advanced by 
Keller (2005) and Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) that psychological 
essentialism arises from people’s belief in genetic determinism (BGD); that 
the essence of who we are is pre-programmed in our genes.  This was later 
modified by Rangel and Keller (2011) to also include a belief in social 
determinism (BSD).  Namely, it was proposed that BGD and BSD constitute 
two independent (but moderately correlated, see Rangel & Keller, 2011) 
dimensions that can lead (to varying degrees depending on the category and 
properties in question) to an essentialist perception of social categories.   
 Using a number of questionnaire studies with adults, Keller (2005) and 
Rangel and Keller (2011) showed that BGD and BSD were associated with 
the endorsement of essentialist beliefs, stereotyping, prejudice and 
discriminatory attitudes.  Further to this, the authors also found that priming 
prejudice in adults who present as chronically prejudiced led to stronger 
essentialist beliefs and was associated with ideological motives, such as right 
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wing authoritarianism.  Thus, Keller shows that the relationship between 
essentialist beliefs and prejudice can be bi-directional.   
 When this relationship has run from prejudice to the strategic 
endorsement of essentialist beliefs (i.e., endorsing essentialist beliefs in 
order to maintain the status quo when under threat, as demonstrated in 
studies by Morton, Haslam, Postmes & Hornsey, 2009; Morton, Hornsey & 
Postmes, 2009), it has been referred to as ‘political essentialism’ (Stoler, 
1997) or ‘strategic essentialism’ (Morton et al., 2009a).  Stoler (1997) called 
this ‘political essentialism’ because she viewed it as a deliberate attempt by 
members of groups to endorse a naturalised view of social categories in 
order to serve a particular agenda.  When conducting research, it is important 
to be aware of the many different ways that researchers view essentialism 
because the perspective taken has implications for how it should be 
measured.  In the next section, I look at another conceptualisation of 
essentialism that, like Keller’s, also maintains there are two possible routes to 
perception through a social essentialist lens. 
 
1.1.9. Social psychology: Naturalness and entitativity     
Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst (2000) first provided empirical support 
for the theory (e.g., Rothbart & Taylor, 1992) that essentialism may not be a 
uni-dimensional construct.  Haslam et al. conducted a questionnaire study, 
asking adults to rate 40 social categories along nine aspects of essentialist 
beliefs.  They found that two main factors emerged, which they named 
‘natural kind-ness’ (i.e., how natural, discrete and unalterable a category is) 
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and ‘reification’ or entitativity3 (i.e., how entitative, unified, cohesive, 
homogeneous and informative a category is).  In their ratings of the 40 social 
categories, participants treated categories that seem more biological in 
origin, such as gender and race, as more natural, while categories such as 
sexual orientation and religion groups where rated higher in entitativity.  
Demoulin, Leyens and Yzerbyt (2006) also found these two factors from their 
research, and further demonstrated that people tend to attribute ‘natural kind-
ness’ to social categories that individuals are born into, while they attribute 
entitativity to social categories that individuals can choose to be members of.   
 These approaches show that essentialism is the result of more than 
one way of perceiving social categories.  This is important to note because 
even though two categories - for example, gender and occupation - may be 
equally essentialised, one may be essentialised due to the perception of 
naturalness and the other may be essentialised due to the perception of 
similarity and cohesion.  Furthermore, while researchers, such as Haslam 
and colleagues (2000), view essentialism as the result of naturalness or 
entitativity, others maintain that they are distinct concepts and essentialism is 
not necessarily the outcome (e.g., Hamilton, 2007; Hamilton, Sherman & 
Rodgers, 2004).  In other words, some researchers believe that essentialist 
thinking can lead to the perception of entitativity or naturalness, and the 
perception of entitativity and naturalness can lead to increased essentialist 
thinking.       
 
                                                          
3 Note that ‘entitativity’ is a term coined by Campbell (1958) to refer to 
the extent to which a social category is seen as a single entity; a unified, 




1.1.10. Conclusion: Underpinnings of psychological essentialism 
 
The main point highlighted in this section, exploring the possible 
underpinnings of psychological essentialism, is that there is no agreement 
between scholars on where essentialism comes from in the mind and how it 
comes to be applied so differently depending on the type of category 
reasoned about and the context that essentialist reasoning takes place in.  
Thus, it is important to consider how a researcher is defining essentialism 
and what aspects of it they claim to be measuring when examining research 
in the field.  As the current thesis is concerned primarily with the development 
of childhood essentialism, the next section will review what is already known 
about essentialism in childhood.  
  
1.2. Essentialism in children: Natural kinds 
In this section, I will consider how children’s essentialist reasoning about 
natural kinds and artifacts develop across childhood.  Natural kinds and 
artifact categories have been the focus of the earliest developmental 
research on essentialism, with attention to social categories emerging later.  
For this reason, I will focus on natural kinds and artifacts here, and will review 
work on social categories in the next chapter.  I will begin this section by 
looking at studies that have examined the inductive potential of essentialised 
categories for children.  I will then move on to research examining beliefs 
about the immutability and stability of essentialised categories, and I will 
conclude this part of the review by discussing studies focusing on beliefs 




1.2.1. Induction studies 
This section of the review will discuss inference studies that have 
examined children’s essentialist reasoning about natural and artifact kinds.  
In the literature, inductive inference has been treated as an index of 
essentialist reasoning, because research has found that essentialised 
categories are treated as a stronger basis for inference than categories that 
are not essentialised (see Gelman, 2003).  Inductive inference can be a 
measure of the assumption that a common essence exists, causally linking 
all members of the same category, and making it more likely that category 
members share many other surface and non-obvious commonalities.  Thus, 
membership in an essentialised category is treated as a more informative 
basis for inference than membership in a category that is not essentialised, 
or membership in a category that is essentialised to a lesser degree, (for 
example, artifact categories).  This has been found by research examining 
essentialist reasoning about natural kinds in comparison to artifacts (Gelman, 
2003).  Natural kinds appear to be essentialised more than artifacts because 
natural kinds – such as tigers – are richly structured categories with a 
biological basis, while artifacts – such as a teapot – are man-made and do 
not have a rich cluster of inter-connected properties that would support as 
many strong inferences.  The earliest induction studies with children 
examined artifacts, and natural kind categories - like animals, plants or 
minerals - which are assumed to have a biological basis and are discovered 
in nature (Gelman, 2003; McQueen & McQueen, 2010).   
Gelman and Markman (1986; 1987) conducted studies with 4 year old 
children, examining how strongly they essentialise natural kinds by using a 
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forced choice task to pit information about an entity’s category membership 
against conflicting perceptual information.  For example, children were 
presented with a target picture and two test pictures.  One test picture (for 
example, a flamingo) shared category membership with the target (for 
example, a blackbird) but was atypical in appearance, and one test picture 
(for example, a bat) did not share category membership with the target but 
was more similar to the target in surface appearance.  Thus, children were 
forced to decide whether shared category membership (i.e., ‘bird’), or 
similarity in surface appearance (i.e., small with wings), was more important 
in determining how likely it was that the target shares a property (e.g., ‘feeds 
its babies mashed up food) with each of the two test pictures.  The natural 
categories presented in this task were animate, for example, dolphins, or 
inanimate, for example, rocks.  The rationale behind this task was that if 
young children essentialise natural categories then they would find shared 
category membership more informative than perceptual similarity when 
drawing inferences.  Gelman and Markman (1986) found that children based 
their inferences on shared category membership rather than on surface 
appearance, 68% of the time, indicating that preschool children essentialise 
natural categories.   
This research also demonstrated the importance of category labels in 
aiding children’s inductive reasoning, with children responding at chance 
level when presented with no labels in the task or with coloured tabs.  Further 
to this, the researchers were able to rule out a label-matching strategy and 
demonstrate that children’s responses were based on the content of their 
categories when synonyms (e.g., rabbit and bunny) were used as labels 
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during the task.  Gelman and Markman (1986) also showed that the four year 
old children were capable of making sensible inferences about the categories 
they were presented with as they responded at chance when category 
membership and surface appearance had no link to the properties in 
question (for example, the property they were invited to project was the 
weight of the target animal).  Thus, children demonstrated that they consider 
whether properties are projectable or not when they make inferences. 
  Gelman and Markman (1987) pursued this research further by 
extending their findings to 3 year old preschool children, in addition to the 4 
year olds.  Their aim was to pin-point the age when children begin treating 
membership in natural kinds as indicative of deeper commonalities by 
examining a younger age group, which was possible by reducing the 
cognitive demands using a simpler task.  They replaced the forced choice 
triads by presenting children with one target picture and four test pictures, 
and inviting children to make an inference from the target to each of the four 
test pictures in turn, rather than asking them to choose between two 
competing test pictures when deciding whether to draw an inference.  Each 
test picture varied by how similar it was to the target.  For example, if the 
target was brown sugar, one test picture would be exactly the same (e.g., 
brown sugar), one would be similar in category but not appearance (e.g., 
sugar cubes), one would be similar in appearance but not category (e.g., 
brown sand), and one test picture would be completely dissimilar (e.g., 
wood).  Children were invited to project a property from the target (e.g., 
‘melts in water’) to each test picture one at a time; so children had the 
opportunity to project the property from the target to all four test pictures if 
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they wished to do so.  Thus, this task measured children’s absolute rather 
than their relative level of inference.  
 The essentialist findings of Gelman and Markman (1986) were 
replicated.  Four year old children still chose to make more category based 
inferences (60%) than appearance based inferences (22%), even when they 
did not have to choose between competing test information.  Furthermore, 
this finding extended to 3 year olds (i.e., category-based inferences were 
made 67% of the time).  In addition, when children were given labels without 
pictures they based most of their inferences on category membership, but 
when given pictures with no labels children made more inferences based on 
appearances than category information, more so for inanimate natural kinds 
than for animals.  This may have been because they were able to determine 
the category membership of animals from the pictures alone, and used 
surface appearances when presented with inanimate natural kinds whose 
identity may have been harder to discern.  These studies by Gelman and 
Markman (1986; 1987) showed thoroughly that children as young as three 
years of age have an essentialist bias when reasoning about the natural 
world. 
Gelman and Coley (1990) extended these findings further to two-and-
a-half year olds, using the same type of task as Gelman and Markman (1987) 
that removed the necessity of a forced choice.  The results of the task 
demonstrated that children as young as two and a half years old essentialise 
category membership, even when the category items they are essentialising 
are unfamiliar or atypical (e.g., a dodo as an atypical and unfamiliar bird).  Of 
particular interest in this paper, Gelman and Coley (1990) analysed each 
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child’s individual pattern of responses and classified them as particular 
responders: category based, appearance based, inconsistent, or response 
biased.  This analysis revealed that 6 out 11 children in the label condition 
were category based responders, 0 were appearance based responders, 3 
exhibited a response bias, and 2 were inconsistent.  This indicates that two-
and-a-half years of age is the lowest age limit in which children can be tested 
in this way, because when presented with labels, approximately half the 
children (5/11) do not reliably favour category information, indicating they do 
not consistently essentialise natural categories.    
 A number of other studies have also been conducted by Gelman (i.e., 
see, Gelman, 1988; 1989; 2003; 2013; Gelman & O’Reilly, 1988) examining 
children’s stronger essentialist reasoning about natural kinds in comparison 
to artifacts, how projectable different types of properties are to children, and 
the levels of categorisation that children prefer (i.e subordinate, basic or 
superordinate level).  These studies of early category based induction show 
that children have many constraints that guide them towards making 
appropriate and sensible inferences about the world (Gelman, 1988b).  
Research has shown that children are not solely driven by similarity of 
surface appearances when making categorization judgements, but look for 
deeper commonalities (i.e., Gelman, 2003; Medin, 1989).  It has also shown 
that category labels play an important role in children’s category based 
inductions (e.g., Gelman & Markman, 1986); children make more category 
based inferences in the presence of labels than without.  Labels promote 
inferences most at the basic level, and their role is not in aiding ‘picture 
matching’ but is more likely to be in helping children access their category 
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information, as shown by children’s continued bias towards category based 
induction when items are not given identical labels, for example, ‘bunny’ and 
‘rabbit’ (i.e., Gelman & Markman, 1986).  Thus, young children are not just 
captured by perceptual similarity, their inferences are also guided by the 
strength of their essentialist beliefs about natural categories (and to a lesser 
extent – artifact categories).  As the next section will show, studies of 
category based induction are not the only evidence of essentialism that has 
been found in childhood.   
  
1.2.2. Transformation studies 
In this part of the review I will discuss research that has focused on 
children’s essentialist reasoning about the stability and immutability of 
category boundaries.  Research about the essentialisation of natural kinds 
and artifacts has used transformation studies to examine essentialist beliefs 
about category boundaries (Gelman, 2003; Keil, 1989) (as well as using 
essentialism questionnaires with children, e.g., Diesendruck & Haber, 2009 – 
discussed in the next chapter due to its inclusion of social categories with 
natural kinds).  Frank Keil (1989) conducted a number of studies in this area, 
presenting children with scenarios involving a natural kind or artifact that 
undergoes a physical transformation, at a superficial level or a deeper 
biological level, and children were then asked to decide what the category 
membership of the animal was.  For example, a racoon that is superficially 
transformed into a skunk by: shaving and dying its fur, or by shaving it, dying 
it, and surgically implanting a smelly sac inside it, or by injecting an animal 
with the wrong medicine when it was a baby.  After presenting children with a 
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transformation, they then had to decide if the animal was a racoon or a 
skunk.  An example of an artifact transformation was altering a coffee pot to 
turn it into a bird feeder.     
 Keil (1989) found that when physical alterations were made to natural 
kinds - such as dying fur or performing surgery on an animal – 7 year old 
children and 9 year old children maintained that the essence of the animal 
had not changed and it retained its original category membership, with the 
strength of this conviction increasing between 7 and 9 years of age.  On the 
other-hand, the youngest children at 5 years of age did not appear to 
essentialise natural kinds and were willing to say that an animal’s category 
membership had changed.  This finding contrasts with the results of the 
inference studies previously described, indicating that children are strong 
essentialists at 5 years of age.  However, it is possible that different tasks 
aimed at measuring different aspects of essentialist reasoning would have 
different results, particularly when testing young children whose lay theories 
about biology and essentialism are continuing to develop.  As Gelman et al. 
(2007) showed, various strands of essentialist reasoning about personality 
traits do not appear to form a coherent construct before 9 years of age.  
Furthermore, essentialist reasoning in adulthood is not a unitary construct 
either, but is comprised of two factors (Haslam et al., 2000). 
 Keil (1989) explored further by developing scenarios that might be 
more sensitive to the developing theories of young children, and therefore 
able to reveal more subtle signs that 5 year olds believe categories have a 
fixed essence, using this type of task.  Keil (1989) theorised that younger 
children may have difficulty deciding which properties are central to a 
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category essence due to their lack of biological knowledge and so deem 
superficial and deeper changes to an animals properties as plausibly 
changing its categorisation.  To make the task easier, Keil presented children 
with additional scenarios in which an animal’s superficial and deeper 
properties were not altered, but instead the animal was said to be wearing a 
costume.  For example, a zebra wearing a horse costume, or a finch wearing 
a blue-bird costume.  When asked whether category membership had 
changed, all children, including the 5 year olds, showed essentialist 
reasoning by judging the animals’ category membership to have remained 
the same.   
Keil (1989) was also able to demonstrate essentialist reasoning about 
category boundaries with 5 year olds when he asked them to judge 
transformations that crossed ontological category boundaries.  For example, 
transforming a toy bird into a real bird by giving it feathers and a beak, and 
doing an operation to put a machine inside it to make it chirp and fly.  All 
children resisted the idea that the toy bird had become a real bird.  Keil 
interpreted this as evidence that 5 year old children are not simply basing 
their beliefs on surface characteristics.  The fact that they essentialised 
category membership at the ontological level suggests that children as young 
as 5 years do possess some intuition about biological categories that 
prevents them from viewing transformations across ontological boundaries as 
possible.   
This is an important finding because it indicates that developmental 
changes in children’s reasoning about the immutability and stability of 
category membership is not simply a change from perceptual reasoning to 
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the development of deeper reasoning about the nature of categories.  The 
beginnings of essentialist reasoning about category boundaries are present 
at 5 years of age in their thinking.  With regards to artifact categories, all 
three age groups reported that transformations to objects changed their 
category membership.  This does not necessarily mean that children did not 
view artifacts as containing an essence, rather it may indicate that children 
viewed the intention of the creator in transforming the object into something 
else to be the essence of the object.  Therefore, if a person wants to use a 
coffee pot as a bird feeder, then the coffee pot becomes a bird feeder. 
  This collection of experiments conducted by Keil (1989) suggests that 
5 year olds do have intuitive theories about the biological world, but at this 
age they do not have a fully developed theory about which properties are 
central and causally related to the essence of biological categories.  This 
may be responsible for impeding the development of 5 year old children’s 
essentialist beliefs about the discreteness and inalterability of category 
membership for natural kinds.  Overall, the developmental studies conducted 
by Keil (1989) were important in demonstrating that essentialist beliefs about 
the immutability and stability of natural kinds in transformation scenarios are 
clearly evident by 7 years of age, and become stronger by 9 years of age.   
In addition to Keil’s (1989) seminal work, Gelman and Wellman (1991) 
also examined children’s reasoning about the nature of categories when they 
investigated how well 3-5 year olds understand that there can be a huge 
difference between surface appearance and reality; an important ability for 
understanding transformation scenarios.  Gelman and Wellman (1991) found 
that preschool children were able to correctly distinguish between surface 
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appearance and insides - judging an orange balloon as similar in appearance 
to an orange, and judging a lemon as internally similar to an orange.  This 
distinction was more pronounced for 4 year olds than 3 year olds, and similar 
to the findings of Gelman and Markman (1986; 1987) and Keil’s (1989) 
costume scenario, demonstrates that young children understand that 
discrepancies between appearance and reality can exist. 
As well as this, Gelman and Wellman (1991) also presented pre-
schoolers with transformation scenarios different to those presented by Keil, 
in which 4 and 5 year olds were asked to judge whether an entity had 
changed category membership, without having to determine what it had 
changed into.  For example, children were presented with a picture of a dog 
and were told that its fur was removed, or its insides were removed.  Children 
were asked whether the animal was still a dog, and whether it could bark.  
This study found that children privileged insides, judging the identity, function 
or behaviour of a dog as changed if its insides were removed, but not when 
the outsides were removed (moreover, for artifacts such as a fridge, children 
correctly judged that a fridge is not changed by removing food from it).   
This research is significant because it showed that 4-5 year old 
children are capable of giving stronger essentialist responses when 
reasoning about category boundaries than Keil (1989) thought.  Gelman and 
Wellman (1991) found that preschool children judged superficial 
transformations to an animal, such as removing fur, to be non-essential to 
category membership, while preschool children in Keil’s studies judged 
superficial transformations (but not a ‘costume’) as having the potential to 
alter category membership.  Thus, when presented with a transformation that 
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did not require children to judge what the new category membership of an 
entity was, young children showed stronger evidence of essentialist 
reasoning.   
In the following section, I will now turn to another index of essentialist 
thinking – children’s essentialist reasoning about the heritability and innate 
potential of membership in natural categories.  
  
1.2.3. Innate potential and heritability studies 
In the final part of this section on essentialism in childhood, I will 
discuss a series of experiments displaying evidence that young children treat 
membership in a natural category as heritable, and they treat category 
membership as predictive of certain properties that are inherent to category 
group membership (for example, a Dalmatian puppy is not born with spots, it 
develops them over time).  This belief that category membership is innate is 
another major aspect of essentialist reasoning.  
Gelman and Wellman (1991) investigated children’s reasoning about 
the heritability and innate potential of category membership in natural kinds.  
Children aged 4 and 5 years were presented with ‘switched at birth’ 
scenarios, requiring them to consider how an animal would develop if it was 
raised by animals with membership in a different category - for example, a 
kangaroo raised by goats.  Children were asked to identify the animals and 
consider what physical and behavioural characteristics the baby animal 
would develop over time - for example, would the infant kangaroo have a 
pouch or no pouch when it grew up, and would it hop or be good at climbing.  
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Children, therefore, had to decide whether the animal’s original category 
membership would determine its physical and behavioural characteristics, or 
whether the infant’s environment and ‘adoptive parents’ had the potential to 
change these.  The results showed that 4 and 5 year old children held 
essentialist beliefs about the heritability and innate potential of category 
membership in this research - children believed that a baby kangaroo would 
grow up to have a pouch and hop, even if it was raised by goats.   
 In further tasks exploring children’s understanding of innate potential, 
Gelman and Wellman (1991) presented children with only pictures of infant 
animals and asked them what physical and behavioural characteristics the 
baby animal would have.  The aim of this task was to provide evidence that 
children essentialise natural categories by examining whether children realise 
that as an infant, an animal does not possess all of the characteristics that it 
would have as an adult.  This would show that children in the previous study 
were not simply reporting the characteristics that they knew were associated 
with a category label, such as ‘cow’.   
The results showed that 4 and 5 year old children believed that a baby 
animal would possess the behavioural characteristics of its kind in infancy 
(for example, a cow goes ‘moo’) 87% of the time, while physical 
characteristics of its kind (for example, a cow has a straight tail) were 
attributed 40% of the time.  This lower endorsement of physical traits in 
comparison to behavioural traits (and in comparison to the children’s higher 
endorsement of physical traits for adult animals, i.e., 67%) is interesting, as it 
indicates that children realise that there are significant differences between 
an infant animal and a mature animal, while also showing that children hold 
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essentialist beliefs about heritability and innate potential.  This result was 
further supported by control questions about characteristics that all animals 
would have (such as eyes) and characteristics that it would be impossible for 
a particular animal to ever have (such as fins, if reasoning about a cow or a 
kangaroo).  Children responded to the control questions correctly, showing 
that 4 and 5 year olds were not employing a strategy of describing 
characteristics they associated with category labels, rather they 
demonstrated an understanding that an animal’s category membership 
confers the innate potential to one day develop all of the characteristics 
essential to its kind. 
 The final study conducted in this series of experiments examined 
children’s essentialist reasoning about the innate potential of seeds.  Gelman 
and Wellman (1991) carried out this experiment to provide further support for 
their assertion that children do not just report characteristics associated with 
a category label in these studies.  To do this, the authors presented children 
with scenarios in which the initial state of an entity (e.g., a seed) was 
extremely different in appearance and in its label from the end state once it 
reached maturity (e.g., a tree).  Children were presented with ‘switched-at-
birth’ scenarios in which the seed from one plant or fruit was planted 
alongside different seeds in a pot – for example, seeds from an apple planted 
in a flower pot.  It was found that older 4 year old children responded in an 
essentialist manner, correctly predicting that the seed would grow into an 
apple tree if planted with flower seeds.  However, some of the younger 4 year 
olds had more difficulty with this task, with 5 out of 12 children making 
incorrect responses and 7 out 12 children responding in an essentialist 
50 
 
manner on the basis of innate potential.  Despite the increased difficulty that 
some of the younger 4 year olds had with this study, overall, it provided a 
stronger test of preschool children’s essentialist reasoning about the innate 
potential of natural kinds. 
To conclude this section, the key studies of early childhood 
essentialism reviewed in this chapter show that young children exhibit an 
essentialist bias in their reasoning about certain types of categories (i.e., 
natural kinds and artifacts).  As essentialist beliefs cannot be measured 
directly, obtaining evidence of essentialist beliefs is dependent on 
experiments being sensitive enough to tap into these beliefs in very young 
children.  The evidence so far suggests that children of at least 4 years of 
age (if not younger in some cases, i.e., Gelman & Coley, 1990), are guided 
by an essentialist framework in their reasoning about natural categories.  
Studies examining beliefs about inductive potential, the immutability and 
stability of category boundaries, and heritability and innate potential, have 
provided an index of essentialism in childhood.  Moving on to the last section 
in this chapter of the literature review, I will discuss criticisms that have been 
faced by essentialism, before the second chapter which will focus on social 
essentialism in childhood.   
 
1.3. Challenges to Psychological essentialism 
 1.3.1. Feature-Based Categorization and Induction 
Like any area of research, studies of psychological essentialism have 
not existed without criticism.  The main challenge that psychological 
essentialism in childhood has faced has come from proponents of feature-
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based categorization and induction, Vladimir Sloutsky and colleagues (e.g., 
Sloutsky, 2003; Sloutsky & Lo, 1999; Sloutsky, Lo & Fisher, 2001; Godwin & 
Fisher, 2015), who maintain that children are not capable of category-based 
induction until at least 7 years of age.  Thus, an innate, essentialist bias does 
not operate on children’s reasoning in early childhood and, according to 
Sloutsky and colleagues, does not exist at all (see Sloutsky, 2003; Sloutsky & 
Lo, 1999; Sloutsky, et al., 2001).  Instead the authors proposed that children 
perform induction using the perceptual features of an object or entity, and 
that labels contribute to the perception of similarity because of their auditory 
properties rather than because of their semantic properties.  In a number of 
studies, Sloutsky et al. claim to show that children do not perform category 
based induction until at least 7, if not 9, years of age, but rely on perceptual 
similarity when making generalisations (i.e., Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005; 
Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004a; 2004b; 2012; Sloutsky, Kloos & Fisher, 2007; 
Sloutsky & Lo, 1999; Sloutsky et al., 2001).          
However, there are a number of issues with the experiments that 
Sloutsky and colleagues cite as evidence that young children do not 
essentialise categories.  The stimuli that Sloutsky et al. used in their 
inference studies are either artificial categories (e.g., an alien called ‘Bala’, a 
creature called a ‘flurp’) (Sloutsky & Lo, 1999; Sloutsky et al., 2001; Sloutsky 
et al., 2007) or novel pictures featuring two animals that have been morphed 
together and given novel (e.g., ‘lolo’, ‘tippy’) or familiar labels (e.g., cat or 
dog) (Sloutsky et al., 2001; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2012).  As the entities that 
children were presented with had no conceptual grounding or richly clustered 
properties like a natural kind would, it seems reasonable that 4-5 year old 
52 
 
children would attend to the perceptual properties of the stimuli - especially in 
a situation where, for example, a bunch of grapes or a dog is given a novel 
label that conflicts with children’s existing knowledge, or when pictures of a 
cat and a dog have been morphed together and presented to children with 
familiar labels that conflict with what they are seeing.   
Moreover, Noles and Gelman (2012b) showed that the order in which 
4 year old children were presented with the stimuli in these triads elicited 
different patterns of responding.  When children were presented with three 
pictures that were identical in appearance, but only two shared the same 
label (as Sloutsky et al. have), children rely on label matching rather than 
visual information in induction because it seems they are unsure what to 
focus their attention on.  When they are not presented with a triad of identical 
pictures to begin with, they rely on the similarity between visual features 
rather than the label in induction.  This study would suggest that children find 
the stimuli presented by Sloutsky and colleagues confusing, and adopt a 
strategy of attending to whichever aspect of the stimuli their attention has 
been focused on.  
Further to this, the claim by Sloutsky and colleagues that labels 
possess greater perceptual weight than a single visual feature for children 
(see Sloutsky & Napolitano, 2003; 2004) was challenged by Noles and 
Gelman (2012a).  Noles and Gelman showed that there were issues with 
Sloutsky et al.’s studies of auditory dominance.  Mainly, Noles and Gelman 
suggested that children’s preference for auditory cues over visual stimuli was 
caused by the visual stimuli being more complex to process than the auditory 
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tones (e.g., children were presented with pictures of landscapes, Sloutsky & 
Napolitano, 2004).  By presenting children with shapes that only varied by 
colour depth, and tones that only varied in pitch, Noles and Gelman showed 
that children preferred visual information, and auditory information was 
attended to more when the visual stimuli was more difficult to discriminate 
between (i.e., the shapes were almost the same colour depth).   
 In addition to this, Wilburn and Feeney (2008) also found evidence 
that contradicts Sloutsky and colleagues claims that children younger than 7 
years of age do not perform category based induction.  Sloutsky and Fisher 
(see Fisher & Sloutsky, 2005; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004b) conducted tests of 
children’s recognition memory for stimuli following categorization and 
induction tasks, and interpreted children’s more accurate recognition of 
stimuli they had been presented with, in comparison to adults, as evidence 
that children attend to perceptual features more closely than adults as a 
result of feature-based induction.  However, Wilburn and Feeney (2008) 
demonstrated that children’s better recognition memory was due to their 
tendency to spend longer looking at the pictures, and that when a time limit of 
250ms was placed on both children and adults’ exposure to the stimuli, 
children’s recognition accuracy dropped to the level of adults’, but their 
reasoning accuracy was unimpaired. 
 Given the challenges that Sloutsky and colleagues (see also, Gelman 
& Davidson, 2013; Noles & Danovitch, 2015) have faced in providing 
evidence to support their model of feature-based induction in early childhood 
- as well as the implausibility of claims that children perform bottom-up 
induction without activating conceptual knowledge, or perform top-down 
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induction without also considering perceptual features - the authors have now 
amended their model (i.e., Fisher, Godwin & Matlen, 2015a; Fisher, Godwin, 
Matlen & Unger, 2015b; Godwin & Fisher, 2015) to incorporate the use of 
semantic knowledge in the induction process.     
 
 1.3.2. Other knowledge-based approaches. 
 Fisher, Sloutsky and colleagues (Fisher et al., 2015a; 2015b; Godwin 
& Fisher, 2015; Sloutsky, Deng, Fisher & Kloos, 2015) have recently 
proposed a new model of induction in which perceptual features and 
semantic knowledge both operate on children’s generalisations.  Fisher et al. 
propose that induction in early childhood is based on perceptual features, but 
over the course of development these features become organised into 
taxonomies that are also available to children when they make 
generalisations.  The authors call this representational similarity, in which 
children are able to compare the features of an entity to exemplars that they 
have stored in memory, and this gives rise to inferences that appear to be 
category-based, but in reality induction is still based on comparing perceptual 
features to others stored in semantic memory, which are activated by the 
category label.  Fisher and colleagues (Fisher et al., 2015a; 2015b; Godwin & 
Fisher, 2015; Sloutsky, Deng, Fisher & Kloos, 2015) still claim to show that it 
is not until 7 years of age that children’s inferences are truly category-based, 
as by this age they have fully established taxonomic relations between 
categories, which can only happen once children have built category 
knowledge through direct experience with categories, or indirectly through 
books, television, or other such mediums.   
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This model is quite similar to Sloman’s (1993) feature-based model of 
induction, which proposes that semantic knowledge is retrieved from memory 
during induction, and this knowledge involves not only physical features (e.g., 
has a beak and wings), but also other types of features, such as information 
about habitat and diet (e.g., lives in a nest and eats worms).  It is also not 
unlike Osherson’s (Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez & Shafir, 1990) similarity-
coverage model, which proposes that induction is the result of comparing the 
perceptual similarities between two entities, as well as retrieving semantic 
knowledge about categories in an effort to find a category that they both can 
be sufficiently grouped by.  Thus, Fisher and colleagues do not seem to 
contribute anything new with their model that previous authors have not 
already proposed. 
Furthermore, while the development of children’s category knowledge 
and level of expertise (via direct experience with natural kinds and objects, as 
well as indirectly through schooling and television etc) undoubtedly has an 
impact on their reasoning about categories (e.g., differences in children’s 
reasoning about biology depending on whether they live in urban or rural 
areas of the US, i.e., Medin et al., 2010, or between different cultures, i.e., 
Lopez, Atran, Coley, Medin & Smith, 1997) as the above models suggest, the 
development of taxonomies and semantic knowledge still does not explain 
why children are clearly motivated to acquire category knowledge (see 
Cimpian, 2016; Greif, Kelmer-Nelson, Keil & Gutierrez, 2006) and use 
categories from as young as 2 years of age (Gelman, 2003; Graham, Nayer 
& Gelman, 2011).   
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Studies examining generic language production (i.e., noun phrases 
that refer to categories or kinds as a whole) in early childhood show that 
children as young as 2 years of age universally produce generic language 
both spontaneously (e.g., Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka & Flukes, 2008; Goldin-
Meadow, Gelman & Mylander, 2005; Pappas & Gelman, 1998) and in 
discussions led by their parents about toys or story books, and they produce 
more generic language – and generic questions (i.e., Gelman et al., 2008) - 
about animals than artifacts.  This shows that children have the ability to 
reason about categories in the abstract well before 7 years of age, and it also 
shows that children are motivated to learn about categories - particularly 
natural kinds.   
In addition to this, studies by Cimpian and colleagues (e.g., Cimpian & 
Erikson, 2012; Sutherland, Cimpian, Leslie & Gelman, 2015) found that 
young children have a superior memory for category information that has 
been presented to them using generic language, suggesting that they are 
more interested in attending to information that is presented to them as 
referring to an entire category compared to an individual.  Research by 
Gelman, Rhodes and colleagues has also demonstrated a link between 
generic language production and essentialist beliefs (e.g., Cimpian & 
Markman, 2011; Gelman & Heyman, 1999; Rhodes, Leslie & Tworek, 2012), 
showing that the presentation of generic information about categories either 
leads to or exacerbates essentialist beliefs about categories, and holding 
essentialist beliefs about categories leads to the production of more generic 
language about them.    
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Another alternative to psychological essentialism that has been put 
forward is Strevens’ (2000) minimal hypothesis.  Strevens put forward the 
idea that children’s category-based responses in Gelman’s induction studies 
(e.g., Gelman & Markman, 1986; 1987) and Keil’s transformation studies 
(mostly 7 years of age plus, Keil, 1989) are not the product of an essentialist 
bias but the result of children attending to K-Laws, which are causal links that 
children track between natural kinds and their observable properties (e.g., 
tigers have stripes and claws, and they roar – and these properties are 
causally related to being a tiger).   This is quite similar to computational 
models of categorization and induction (e.g., McClleland & Rogers, 2003), 
which maintain that categories are formed by tracking and storing information 
about the statistical regularities observed between a category and its 
properties (and between categories within taxonomies), and also has the 
same issue of how children decide which properties are central to category 
membership and which are not if there is no proposed mechanism of 
constraint - such as the assumption of a category essence that some 
properties, but not others, are causally related to (i.e., Medin & Ortony, 
1989).   
In addition to Strevens’ (2000) minimal hypothesis lacking a 
mechanism of constraint, it also does not account for children’s 
essentialisation of categories that are not natural kinds, such as artifacts 
(which are essentialised by their intended function rather than their physical 
properties, e.g., Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Bloom, 2000; Keil, 1989) and 
personal belongings (e.g., a child’s teddy bear), or the belongings of a 
celebrity, which possess no rational basis for holding more value than similar 
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objects not owned by a celebrity (e.g., Gelman, 2013; Gelman, Frazier, 
Noles, Manczak & Stillwell, 2015).  It is possible that K-Laws, and similarly 
the inherence heuristic (i.e., Cimpian & Salomon, 2014), may be precursors 
to essentialist reasoning.  It has been demonstrated that psychological 
essentialism is not a uni-dimensional construct (e.g., Haslam et al., 2000), 
but consists of a number of interrelated strands of thought, which form at 
least two main underlying dimensions.  It has also been theorised that an 
essentialist bias may emerge in childhood due to the convergence of a 
number of different cognitive abilities across development (i.e., Gelman, 
2003) that do not seem to fully cohere until about 9 years of age (Gelman et 
al., 2007).  Thus, K-Laws and the inherence heuristic may represent two of 
the mechanisms by which an essentialist bias begins to emerge in early 
childhood, and correspond to essentialist beliefs about natural kinds 
possessing a rich cluster of causally related properties, as well as beliefs 
about the innate potential of category membership and the intuition that not 
all meaningful category properties are directly observable.     
 In conclusion to this section, the developmental literature clearly 
shows that children engage in category based reasoning before the age of 7, 
and in some cases are capable of doing so from as early as 2-3 years of age 
(e.g., Gelman & Coley, 1990; Gelman & Markman, 1987; Graham et al., 
2011).  Children pay particular attention to category information (e.g., 
Gelman et al., 2008) and as this tendency emerges early in childhood, this 
would suggest that children are driven by an early emerging bias to acquire 
category knowledge and use categories in their reasoning.  It seems likely 
that children use both perceptual features and conceptual knowledge when 
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performing categorization and induction, as perceptual features are usually 
not at odds with category membership.  It remains to be seen how future 
research in this area will determine under which conditions children largely 
prefer the feature-based or category-based route to induction.   
 
1.4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter on psychological essentialism has discussed the 
emergence of the concept of essentialism within psychology and it has 
looked at the evidence suggesting that an essentialist bias operates on 
children’s reasoning early in childhood.  The research has shown that by at 
least 4 years of age, children hold essentialist beliefs about natural kinds and 
artifacts (Gelman, 2003), and this has been demonstrated by studies of the 
inductive potential of categories, the stability of categories, and the innate 
potential and heritability of categories.  Having reviewed the developmental 
literature on essentialist reasoning about natural kind and artifact categories, 
the next chapter in this thesis will now turn to the literature examining the 













This chapter focuses on the development of social essentialism in childhood.  
As the previous chapter showed, young children display evidence of 
essentialist reasoning about natural kinds and artifact categories from at least 
4 years of age on a variety of tasks (Gelman, 2003).  From this research, 
interest has grown in how children might apply an essentialist framework to 
reasoning about social categories across development (e.g., Birnbaum, 
Deeb, Segall, Ben-Eliyahu & Diesendruck, 2010; Hirschfeld, 1995; 1996; 
Taylor, 1996).  This is because it constitutes one possible cognitive source of 
stereotyping and prejudice, as a number of adult studies (i.e., Leyens et al., 
2003; Prentice & Miller, 2007), and more recently child studies (Diesendruck 
& Menahem, 2013; Pauker et al., 2010; Pauker, Xu, Williams & Biddle, 2016; 
Segall et al., 2015), have found.  The aim of this chapter is to review 
developmental studies of social essentialism and outline the rationale for 
exploring the developmental of social essentialism in Northern Ireland. 
 
2.2. Essentialised social categories: Developmental studies 
A number of studies have found that children essentialise a range of social 
categories, including gender, race and ethnicity (e.g., Diesendruck & ha Levi, 
2006; Gelman, Colman & Maccoby, 1986; Hirschfeld, 1995; 1996; Taylor, 
1996).  However, unlike the pattern of an early emerging essentialist bias that 
is found in young children’s reasoning about natural kinds (Gelman, 2003),  
essentialist reasoning about social categories varies widely across different 
cultural and social contexts (e.g., Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz et al., 2013; 
Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).  The reason for this may be because researchers 
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have used different tasks to measure essentialism, so there has been no 
standardisation in the approaches that scholars have taken across cultural 
contexts (e.g., del Rio & Strasser, 2011; Kim, 2013).  On the other hand, it 
may reflect the impact that different cultural input can have on the 
development of children’s reasoning about particular social categories 
(Kinzler, Shutts & Correll, 2010).  The next section of this review will discuss 
these early studies of social essentialism in childhood, followed by more 
recent work in this area. 
 
2.2.1. Early studies  
One of the earliest studies of social essentialism was conducted by 
Gelman, Collman & Maccoby (1986), who examined the gender-based 
inferences of 4-5 and 7-9 year old children.  Using a forced choice inference 
task, children were presented with a target picture (e.g., a male with long 
hair) that shared gender category membership with one test picture (e.g., a 
male with short hair), but was perceptually more similar to another test 
picture (e.g., a girl with long hair).  Children were asked to project a novel 
biological property (e.g., has andro in their blood) from the target to one of 
the two test pictures.  It was found that 4-9 year old children showed 
evidence of essentialist thinking about gender categories; they preferred to 
draw inferences on the basis of shared gender category membership rather 
than on the basis of similar physical appearance.   
 Further to this, Taylor (1996) examined children’s essentialist beliefs 
about the innate potential and heritability of gender category membership.  
Children aged 4-10 years participated in a switched-at-birth task, in which 
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they were presented with scenarios about a male or female infant being 
raised in isolation by members of the same or opposite gender.  Essentialist 
beliefs were probed by asking children to consider what physical properties 
(e.g., ‘has a boy’s body’, or ‘grows up to be a mommy’) and behavioural 
properties (e.g., ‘likes to play with dolls’, ‘likes to play football’, ‘has short 
hair’) they would expect the infant to display when they reach 10 years of 
age. 
 Results showed that all children held essentialist beliefs about the 
biological properties of gender; regardless of the environment that the infants 
were raised in, it was deemed that infants would possess the biological 
properties consistent with their gender.  In contrast, children did not 
essentialise the behavioural properties associated with gender at 4 and 10 
years of age; they treated properties such as toy and clothing preferences as 
flexible and dependent on the environment that the infants were raised in.  
Meanwhile, 5 and 8 year olds essentialised the behavioural properties 
typically associated with gender by treating them as determined by gender 
category membership.  These results would suggest an increase in children’s 
tendency to essentialise gender group membership across middle childhood, 
followed by a decline at 9-10 years of age.  A more recent replication by 
Taylor, Rhodes and Gelman (2009) also showed that 5-6 year olds 
essentialise the biological and behavioural properties of gender, while 10 
year olds showed more flexibility in treating the behavioural properties 
associated with gender as amenable to environmental influence.  Thus, these 
studies by Taylor and colleagues highlight children’s tendency to treat gender 
and its associated properties as highly natural. 
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Another noteworthy study of social essentialism in the early literature 
is Hirschfeld’s (1995; 1996) studies of race.  In a number of studies 
Hirschfeld (1995; 1996) examined children’s judgements about the salience, 
innate potential and the heritability of racial categories in comparison to 
occupation and body build.  In this research, 3-7 year old children were 
presented with forced choice scenarios in which two test pictures each 
shared membership of a different category with a target picture (e.g., a child 
that was white and of large body build, a child that was black and of small 
body build, and a target picture of an adult who was white and of small body 
build).  Depending on the condition that children were in, they were asked to 
decide: which test picture was most similar to the target picture, which test 
picture was the adult when they were a child (examining stability), or which 
test picture was the child of the adult (examining heritability).  Moreover, 
children were given switched-at-birth scenarios in which a child of one race 
had been raised by parents of a different race and children were asked to 
identify how the child would look at 10 years of age using test pictures 
(examining innate potential).  The findings demonstrated that 3-7 year old 
children in these studies treated race as more salient, stable, heritable and 
innate than occupation or body build.  
The pattern that these early studies show is one of an early emerging 
bias towards the essentialisation of gender and race, which seems to be 
strong across early and middle childhood.  However, one issue with this 
picture is that these studies were all conducted with children in the USA with 
regards to reasoning about gender and race, and so this research only 
provides evidence of social essentialism about these categories in American 
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children.  As interest in other social categories in a wider range of social and 
cultural contexts has grown, the emerging picture of the development of 
social essentialism is more complex than it initially appeared.  The following 
section will examine more recent research in this field.  
 
2.2.2. More Recent Research  
A number of studies around the globe have now examined essentialist 
thinking about social categories.  This literature is narrow in scope, lacks 
standardisation in methodological approach across different contexts (e.g., 
Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009), and to begin with 
was mostly conducted with adult participants.  While the current section 
focuses on the growing number of studies that have now been conducted 
with children in different cultural contexts, it is first worth mentioning that adult 
studies have documented strong essentialist reasoning about a number of 
social categories across different contexts.  For example, strong ethnic 
essentialism has been found among adults in Mongolia (Gil-White, 2001) and 
adults in Japan (Tsukamoto, Enright & Karasawa, 2013).  Ethnic and gender 
essentialism have been found among adults in Australia (Keller, 2005; 
Morton et al., 2009a; 2009b) and India (Mahalingam, 2003; Mahalingam, 
Haritatos & Jackson, 2007; Mahalingam & Rodriguez, 2006), as well as 
about a range of other social categories (Haslam et al., 2000; Haslam & 
Levy, 2006; Haslam, Rothschild & Ernst, 2002).   
It is clear from these studies that essentialisation of particular social 
categories is influenced by the social and cultural contexts that people live in, 
and this has also become increasingly clear from the studies of social 
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essentialism in childhood.  For example, in Israel  (Birnbaum et al., 2010; 
Deeb, Segall, Birnbaum, Ben-Eliyahu & Diesendruck, 2011; Diesendruck, 
Birnbaum, Deeb & Segall, 2013; Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz, Rhodes, 
Gelman & Neumark, 2013; Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006; Diesendruck & 
Haber, 2009; Diesendruck & Menahem, 2015; Segall, Birnbaum, Deeb & 
Diesendruck, 2014) a large body of work has shown that ethnicity (which has 
enormous ethno-political significance in Israel) is the most strongly 
essentialised social category among young children (particularly for Orthodox 
Jewish children), and across development the strength of children’s ethnic 
essentialism appears to decline, with adults (at the end point of development) 
showing a preference for information about psychological traits over social 
categories (this body of research will be discussed further in Section 2.1.4.).  
In Chile - a country where there is a wide socio-economic gap 
between the rich and poor- del Rio and Strasser (2011) explored 5 year old 
children’s essentialist reasoning about poverty as a social category (del Rio & 
Strasser, 2011).  Using more than one measure of essentialism, this 
research demonstrated that 5 year olds displayed essentialist beliefs about 
the inductive potential, innate potential and heritability of poverty.  In contrast, 
similar research in Colombia with 5-7 year old children did not find strong 
essentialist beliefs about poverty (Amar, Abello, Llanos, Martinez Gonzalez, 
Monroy Agamez, Cortes Pena, Crespo Romero, 2015).  Amar et al. (2015) 
found that Colombian children – particularly the 7 year olds – viewed poverty 
as a result of people’s circumstances and poor access to resources, rather 
than as a heritable, stable and informative social category.  Even though 
Colombia is a country, like Chile, where the gap between rich and poor is 
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extremely wide (Amar et al., 2015; del Rio & Strasser, 2011), the different 
findings from the two regions might reflect differences in what adults have 
come to believe about poverty, and perhaps have transmitted to their 
children4.  As these studies did not examine parental input this remains to be 
seen in future research in South America. 
As well as these studies in South America, research has also been 
conducted in South Africa (i.e., Giles et al., 2008) where it has been found 
that children hold strong essentialist beliefs about aggression in a country 
that has experienced high levels of conflict and violence.    In South Korea – 
a collectivist society – Kim (2013) also explored children’s essentialist 
reasoning about personality traits and found that South Korean children 
display a decline in essentialist reasoning about personality traits from 9 to 
11 years of age, whereas American children in a study previously conducted 
by Gelman and colleagues (2007) found an increase in the essentialisation of 
personality traits across this age range. 
Further research in the US (since the work of Taylor (1996) and 
Hirschfeld (1995; 1996)) has continued to examine essentialist beliefs about 
gender and race.  Studies have shown that while gender essentialism 
emerges early at around 4 years of age, race essentialism is not always 
evident in early childhood (i.e., Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Rhodes & Gelman, 
                                                          
4 As mentioned in Chapter 1, adults’ essentialist beliefs about certain 
categories, such as ethnicity or gender, have been found to vary with their 
ideological motivations in relation to these categories, or their position in the 
social hierarchy in relation to these categories (Morton et al, 2009a; 2009b; 
Mahalingam, 2003).  Perhaps, poor people in Chile feel better about their 
status if they believe it is predetermined and cannot change, while poor 
people in Colombia may feel better about their status if they believe they can 




2009).  The developmental trajectory of race and gender essentialism can 
vary depending on the social or cultural context of the sample.  Furthermore, 
research has also found that language is strongly essentialised by US 
children (e.g., Byers, Heinlein & Garcia, 2014; Kinzler & Dautel, 2012).        
It is clear from these studies that the developmental trajectory of social 
essentialism in childhood is strongly influenced by the child’s cultural and 
social context.  In the next section, I will discuss this in greater detail.   
 
2.2.3. The effect of different social and cultural contexts on the 
development of social essentialism 
To examine the impact of social and cultural context on the 
development of social essentialism in childhood, I will now discuss the 
research that has explored social essentialism across a variety of different 
contexts.  One study in particular that demonstrates the power of an 
individual’s social and cultural environment over their reasoning about others 
was carried out in Madagascar by Astuti, Solomon and Carey (2004).  Astuti 
and colleagues conducted heritability studies (like Hirschfeld, 1995; 1996, 
and Taylor, 1996) with Vezo (an ethnic group) children, teenagers and adults.  
It was found that children showed essentialist reasoning; they believed that a 
baby adopted by another ethnic group would still share ethnic group 
membership with their birth parents.  However, adolescents were less certain 
about whether ethnic group membership is heritable, while adults maintained 
that ethnic group membership was shared with the adopted parents.  Astuti 
et al. explain that ethnic groups in Madagascar are not defined by biological 
factors but by where they live and the skills that they have (e.g., living by the 
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sea and knowing how to fish).  Thus, this emphasis on how external factors 
can shape an individual – like where you live and what you can do – seem to 
override essentialist beliefs about the heritability and stability of a child’s 
ethnic group membership at birth, by the time Vezo individuals reach 
adulthood.  
As briefly mentioned in the previous section, Rhodes and Gelman 
(2009) found different developmental patterns of essentialist reasoning about 
gender and race depending on where in the US the sample of children lived. 
Rhodes and Gelman (2009) conducted a study examining the 
essentialisation of gender and race by children living in an urban area of the 
USA and in a rural, politically conservative area of the USA.  In this study, 
children were presented with questions inviting them to reason about how 
natural and fixed, or arbitrary and flexible these categories were.  The results 
revealed that at 5 and 7 years of age children living in both social contexts 
essentialised gender but not race.  However, at 10 and 17 years of age 
children living in urban areas did not essentialise gender or race, while 10 
and 17 year olds living in a rural area did essentialise gender and race.  
Thus, this study is notable for suggesting that living in a rural, homogenous, 
and politically conservative environment may foster stronger essentialist 
beliefs about social categories than living in a less homogenous, more 
socially diverse, urban environment. 
Another interesting study conducted by Kinzler and Dautel (2012) also 
demonstrated effects of context.  This research examined essentialist beliefs 
about the heritability and stability of language and racial categories in the US. 
It showed that European American children hold stronger essentialist beliefs 
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about language compared to race, across early and middle childhood, and it 
is not until 9 years of age that these children appear to essentialise race 
more than language5.   
In contrast, Kinzler and Dautel reported that African American children 
essentialised race more strongly than language from 5 years of age, 
indicating that these children may have experienced different social and 
cultural input about racial categories, specific to their own race group 
membership, that influenced their beliefs about race at an earlier age, or 
made race more salient to them. Analogous differences between groups 
living within the same dominant culture or society have been found in other 
research.  For example, in the US, 10 year old children and adults who are 
religious Jews have been found to essentialise religion categories (Judaism 
and Christianity) more strongly than less religious Jewish and Christian 
participants (Chalik, Leslie & Rhodes, 2017).  Similarly, in Israel, ethnic 
essentialism is much stronger among Orthodox Jewish children than among 
secular Jewish and Arab children (i.e., Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et al., 
2011).   
A recent US study by Pauker et al. (2016) explored the effect of 
cultural context on the development of race essentialism in Massachusetts, a 
majority white region, and in Hawaii, which is so ethnically diverse there is no 
                                                          
5 This is similar to the findings regarding race that were reported by 
Rhodes and Gelman (2009), and unlike the findings of Hirschfeld (1995; 
1996).  One possible reason for this discrepancy may be Hirschfeld’s use of 
occupation and body build for comparison, rather than more richly clustered 
social categories in his research.  It seems that race essentialism may 
emerge later in childhood among European American children depending on 




majority racial group.  Children participated in a picture sorting task 
measuring race salience, a task examining children’s endorsement of group 
stereotypes, and a heritability/stability task exploring essentialist beliefs about 
what children thought the child of a particular adult would look like and what 
the adult looked like themselves as a child.  The authors reported that the 
salience of race increased with age, from 4-11 years of age, in both contexts, 
but it was only in Massachusetts that children essentialised race more 
strongly as they got older, and this was associated with increased 
stereotyping of outgroups.  This study indicates that living in an ethnically 
diverse cultural environment has a positive effect on the tendency to 
stereotype outgroups, and this is associated with weaker essentialist beliefs 
about race.     
Among adults in India, Mahalingam (2003) explored reasoning about 
caste, which determines status in Indian society.  Adults were presented with 
brain transplant stories and were asked to decide if the transplant would 
change caste/ethnicity.  Brahmins essentialised their own group – the rich 
man – saying the rich man would not be changed by a poor man’s brain, but 
they believed a poor man would be changed by a rich man’s brain.  However, 
Dalit participants did not show essentialist reasoning; they viewed either type 
of transplant as having the potential to change caste.  These responses 
could have been motivated by strategic essentialism (as discussed in 
Chapter 1, e.g., Morton et al., 2009a; 2009b), or it could reflect differences in 
social or cultural input that is received about the caste hierarchy, depending 
on one’s caste group membership.   
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In a US study of children’s essentialist beliefs about language 
categories, Byers-Heinlein and Garcia (2015) reported findings indicating that 
the experience of learning a second language in childhood can have a 
generalized effect on essentialist reasoning about categories.  They 
investigated 5-6 year olds’ essentialist beliefs about the heritability and 
stability of human language categories, different animal vocalizations, and 
physical animal traits.  It was found that children who learned a second 
language within the first few years of life did not essentialise language 
categories, animal vocalizations, or physical animal traits, while monolingual 
children held strong essentialist beliefs about all of these.  These findings 
suggest that the experience of receiving input at a young age about the 
fluidity of language can lead children to view other categories as fluid, and 
attenuate their essentialist bias.   
Taken together, the research discussed here demonstrates how an 
essentialist bias about social categories can emerge and develop differently 
depending on the social and cultural context that children live in.  What is yet 
to be fully understood is how the social messages transmitted in a child’s 
environment come to be received by them.  It is not clear whether parental 
input is the main mode of transmission (i.e., how parents overtly talk about 
social categories, or more subtle cues like generic language use – e.g., 
Gelman, 2003; Gelman et al., 2008; Goldin-Meadow et al., 2005; Segall et 
al., 2015), or if a child’s immediate social environment (e.g., school or local 
community) is where information and attitudes towards certain social 
categories is absorbed due to the ethos of the environment and subtle cues 
about the attitudes of others, or it may be the level of social diversity 
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experienced in different types of environments (e.g., Connolly, Smith & Kelly, 
2002; Deeb et al., 2011; for positive effects of social diversity see Turner, 
Tam, Hewstone, Kenworthy & Cairns, 2013). 
Although all three modes of transmission are likely to play a role, as 
the focus of this thesis is on the development of children’s essentialist 
reasoning in the Northern Irish context, a discussion of exact modes of 
transmission is beyond the scope of this review.   
 
2.2.4. The Israeli case study  
Whichever the route essentialist beliefs are transmitted by, there is 
clear evidence that social essentialism exists and that the context has an 
important influence on which categories are essentialised. Given that the 
focus of this thesis is on the development of essentialism in Northern Ireland, 
recent work in Israel on essentialised ethnicity categories is particularly 
relevant. In fact, the most extensive examination of social essentialism in 
childhood has been conducted in Israel by Diesendruck and colleagues, 
using a number of different measures to collect converging evidence of 
ethnic essentialism (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et al., 2011; Diesendruck, 
Birnbaum, et al., 2013; Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz, et al., 2013; 
Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009; Diesendruck & 
Menahem, 2015; Segall, Birnbaum, Deeb & Diesendruck, 2015).   
 In their first study of this kind, Diesendruck and ha Levi (2006) 
employed a forced choice task (similar to Gelman and Markman; 1986) with 
5 year old Jewish children and adults.  Participants had to decide which of 
two test pictures (e.g., a girl who is Jewish, shy and likes to play zigo, or a girl 
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who is Arab, friendly and likes to play zaber) was most likely to share a 
commonality (i.e., zigo or zaber) with a target character (e.g., a girl who is 
Jewish and friendly).  Thus, Diesendruck and ha Levi (2006) invited 
participants to choose between different social categories, as well as 
between social category membership and personality traits when drawing 
inferences about others.  The social categories included in this study were 
ethnicity, social status, religiosity and gender.    
This study showed that 5 year old Jewish children essentialised social 
category membership over personality traits, while adults did the opposite 
and privileged personality traits more.  Further to this, the authors also 
examined children’s preference (compared to chance) for each social 
category as a source for induction.  The findings indicated that Jewish 5 year 
olds essentialised ethnicity and social status at a rate greater than chance, 
while their reasoning about religiosity and gender did not differ from chance.  
In contrast, adults did not seem to essentialise religiosity or gender (which 
were below chance), while their treatment of ethnicity and social status did 
not differ from chance.  This would suggest that even though adults treated 
personality traits as more informative than social category membership, they 
still were more likely to hold essentialist beliefs about ethnicity and social 
status (like children) than for religiosity or gender.     
Following this, Birnbaum et al. (2010) conducted another forced 
choice induction study examining the essentialist reasoning of Arab as well 
as Jewish orthodox and secular children, aged 5, 7 and 11 years old.  The 
findings of Diesendruck and ha Levi  (2006) were replicated with children 
living in Israel showing stronger essentialist reasoning about ethnicity and 
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social status than they did about gender and religiosity.  In addition, this 
study was able to demonstrate effects of age and ethnic group membership 
on children’s essentialist reasoning.  Orthodox, Jewish children essentialised 
ethnicity most strongly, while secular Jewish children and Arab children 
responded at chance level when reasoning about ethnic categories.  As well 
as this, it was reported that 5 and 7 year old children showed more 
essentialist reasoning about social categories in general, than they did about 
personality traits.  On the other hand, 11 year olds were equally as likely to 
show essentialist reasoning about personality traits as about social 
categories, suggesting that the strength of children’s essentialist reasoning 
about social categories declined in later childhood.   
In addition to this, Diesendruck and Haber (2009) also examined 
children’s essentialist beliefs using (the Essentialism Components 
Questionnaire (ECQ) to explore different aspects of essentialist thinking (i.e., 
beliefs about non obvious differences between category members, 
discreteness of boundaries, stability and immutability of category 
membership, and the innate potential and heritability of category 
membership).  The participants in this study were Secular Jewish children, 
and Orthodox Jewish children, aged 6-7 years and 10-11 years. The social 
categories examined were ethnicity, gender, race, and socio-economic status 
(SES).   
The results of this study revealed that children’s essentialist beliefs 
clustered into two dimensions, which the authors called ‘distinctive properties’ 
(i.e., how discrete category boundaries are and how informative categories 
are) and ‘stable membership’ (i.e., innate potential, heritability, and stability of 
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category membership).  It was found that for ‘distinctive properties’, all 
children essentialised ethnicity, gender and SES equally and more so than 
race.  There was an effect of children’s own religiosity on their beliefs about 
ethnicity only; while all 6-7 year olds essentialised ethnicity, 10-11 year old, 
orthodox Jewish children endorsed essentialist beliefs about ethnicity more 
strongly than 10-11 year old secular Jewish children.   
For ‘stable membership’, all children essentialised race most, followed 
by gender, then ethnicity, and then SES.  There was an effect of children’s 
own religiosity, with 10-11 year old orthodox, Jewish children essentialising 
gender and race more than other social categories.  In addition to this, 
comparisons to chance revealed that orthodox children were above chance 
in their endorsement of essentialist beliefs about the distinctiveness of 
ethnicity, while secular children were at chance (neither group strongly 
endorsed essentialist beliefs about stability for ethnicity).  This questionnaire 
study shows that while Jewish children held essentialist beliefs about social 
categories, including ethnicity, their beliefs were not coherent (children 
reasoned differently about category distinctiveness and category stability) 
and differences between orthodox and secular children emerged at 10-11 
years of age. 
As well as employing forced choice induction tasks and 
questionnaires, Diesendruck, Birnbaum et al. (2013) examined essentialist 
beliefs about social categories using a heritability task and the switched-at-
birth task with secular Jewish and Arab children.  Children were asked to 
decide which of two children were likely to be the offspring of an adult, 
depending on which social categories they shared membership of with the 
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adult.  Five year olds did not appear to believe that any category was more 
heritable than another, while 7 and 11 year olds appeared to hold stronger 
essentialist beliefs about the heritability of ethnicity and social status than 
they did about religiosity, occupation and body build.  Thus between 5 and 7 
years of age there was an increase in children’s level of ethnic essentialism.   
On the switched-at-birth task, it was reported that 5 and 7 year old children 
displayed essentialist beliefs about the heritability and innate potential of 
ethnicity (while their beliefs about social status and religiosity were at 
chance), while 11 year old children did not.  Thus, ethnic essentialism in 
Israel appeared to be strong at 5 years of age and declined between 7 and 
11 years of age on this measure.  This difference between the two different 
measures of essentialism may have emerged because the heritability task 
forced children to make a relative choice between social dimensions, while 
the switched-at-birth task allowed children to display their absolute level of 
essentialist thinking about each social dimension rather than having to 
choose between them.   
Having established that children from Israel display strong essentialist 
reasoning about ethnic categories, with differences emerging depending on 
age, the method used, and the religious sector that children were members 
of, Diesendruck et al. focused on drilling further down into the influence of 
social and cultural input on children’s reasoning.  Deeb et al. (2011) decided 
to examine the effect of educational context on children’s ethnic essentialism; 
they explored the salience of ethnicity (i.e., using a guessing game about 
social categories, and recall of social categories mentioned in a story) and 
essentialist beliefs (using the ECQ) about ethnicity, among orthodox Jewish 
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children, secular Jewish children, and Arab children in regular, homogenous 
school environments in Israel and in integrated schools.   
Overall, it was found that 5 year old Orthodox Jewish children 
displayed strong essentialist beliefs about ethnicity, while an effect of 
educational context emerged at 7 years of age.  At 7 years of age, ethnicity 
was more salient for Orthodox Jewish children attending integrated schools, 
than it was for Orthodox Jewish children attending homogenous schools.  
Furthermore, Orthodox Jewish children attending integrated schools showed 
less ethnic essentialism at 7 years of age, while this decline was not 
apparent in regular, segregated schools until 11 years of age for Orthodox 
Jewish children.  Thus, attending an integrated school appeared to increase 
awareness of ethnic categories, and attenuate ethnic essentialism at an 
earlier age for Orthodox Jewish children, compared to Orthodox Jewish 
children in regular homogeneous schools.  This may be because 
experiencing intergroup contact can have a positive effect on children’s social 
cognition (e.g., Turner et al., 2013), or it may be due to the ethos of 
integrated schools, or alternatively it may be a reflection of the beliefs of 
parents who choose to send their children to an integrated school (e.g., 
Diesendruck & Menahem, 2015; Segall et al., 2015).  Either way, Orthodox, 
Jewish children from an integrated educational context displayed a different 
pattern of ethnic essentialist reasoning compared to Jewish children from a 
segregated educational context, and from secular Jewish and Arab children. 
Further to this, Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz et al. (2013) conducted a 
cross-cultural study in which essentialist beliefs about categories (ethnicity, 
race, gender, animals, artifacts and occupation) in Israel and the USA were 
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directly compared.  Using the questions designed by Rhodes and Gelman 
(2009) examining the objectivity versus flexibility of social categories, the 
authors again found that Israeli children, at 5 and 10 years of age, 
essentialised ethnicity more than any other category, and they essentialised 
gender more than race.  While race was expected to be the most 
essentialised category in the US (i.e., based on prior research, Hirschfeld, 
1995; 1996; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009), it was found that American children 
displayed stronger essentialist beliefs about ethnicity, gender and animal 
categories than they did about race.  Only further research on race 
essentialism in the US can shed light on this finding; as previous studies 
have found, there are different factors that seem to influence the 
development of racial essentialism in the US.  Such factors are where 
participants live, the cultural and social input that they receive about racial 
categories (Rhodes & Gelman, 2009), the racial category that participants 
themselves are members of (Kinzler & Dautel, 2012), and the method that is 
used to measure race essentialism.    
More recently, Diesendruck and colleagues have turned their attention 
to investigating the link between essentialist beliefs, and stereotyping and 
prejudice towards outgroups.  Segall et al. (2015) found that parents – 
particularly orthodox Jewish parents – whose 5 year old children attended de 
facto segregated schools in Israel, showed stronger essentialist beliefs about 
ethnic categories than parents of children who attended integrated schools, 
and they were more averse to negotiating a resolution to the conflict between 
Jews and Arabs.  In addition to this, these parents endorsed more negative 
stereotypes about Arabs than the parents of integrated school children, they 
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labelled ethnic categories more, and it was found that the children of these 
parents showed stronger essentialist reasoning about ethnicity than 
integrated school children.  This study demonstrated the link between ethnic 
essentialism and negative attitudes towards ethnic outgroups, as well as the 
complex interplay that exists between parental input about social categories 
and the type of school children attend, on the development of children’s 
social cognition.  
Further to this, Diesendruck and Menahem (2015) directly examined 
the link between ethnic essentialism and intergroup bias with secular Jewish 
6 year olds.  It was reported that when children were told a story that was 
intended to prompt essentialist beliefs about ethnicity – rather than an 
essentialist story about animals or a story that was not essentialist at all – 
children drew pictures with Jews and Arabs further apart, and with more 
positive facial expressions on Jewish characters.  Moreover, boys who 
listened to the story prompting ethnic essentialism also displayed more inter-
ethnic bias when completing an implicit association task.  This study is one of 
few that has investigated the link between social essentialism, stereotyping, 
and intergroup bias in childhood (see Mandalaywala & Rhodes, 2017; 
Pauker, Ambady & Apfelbaum, 2010; Pauker et al., 2016); the majority of 
these studies have been conducted with adults (see Bastian & Haslam, 2006; 
Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Haslam, Bastian, Bain & Kashima, 2006; 
Mahalingam, Haritatos & Jackson, 2007; Morton et al., 2009a; 2009b; 
Prentice & Miller, 2007; Rangel & Keller, 2011). 
Taken together, the research on childhood essentialism in Israel can 
be considered a comprehensive case study documenting how social 
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essentialist reasoning emerges and what form it takes in a society that has 
been divided by an ethno-religious conflict.  As such, the findings from Israel 
constitute a good starting point for research on essentialism in a society such 
as Northern Ireland (NI).  NI shares commonalities with Israel as a society 
that has experienced (and continues to experience) violent inter-ethnic 
conflict, and is largely polarised by ethno-religion category membership 
(Gillespie, 2010; Gough, Robinson, Kremer & Mitchell, 1992; Nolan, 2014).  
Also like Israel, Northern Ireland has made attempts at improving intergroup 
relations through the creation of integrated education (Gallagher, 2010; 
Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Paolini, McLernon, Crisp, Niens & Craig, 2005; 
O’Connor, 2002; Smith, 2001), but the majority of schools in Northern Ireland 
remain segregated by default.  Thus, the research detailed in this thesis is 
based on studies carried out by Diesendruck and colleagues, and is intended 
to comprise a case study of the development of social essentialism in 
Northern Ireland – the first of its kind within this social and cultural context.         
 
2.3. The present research:  The development of children’s essentialist 
reasoning about social categories in Northern Ireland. 
The current research examines the development of children’s essentialist 
reasoning about the ethno-religion groups, Catholic and Protestant, in 
Northern Ireland.  As previously alluded to, Northern Ireland is a society 
polarised by ethno-religion group membership due to its history of sectarian 
intergroup conflict (see Darby, 1995; Gough et al., 1992; Rees, 2001).  The 
most recent period of conflict that Northern Ireland has emerged from was 
The Troubles, which is a period of intergroup violence lasting from 1968 to 
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1998 (for a detailed history see Gillespie, 2010).  While the terms Catholic 
and Protestant contain religious connotations for most people in other parts 
of the world, in NI they are tied up with cultural and political sentiments.  
Traditionally, the Catholic community has culturally identified more strongly 
with Ireland, and aspired politically to a united Ireland, while the Protestant 
community has identified more strongly with Britain and supports the political 
union between Northern Ireland and the UK (Gillespie, 2010).  These 
differences between the two groups have been a source of conflict – along 
with perceived inequalities in the distribution of power and resources – and 
even in post-conflict times, Northern Ireland continues to experience sporadic 
acts of sectarian violence, paramilitary activity, and friction over issues such 
as parades, flags, policing, and historical enquiries (Gough, Robinson, 
Kremer & Mitchell, 1992; McEvoy, McEvoy & McConnachie, 2006; Nolan, 
2014).   NI society is still largely segregated through the education system, 
the areas people choose to live in, by marriage, and in the ways people 
culturally express themselves.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect that 
children in NI will show indications of essentialist thinking about ethno-
religion categories, just like children in Israel have (e.g., Birnbaum et al., 
2010).   
Post-conflict research into children’s awareness and reasoning about 
religion categories in NI since the end of the troubles has been limited with a 
small number of studies conducted by Connolly and colleagues (Connolly, 
2009; Connolly, 2011; Connolly, Kelly & Smith, 2009; Connolly, Smith & 
Kelly, 2002).  The findings of Connolly and colleagues revealed that from as 
young as 3-4 years of age, significant markers of ethno-religion categories in 
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NI are already beginning to impact on children’s awareness, with preschool 
children showing a preference for particular colours of flags (i.e., the British 
and Irish flags), cultural activities (e.g., Irish dancing, parades), and sports 
(e.g., rugby, hurling, certain football shirts) traditionally associated with their 
own ethno-religion group.  Furthermore, by 6-7 years of age, some of the 
children in these studies expressed concepts of the categories Catholic and 
Protestant; 34% said that they belonged to one of these ethno-religion 
groups, and some even expressed negative attitudes towards their perceived 
outgroup (Connolly, 2009; Connolly, 2011; Connolly, Kelly & Smith, 2009; 
Connolly, Smith & Kelly, 2002).  Thus, even though ethno-religion group 
membership may not be as salient as it once was during The Troubles (e.g., 
Cairns, 1980; Cairns, Hunter & Herring, 1980; Jahoda & Harrison, 1975; 
McWhirter & Gamble, 1982), there is good reason to suspect that it enters 
children’s awareness at some point in development in Northern Ireland, and 
is likely to impact on their social cognition, as it continues to be emphasised 
as a highly meaningful dimension to categorise people along in NI.  It is the 
goal of the present research to investigate this, as there have been no prior 
cognitive studies that have extensively examined children’s reasoning about 
ethno-religion categories in NI.  Furthermore, the establishment of integrated 
schools in NI – as in Israel – offers another unique social context for 
investigating the development of essentialist reasoning about ethno-religion 
categories (O’Connor, 2002; Smith, 2001). 
Approximately 5% of children in NI attend an integrated school 
(Gallagher, 2010; Nolan, 2014), most other children attend schools that are 
either majority Catholic and maintained by the Catholic Church – Catholic 
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Maintained Schools – or majority Protestant and controlled by the State – 
State Controlled Schools.  The establishment of integrated education in NI is 
rooted in contact theory, and the majority of social research in NI has focused 
on intergroup attitudes and measuring the success of contact theory 
embedded within integrated schools and cross-community school projects 
(Gallagher, 2010; Hewstone et al., 2005; O’Connor, 2002; Smith, 2001; for 
Shared Education Programme review see Niens, Kerr & Connolly, 2013).  
Due to the fact that intergroup contact is intended to reduce intergroup bias 
and this has had some success in NI (Hewstone et al., 2005; Niens et al., 
2013; O’Connor, 2002), there is good reason to suspect that children from 
the integrated sector in NI may display less ethno-religion essentialism in 
comparison to other children attending segregated schools, similar to the 
findings of Deeb et al. (2011) with integrated school children in Israel.  This is 
another major goal of the present research; to not only examine the 
development of social essentialism in Northern Ireland as a whole, but also 
within different educational contexts. 
To conclude this chapter, I will end with a brief overview of the 
research that will be presented in this thesis.  Chapters 3-6 detail four 
inference studies that were carried out, three in Northern Ireland and one in 
the USA.  This series of inference studies was intended to give as 
comprehensive a picture as possible of the nature and context-specificity of 
the development of social essentialist reasoning about religion categories in 
NI.  Chapter 7 details a questionnaire study that was conducted in NI, based 
on the ECQ previously described in some of the research conducted in Israel 
(e.g., Diesendruck & Haber, 2009).  This study was conducted to provide a 
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different measure of social essentialism alongside the extensive inference 
data that was collected.  Finally, Chapter 8 is a meta-analysis of the four NI 
studies contained within this thesis, and was carried out so that the entire NI 
dataset could be explored as a whole.  The results of these studies and their 






























As outlined in the preceding two chapters, the aim of this thesis is to present 
a case study of the development of social essentialism in Northern Ireland 
(NI), similar to the extensive body of research that has been conducted in 
Israel, and with the aim of building on those findings by documenting the 
emergence and development of essentialist thinking about different social 
categories within a different cultural context.  As the previous chapter has 
shown, the picture provided of the development of social essentialism in 
childhood is not as coherent as the one that emerges from the literature 
about natural kind categories (i.e., see Chapter 1), in which children seem to 
be universally in agreement that naturally occurring categories – such as 
dog, cat, bird, tree, gold – are rich in obvious and non-obvious properties 
(which makes category membership informative), have discrete, immutable 
boundaries, are heritable and possess innate potential, and have a central, 
underlying property or essence (see Gelman, 2003).  Cultural input about 
various social categories constrains the development of children’s 
essentialist beliefs about social dimensions; thus, there is no universal 
pattern to children’s essentialist reasoning about the social world across 
social contexts (e.g., Astuti et al., 2004; Mandalaywala & Rhodes, 2017; 
Rhode & Gelman, 2009).     
Essentialist beliefs about social categories emerge at different points 
in development, in relation to specific categories that are treated as 
particularly meaningful, in many different social and cultural contexts (e.g., 
Deeb et al., 2011; del Rio & Strasser, 2011; Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Rhodes 
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& Gelman, 2009).  Within the social literature, Diesendruck and colleagues in 
Israel have given the most thorough developmental account (Birnbaum et al., 
2010; Deeb et al., 2011; Diesendruck, Birnbaum, et al., 2013; Diesendruck, 
Goldfein-Elbaz, et al., 2013; Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006; Diesendruck & 
Haber, 2009; Diesendruck & Menahem, 2015; Segall, et al., 2015).  The 
Israeli research indicates that ethnicity – a highly meaningful social 
dimension in Israel – is the social dimension most essentialised by Jewish 
children living in the country (and is also preferred to information about 
personality traits) (see Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz, et al., 2013; 
Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009; Birnbaum et al., 
2010). This ethnic essentialism emerges early in childhood with children 
arriving at Kindergarten with these beliefs in place (Deeb et al., 2011; 
Diesendruck & Menahem, 2015; Segall et al., 2015), and ethnic essentialism 
in Israel declines in strength across childhood and at an earlier age for 
Jewish children within the integrated school sector than for children attending 
regular, de facto segregated schools.  At present, it is impossible to know 
whether the pattern of reasoning found in Israel is specific to the social, 
historical and political context of that country, or whether this might be a 
typical developmental pattern in regards to ethno-religion categories across 
cultural contexts.  The current research aims to further our understanding of 
the development of social essentialism by conducting a similar case study, 
examining different ethno-religion categories (Catholicism/Nationalism and 
Protestantism/Unionism in NI), in a different context.    
Further to this, while more studies are beginning to directly compare 
essentialist reasoning across cultures (e.g., Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz et 
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al., 2013), there has been surprisingly little attention paid to educational 
context and there are no studies looking at its effects on essentialist 
reasoning in the types of experimental tasks that are standardly used, such 
as inference tasks (but see Deeb et al., 2011, study of the effects of 
educational contexts on memory and questionnaire responses).  This thesis 
not only provides a developmental account of social essentialism in a 
different cultural context (NI), it also examines the effect of different 
educational contexts on children’s essentialist reasoning.   
As outlined at the end of the previous chapter, Northern Ireland is a 
society that is polarized by a violent history of ethno-religious conflict 
between Catholics and Protestants who disagree about whether NI should be 
governed by the Republic of Ireland (i.e., the position of mainly Catholic 
Nationalists) or continue to be governed as part of the UK (i.e., the position of 
mainly Protestant Unionists) (Gillespie, 2010).  Thus, ethno-religion group 
membership is the most meaningful social dimension that people are 
categorized by in NI, and this division continues to present itself in NI’s 
mainly de facto segregated education system, the areas that people choose 
to live in, marriage, and the cultural activities (e.g., parades, Irish dancing) 
and sports that people choose to engage in (Gallagher, 2010; Gough et al., 
1992; Nolan, 2014).  Integrated education was established as a response to 
the ethno-religious division and conflict (O’Connor, 2002; Smith, 2001) with 
the aim of contact improving intergroup attitudes (Hewstone et al., 2005), and 
accounts for approximately 5% of schools in NI (Gallagher, 2010).  For these 
reasons, religion is the main social dimension of interest in examining the 
development of social essentialism within the Northern Ireland context, and 
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the existence of integrated education in NI offers another unique context 
(similar to Deeb et al., 2011, in Israel) within the wider culture for examining 
potential effects of exposure to social diversity on children’s essentialist 
reasoning.      
 
3.1.1. The current study 
This case study was modelled on the research detailed in the paper by 
Birnbaum and colleagues (2010), who investigated the development of ethnic 
essentialism in Israel using a forced choice inference task – a task that has 
been commonly used to index the strength of essentialist reasoning (e.g., del 
Rio & Strasser, 2011; Gelman et al., 1986; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Taylor 
& Gelman, 1993).  Birnbaum et al. examined children’s pattern of category 
based inferences, as an index of the strength of their essentialist beliefs 
about the ethnic categories, Jew and Arab, as well as about social status, 
religiosity, gender and personality traits.  As described in Chapter 2, this 
forced choice inference task invited children to choose between shared 
membership of two categories when deciding which of two base characters a 
target category was most likely to share other commonalities with.  For 
example, in a trial contrasting religion and gender, the first base character is 
an Arabic boy who wants to be a Mashitz when he grows up, the second 
base character is a Jewish girl who wants to be a Nagim when she grows up, 
and the target character is an Arabic girl.  Children were asked to infer which 
novel occupation the target is most likely to aspire to, based on the social 
category memberships she shares with each of the base characters, thereby 
measuring the inductive potential of each category.   
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 The use of novel properties, such as ‘wants to be a Nagim’, is a 
common methodological feature when examining the inductive inferences of 
children (see Murphy, 2002).  This is because the use of a blank predicate 
means children have only information about category memberships to base 
their responses on when deciding whether to project a property, thus 
providing a stronger test of the inductive power of categories.  In a series of 
12 trials, Birnbaum et al. measured the inductive potential of each dimension 
relative to another: they contrasted ethnicity with gender across two trials, 
ethnicity with social status across two trials, ethnicity with religiosity across 
two trials, gender with social status across two trials, gender with religiosity 
across two trials, and social status with religiosity across two trials.  The 
authors also examined the inductive potential of the social categories 
compared to personality traits across eight trials – for example, one base is a 
shy Jew, the other base is a nice Arab, and the target is a shy Arab, thus 
inviting children to project on the basis of ethnicity or personality traits.  As 
mentioned before, the findings reported by Birnbaum et al. (2010) suggested 
that ethnic essentialism is evident in children’s reasoning from at least 5 
years of age, and orthodox Jewish children in Israel were much more 
essentialist about ethnicity than secular Jewish and Arab children.  Further to 
this, essentialist reasoning about ethnicity was stronger than it was for other 
social categories (with the exception of social status which was almost as 
strongly essentialised as ethnicity), as well as personality traits.  It was also 
indicated that the strength of ethnic essentialism declined between 7 and 11 
years of age in Israel, with 11 year olds choosing to make inferences based 
on personality traits equally as often as they used social categories.  This 
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decline in the strength of ethnic essentialism in later childhood was also 
found by Deeb et al. (2011), who also reported that this became apparent at 
the earlier age of 7 for Jewish children attending integrated schools.  
 The current study, of social essentialist reasoning across childhood in 
Northern Ireland, is intended to contribute to the literature by complementing 
the Israeli case study.  This first study is a forced-choice inference task, 
similar to the inference task employed by Birnbaum et al. (2010), and the 
dimensions that are contrasted in it are religion (Catholic and Protestant), 
gender (boy and girl), and a control category of ‘pet ownership’ (i.e., of either 
a goldfish or a hamster).  For the reasons described in the previous chapter 
and the introductory section above, religion is the primary social dimension of 
interest in this study.  Gender was included as a contrasting social category 
as gender is known to feature as a highly natural and powerful category in 
children’s social cognition (e.g., Halim & Ruble, 2010; Taylor et al., 1996).  
An arbitrary control category was included against which to measure the 
inductive potential of religion and gender categories. The control category is 
particularly important because ethno-religion categories in NI might well be a 
novel, arbitrary grouping for some young children if they do not have 
experience, and well developed concepts, of religion categories.  
Accordingly, an absence of differences between the control and other social 
categories can be interpreted as evidence that those social categories have 
not been essentialised. 
Research exploring children’s awareness and concepts of ethno-
religion categories in NI has found that approximately one third of children 
identify themselves as members of a particular religion category, and even 
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express prejudice by 6-7 years of age (Connolly, 2009; Connolly, 2011; 
Connolly, Kelly & Smith, 2009; Connolly, Smith & Kelly, 2002), while markers 
of these categories (i.e., flags, parades, names, sports) begin to infringe on 
their awareness from 3 years of age.  For this reason, the earliest point in 
development that the current research focuses on is 6-7 years of age (up to 
10-11 years of age), when a large number of children are likely to have some 
understanding of the significance of religion in NI or at least a developing 
awareness of the existence of these categories.  These children were 
recruited from de facto segregated school and also from the integrated 
school sector.             
The initial predictions about the development of ethno-religion 
essentialism in NI are based on the findings from Israel.  It is predicted that 
children from 6-11 years of age in NI will show evidence of holding stronger 
essentialist beliefs about religion categories, than for gender and a control 
category.  It is expected that the strength of children’s essentialist reasoning 
about religion categories will decline in later childhood at around 10-11 years 
of age, and it is expected that this decline in the strength of children’s ethno-
religion essentialism will become apparent at an earlier stage within the 
integrated school sector.  Further to this, there might also be differences 
between Catholic and Protestant children in their essentialist reasoning about 
religion, similar to the group differences found between orthodox Jewish 
children and secular Jewish and Arab children in Israel (Birnbaum et al., 






3.2.1. Participants  
Participants were 174 children, aged 6-11 years, recruited from State 
controlled (majority Protestant), Catholic maintained (majority Catholic), and 
integrated schools in Northern Ireland.  Demographic information about the 
sample is presented in Table 1.  The percentage of students receiving free 
school meals in each school can be taken as an indication of the socio-
economic status of children attending that school (Muldoon & Trew, 2000), as 
children receiving free school meals are of a lower household income.   All 
children who participated in this research did so with full written parental 
consent, as well as giving their own verbal assent to taking part.  Ethical 
approval for this study can be found in Appendix 1. 
 
3.2.2. Design and materials  
Children were presented with a forced choice inference task, similar to 
the previously outlined method used by Birnbaum et al. (2010), in which 
children had to choose between two competing dimensions as a basis for 
inference.  The three dimensions presented to children in this task were 
religion, gender and a control – the control categories were ownership of a 
hamster or a goldfish.  The task consisted of 12 trials, and in each trial 
children were presented with triads of hand-drawn pictures depicting child 
characters.  There were no visual cues highlighting membership in religion 
categories or the control categories in these pictures; the only visual cues 
presented depicted the gender category membership of the characters (see 
the materials in Figure 2 and Figure 3) – thus, only gender cues were 
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presented pictorially, as well as by category labels.  Religion categories and 
the control categories were only presented by their labels.  The labels 
presenting religion categories were Catholic and Protestant, the labels 
presenting the control categories were ‘owns a goldfish’ and ‘owns a 
hamster’, and the labels presenting gender group membership were boy 
and girl.    In total, 36 pictures were used; 3 different pictures were presented 
in each of the trials.   
School 
Type 







6-7 years old: N=19 
8-9 years old: N=20 













6-7 years old: N=19 
8-9 years old: N=20 









Integrated 6-7 years old: N=19 
8-9 years old: N=20 










Of the 12 trials that children were presented with, each trial consisted 
of a triad of one target and two test pictures, and children were presented 
with a conflict between two dimensions in each triad.  In each experimental 
trial, one test picture shared category membership with the target picture 
along one dimension, and the other test picture shared membership with the 
target picture along a different dimension.  For example, Figure 2 shows a 
triad in which the conflict is between membership in religion categories and 
membership of gender categories.  In this example, one test picture shares 
religion group membership (not gender) with the target – they are both 
Catholic – and one test picture shares gender group membership (not 
religion) with the target – they are both girls.  In triads where the forced 
choice was between membership of religion categories and membership of 
the control categories, gender categories were kept constant and so all three 
pictures were drawn as the same gender (for an example see Figure 1) – two 
out of four triads showed all male characters, and two out of four triads 
showed all female characters.  
The 12 trials can be viewed as consisting of three sets of forced 
choice triads.  Set 1 presented a conflict between religion categories and the 
control categories, Set 2 presented a conflict between religion categories and 
gender categories, and Set 3 presented a conflict between gender categories 
and the control categories.  Each set consisted of four trials.  The trials within 
each set differed by presenting the participant with each possible 
combination of the two dimensions being presented.  So to use the conflict 
between religion categories and gender categories (set 2) as an example, the 
four trials would consist of: 1. A Catholic boy target, which shares religion 
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with a Catholic girl test picture and gender with a Protestant boy test picture.  
2.  A Catholic girl target, sharing religion with a Catholic boy and gender with 
a Protestant girl, 3.  A Protestant boy target, sharing religion with a Protestant 
girl and gender with a Catholic boy, and 4.  A Protestant girl target, sharing 
religion with a Protestant boy and gender with a Catholic girl.  The order of 
each set of triads was counterbalanced across participants.   
For each test picture, the character in it was presented as possessing 
a different novel property, these properties were counterbalanced across the 
triads and were:  noxy, flirst, trun, dwauche, gleeve, parl, pline, skivered, 
chaunch, flarp, sproice, pent, parkled, gline, legan, skushed, fric, taff, dober, 
trand, femey, prote, wolk, rowd, preper, and swelk.  The order of presentation 
of each set of triads and the novel attributes used were counterbalanced 
across participants.  The order of the verbal labels used to present each of 
the two categories in each picture was also counterbalanced.   
  A practice trial, which can be seen in Figure 3, was conducted before 
the main trials in order to familiarize children with the task and the materials.  
The remaining 12 triads were the experimental trials.  In the familiarization 
trial, children were not presented with a forced choice; only one of the test 
pictures shared categories with the target, presenting no conflict for children 
as can be seen in Figure 3.  All children received the same familiarization trial 
in terms of the pictures used and the familiar properties presented (i.e., food 
preferences and activity preferences), the exception was that half of the 
children were presented with noxy and gline as the novel properties, and the 
other half received legan and flirst as the novel properties.   
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Figure 1.  An example of a triad presenting a conflict between religion 
category membership and membership of the control categories (pet 






Figure 2. An example of a triad presenting a conflict between religion 







Figure3. The familiarization trial used in Study 1, presenting no 
conflict between activities and food preferences. 
 
 
3.2.3. Procedure  
 
Children who had written parental consent were tested individually in a 
quiet area of their school.  They were told that the experimenter was 
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interested in how children think about others and that there were no right or 
wrong answers to the questions that they would be asked.  Children were 
then presented with a practice trial to help them become familiar with the 
stimuli and the novel words that would be presented to them throughout the 
experimental trials.  The experimenter then proceeded with the 12 
experimental trials.  
Figure 2 shows an example of an experimental triad presenting a 
conflict between religion categories and gender categories.  As Figure 2 
illustrates, children were presented with three pictures – two test pictures and 
one target picture.  When presented with the first test picture the 
experimenter said (using Figure 2 as an example) “Look at this child here.  
This child goes to a Catholic Church and is a boy.  This child is gleeve.”  The 
second test picture was presented and the experimenter said “Look at this 
child here.  This child goes to a Protestant Church and is a girl.  This child is 
sproice.”  The target was then presented and the experimenter said “Look at 
this child here.  This child goes to a Catholic Church like this child (the 
experimenter points to the first test picture) and is a girl like this child (point to 
the second test picture).  Do you think this child (points at the target) is 
gleeve like this child (points to test picture 1) or sproice like this one (points to 
test picture 2)?   
Thus, children were asked to choose between shared membership in 
the same religion category and shared membership in the same gender 
category when deciding whether to draw a novel inference.  There were no 
children who were unwilling to make an inference at any point during the 





For each of the trials (there were four trials in each triad set) children 
were given a score of 1 for whichever dimension they chose to base an 
inference on.  For example, when religion categories and gender categories 
were put into conflict, a child would score 2 for religion if they chose to base 
an inference on religion category membership in two out of the four trials, and 
they would score 2 for gender if they chose to base an inference on gender 
category membership in the other two out of four trials.  So for each set of 
triads, children were given a score out of 4 for each of the two categories that 
they had an opportunity to base an inference on. 
 To analyze children’s category based inferences collapsed across the 
three sets of triads, children were given a general score out of 8 for each 
dimension.  This is because children had the opportunity to base an 
inference on each dimension eight times across the entire task.  For 
example, when religion categories were put into conflict with gender 
categories in one set of triads, and religion categories were put into conflict 
with the control categories in another set of triads (and in the third set of 
triads, gender category membership and membership of the control 
categories were put into conflict), there were 8 trials in total in which children 
could choose to base an inference on religion group membership rather than 




3.3.2. Main findings 
Due to the forced choice design of the task, dimension could not be 
included as an independent variable in an analysis of variance, so children’s 
inferences based on each dimension were compared using paired sample t 
tests (Bonferroni adjusted, p=0.017).  The means indicated that children 
treated religion category membership as the strongest basis for inference 
(M=4.94, SD=1.92), followed by membership of the control categories 
(M=3.79, SD=1.69), followed by gender category membership (M=3.27, 
SD=1.93), which was treated as the weakest basis for projecting properties.  
The paired t tests revealed that children made significantly more inferences 
based on membership in religion categories than they did based on 
membership of the control categories, t(173)=4.75, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.62, 
or membership of gender categories, t(173)=6.47, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.87.  
Children’s inferences based on gender group membership were marginally 
less frequent than their inferences based on membership of the control 
categories, t(173)=2.16, p=0.03, Cohen’s d=0.28.   
Comparisons to chance showed that children’s inferences based on 
religion group membership were at a rate significantly above chance level, 
t(173)=6.44, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.98, while their rate of inference based on 
membership of the control categories did not significantly differ from chance, 
t(173)=1.52, p=0.13, Cohen’s d=0.23, and children’s rate of inference based 
on gender group membership was at a rate significantly below chance, 
t(173)=5, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.76.  Overall, these main findings indicate 
that children in NI treated religion group membership as the strongest basis 
for inference and gender group membership as the weakest basis for 
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inference.  Membership of the control categories was intermediate in 
inductive potential and did not differ from chance levels of responding. 
The data was further analyzed by conducting paired sample t tests 
within each age group in each educational context (Bonferroni adjusted, 
p=0.002).  The results indicate that children within each educational context 
did not distinguish between the three dimensions at 6-7 years of age.  
Children aged 6-7 years attending Catholic maintained schools treated 
membership of religion categories (M=4.37, SD=1.54) and membership of 
the control categories (M=4.26, SD=1.63) as equivalent in their inductive 
potential, t(18)=0.19, p=0.85, Cohen’s d=0.07.  They also treated religion 
group membership and gender group membership (M=3.37, SD=2.09) as 
equivalent in their rate of inference, t(18)=1.33, p=0.201, Cohen’s d=0.54, 
and membership of gender categories and the control categories were also 
treated as equivalent in their inductive potential, t(18)=1.14, p=0.27, Cohen’s 
d=0.47.   
Children aged 6-7 years attending State Protestant schools also did 
not distinguish between religion category membership (M=4.16, SD=1.61) 
and membership of the control categories (M=4.47, SD=1.78), t(18)=0.51, 
p=0.62, Cohen’s d=0.18, or between religion group membership and gender 
group membership (M=3.37, SD=2.03), t(18)=1.07, p=0.3, Cohen’s d=0.43, 
in their rates of inference.  They also treated gender group membership and 
membership of the control categories as equally useful bases for inference 
as well, t(18)=1.39, p=0.18, Cohen’s d=0.58. 
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Likewise, 6-7 year old children attending integrated schools also 
treated religion group membership (M=4.53, SD=2.01) as equivalent to 
membership of the control categories (M=3.68, SD=1.57), t(18)=1.15, 
p=0.27, Cohen’s d=0.47, and membership of gender categories (M=3.79, 
SD=1.65), t(18)=0.96, p=0.35, Cohen’s d=0.4, in inductive potential, and they 
rated the inductive potential of gender group membership as equivalent to 
control category membership also, t(18)=0.18, p=0.86, Cohen’s d=0.07. 
At 8-9 years of age, children attending Catholic maintained schools 
made inferences based on membership of religion categories (M=5.7, 
SD=1.75) more frequently than they did based on membership of gender 
categories (M=3.05, SD=1.9), t(19)=3.63, p=0.002, Cohen’s d=1.45, or 
membership of the control categories (M=3.25, SD=1.65), t(19)=3.89, 
p=0.001, Cohen’s d=1.44.  Their rate of inference based on gender group 
membership did not differ from their rate of inference based on membership 
of the control categories, t(19)=0.29, p=0.78, Cohen’s d=0.11. 
The 8-9 year old children attending State Protestant schools also 
treated religion group membership (M=5.85, SD=1.53) as inductively more 
potent than gender group membership (M=2.85, SD=2.03), t(19)=4.84, 
p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.67, and membership of the control categories (M=3.3, 
SD=2.3), t(19)=3.42, p=0.003, Cohen’s d=1.31.  Gender group membership 
and membership of the control categories were treated as equally useful 
bases for inference, t(19)=0.5, p=0.63, Cohen’s d=0.21. 
Children attending integrated schools showed a different pattern from 
segregated school children at 8-9 years of age.  They made as many 
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inferences based on religion group membership (M=4.9, SD=1.97) as they 
did based on membership of the control categories (M=3.85, SD=1.95), 
t(19)=1.42, p=0.17, Cohen’s d=0.54.  They also treated gender group 
membership (M=3.25, SD=2.1) as equivalent to membership of the control 
categories in inductive potential, t(19)=0.76, p=0.46, Cohen’s d=0.3.  
Children made marginally more inferences based on religion group 
membership than they did based on gender group membership, t(19)=2.07, 
p=0.053, Cohen’s d=0.81.   
At 10-11 years of age, children attending Catholic maintained schools 
made more inferences based on membership of religion categories (M=5.41, 
SD=2.15) than they did based on membership of gender categories (M=3.18, 
SD=1.63), t(16)=2.85, p=0.012, Cohen’s d=1.17, and membership of the 
control categories (M=3.41, SD=2.03), t(16)= 2.14, p=0.48, Cohen’s d=0.96.  
They treated gender group membership and membership of the control 
categories as equivalent in their inductive potential, t(16)=0.32, p=0.75, 
Cohen’s d=0.12. 
Likewise, 10-11 year old children attending State Protestant schools 
also made inferences based on membership of religion categories (M=5.15, 
SD=1.63) more frequently than they did based on gender group membership 
(M=3.3, SD=1.56), t(19)=2.98, p=0.008, Cohen’s d=1.16, and membership of 
the control categories (M=3.55, SD=1.57), t(19)=2.56, p=0.019, Cohen’s d=1, 
and they treated gender group membership as equally useful as membership 




In contrast to this, 10-11 year olds attending integrated schools made 
inferences based on religion group membership (M=4.35, SD=2.43) as 
frequently as they did based on gender group membership (M=3.3, 
SD=1.56), t(19)=1.01, p=0.32, Cohen’s d=0.51, and membership of the 
control categories (M=3.55, SD=1.57), t(19)=0, p=1, Cohen’s d=0.39, and 
they treated gender group membership and the membership of the control 
categories as equivalent in their inductive potential, t(19)=1.52, p=0.15, 
Cohen’s d=0.16.    
 
3.3.3. Two way analyses of variance conducted for each dimension 
Three separate between-groups, 3 (Age Group: 6-7, 8-9, 10-11 years) 
x 3 (Educational Context: State controlled, Catholic maintained, Integrated) 
ANOVAs were conducted on children’s inference scores; one for each of the 
three dimensions presented in this study (i.e., religion, gender and the control 
categories).   
The analysis of children’s inferences based on religion group 
membership revealed a main effect of age group on children’s religion based 
inferences, F(2, 165)=5.38, p=0.005, η2partial=0.061.  There was no significant 
effect of educational context, F(2, 165)=1.52, p==0.22, η2partial=0.02, and 
there was no significant interaction between age group and educational 
context on children’s rate of inference, F(4, 165)=0.9, p=0.47, η2partial=0.02).  
Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons showed that 8-9 year old children 
made inferences more frequently based on religion than 6-7 year old children 
(p=0.004), but 8-9 year olds did not differ from 10-11 year olds in their rate of 
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inference (p=0.37), and 10-11 year olds did not differ from 6-7 year olds 
(p=0.27). 
 The analysis of children’s inferences based on gender group 
membership revealed that there was no significant effect of age, F(2, 
165)=0.8, p=0.45, η2partial=0.01, or educational context, F(2, 165)=0.0.35, 
p=0.71, η2partial=0.004, on children’s gender based inferences, and there was 
no significant interaction between age and educational context, F(4, 
165)=0.09, p=0.99, η2partial=0.002.  
 The analysis of children’s inferences based on membership of the 
control categories showed no significant effect of age group, F(2, 165)=2.1, 
p=0.13, η2partial=0.03, or educational context on children’s rate of inference, 
F(2, 165)=0.47, p=0.63, η2partial=0.006, and there was no significant 
interaction between age group and educational context on children’s rate of 
inference either, F(4, 165)=1.39, p=0.24, η2partial=0.03.    
  
3.3.4. Comparisons to chance 
Comparisons to chance (Chance=4), which can be seen in Figure 4, 
were conducted to examine children’s rate of inference, collapsed across trial 
type, for each dimension, within each age group and educational context.  
This analysis revealed that at all ages, from 6-11 years of age, children within 
the integrated context did not use any of the dimensions as a basis for 
inference at a rate that significantly differed from chance level (Religion 
based inferences: t(18)=1.14, p=0.27, Cohen’s d=0.54, Gender based 
inferences: t(18)=0.56, p=0.59, Cohen’s d=0.26, Control category based 
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Figure 4. Children’s mean rate of inference (out of 8) at each age 
group within each school in Study 1 (Chance=4).  Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
In the context of the maintained schools, children aged 6-7 years did 
not make inferences based on any of the three dimensions at a rate that 
significantly differed from chance level (Religion based inferences: 
t(18)=1.05, p=0.31, Cohen’s d=0.49, Gender based inferences: t(18)=1.32, 
p=0.2, Cohen’s d=0.62, Control category based inferences: t(18)=0.71, 
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p=0.49, Cohen’s d=0.33), and in the context of the controlled schools 6-7 
years olds also did not make inferences based on any three dimensions at a 
rate that significantly differed from chance level (Religion based inferences: 
t(18)=0.43, p=0.67, Cohen’s d=0.2, Gender based inferences: t(18)=1.35, 
p=0.19, Cohen’s d=0.64, Control category based inferences: t(18)=1.16, 
p=0.26, Cohen’s d=0.55).  .   
At 8-9 years of age, Catholic maintained children made inferences 
based on religion category membership at a rate greater than chance level, 
t(19)=4.34, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.99, they made inferences based on 
gender category membership that was at a rate significantly lower than 
chance level, t(19)=2.23, p=0.038, Cohen’s d=1.02, and their rate of 
inference based on membership of the control categories did not significantly 
differ from chance, t(19)=2.03, p=0.056, Cohen’s d=0.93.  Likewise, 8-9 year 
olds in controlled schools made inferences based on religion group 
membership at a rate significantly greater than chance, t(19)=5.4, p<0.001, 
Cohen’s d=2.48, they made inferences based on gender group membership 
at a rate that was significantly below chance level, t(19)=2.53, p=0.02, 
Cohen’s d=1.16, and their rate of inference based on membership of the 
control categories did not significantly differ from chance, t(19)=1.36, 
p=0.189, Cohen’s d=0.62.   
The 10-11 year olds in maintained schools made inferences based on 
religion category membership at a rate that was greater than chance level, 
t(16)=2.7, p=0.016, Cohen’s d=1.35, they made inferences based on gender 
group membership at a rate significantly below chance level, t(16)=2.08, 
p=0.054, Cohen’s d=1.04, and they made inferences based on membership 
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of the control categories that did not significantly differ from chance level, 
t(16)=1.19, p=0.25, Cohen’s d=0.6.  The 10-11 year olds in controlled 
schools made inferences based on religion group membership at a rate that 
was greater than chance level, t(19)=3.15, p=0.005, Cohen’s d=1.45, and 
they made inferences based on gender group membership, t(19)=2.01, 
p=0.059, Cohen’s d=0.92, and membership of the control categories, 
t(19)=1.28, p=0.216, Cohen’s d=0.59, at a rate that that did not significantly 
differ from chance. 
Thus, from 8 to 11 years of age, children who attended de facto 
segregated schools preferred to make inferences based on membership of 
religion categories (Catholic and Protestant) at a rate greater than chance 
level, whereas children attending integrated schools did not prefer any of the 
three dimensions as a basis for inference.  
 
3.3.5. Comparisons to chance within each set of triads 
 Comparisons to chance (chance=2), which can be seen in Table 2, 
were also examined for each set of triads – the conflict between religion 
categories and gender categories, the conflict between religion categories 
and the control categories, and the conflict between gender categories and 
the control categories. 
 At 8-9 years of age the results showed that for triads presenting a 
conflict between religion group membership and gender group membership, 




Table 2. Comparisons to chance for each triad type within each age 
group and school in Study 1. 
 
* indicates rates of inference that significantly differed from chance (2). 
 



































t(18)=1.41, p=0.18, d=0.66 
t(18)=0.47, p=0.64, d=0.22 
t(18)=1.56, p=0.14, d=0.74 
 
t(19)=3.33, p=0.004*, d=1.53 
t(19)=4.22, p<0.001*, d=1.94 
t(19)=2.11, p=0.05*, d=0.97 
 
t(16)=4.76, p<0.001*, d=2.38 
t(19)=1.69, p=0.11, d=0.78 
t(19)=1, p=0.33, d=0.46 
 

































t(18)=0.2, p=0.85, d=0.09 
t(18)=0.00, p=1, d=0 
t(18)=0.00, p=1, d=0 
 
t(19)=2.89, p=0.01*, d=1.33 
t(19)=2.6, p=0.02*, d=1.19 
t(19)=1, p=0.33, d=0.46 
 
t(16)=1.1, p=0.29, d=0.55 
t(19)=2.41, p=0.03*, d=1.11 
t(19)=0.17, p=0.87, d=0.08 
 

































t(18)=0.72, p=0.48, d=0.34 
t(18)=1.92, p=0.07, d=0.91 
t(18)=1.03, p=0.32, d=0.49 
 
t(19)=0.16, p=0.87, d=0.07 
t(19)=0.15, p=0.88, d=0.07 
t(19)=0.47, p=0.64, d=0.22 
 
t(16)=0.55, p=0.59, d=0.28 
t(19)=1.05, p=0.31, d=0.48 




membership of religion categories (M=2.9, SD=1.21) at a rate significantly 
above chance, and they projected properties on the basis of gender category 
membership (M=1.1, SD=1.21) at a rate that fell significantly below chance 
level.  Likewise, 8-9 year olds attending Protestant schools made inferences 
based on religion category membership (M=3.1, SD=1.17) at a rate 
significantly above chance level, while their rate of inference based on 
gender group membership (M=0.9, SD=1.17) fell below chance level.  With 8-
9 year olds attending integrated schools, children made inferences on the 
basis of religion group membership (M=2.6, SD=1.27) at a rate that was 
marginally greater than chance level, and their rate of inference on the basis 
of gender group membership (M=1.4, SD=1.27) fell marginally below chance.   
At 10-11 years of age, a different pattern of responding was found.  
Only children attending Catholic schools made inferences based on religion 
category membership (M=2.41, SD=1.54) that was at a rate significantly 
above chance level, and they made inferences based on gender group 
membership (M=1.59, SD=1.54) that fell significantly below chance level.  
The 10-11 year olds attending Protestant and Integrated schools did not 
distinguish between the two dimensions in this way; their rates of inference 
based on religion group membership and gender group membership did not 
significantly differ from chance level.   
 
The conflict between religion group membership and membership of 
the control categories: 
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At 6-7 years of age, children within each educational context made 
inferences based on both categories at a rate that did not differ from chance 
level when presented with these trials.   
When 8-9 year olds were presented with these triads, the 8-9 year 
olds attending Catholic schools made inferences based on religion group 
membership (M=2.8, SD=1.24) at a rate that was significantly greater than 
chance, while making inferences based on membership of the control 
categories (M=1.2, SD=1.24) at a rate that fell significantly below chance.  
Likewise, 8-9 year olds attending Protestant schools also made inferences 
based on religion category membership (M=2.75, SD=1.29) at a rate that was 
significantly above chance level, while their rate of inference on the basis of 
membership of the control categories (M=1.25, SD=1.29) fell significantly 
below chance level.  Children aged 8-9 years, attending integrated schools, 
did not significantly differ from chance level in their rate of inference on the 
basis of either of the dimensions presented in these triads. 
At 10-11 years of age, only children attending Protestant schools 
projected properties on the basis of religion category membership (M=2.7, 
SD=1.3) at a rate that was significantly greater than would be expected by 
chance, while their projection of properties on the basis of membership of the 
control categories (M=1.3, SD=1.3) was at a rate that fell significantly below 
chance.  The 10-11 year olds, within the Catholic school context and the 
integrated school context, did not make inferences on the basis of either 
dimension at a rate that significantly differed from chance level when 




The conflict between gender group membership and membership of 
the control categories:   
Again, at 6-7 years of age, children within each educational context 
did not make inferences at a rate that differed from chance levels based on 
either of these dimensions when presented with these trials.  The same 
pattern of results was also found with 8-9 year olds in each educational 
context, as well as 10-11 year olds within each educational context, when 
presented with this set of triads.  
  
3.3.6. Effect of children’s own religion group membership on their 
religion based inferences. 
To examine the possible effect of children’s own religion group 
membership on their religion based inferences, two 3 (Religion Group 
Membership: Catholic, Protestant, No religion) x 2 (Base & Target Religion: 
Catholic, Protestant) mixed ANOVAs were carried out on the data collected 
from the segregated sector and the integrated sector.  There was a large 
enough group of children in both educational sectors, whose parents 
identified them as having no religion, that could also be included in the 
analyses of children’s own religion affiliations on their inferences.  
As the forced choice method used in this study could only measure 
levels of inference based on one category relative to another category, it is 
not possible to independently examine children’s projections between a base 
and target that had different religion group memberships.  The analysis could 
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only explore children’s different rate of inference between trials when the 
base and target were both Catholic, and trials when the base and target were 
both Protestant.  This is because children’s inferences when the base and 
target had different religion group memberships may have been based on the 
shared gender or control category memberships of the base and target rather 
than being based on reasoning about religion.  
Within the segregated school sector, 50 children were identified as 
Catholic by their parents, 39 children were identified as Protestant by their 
parents, and 17 children were identified as having no religion group 
membership by their parents.  The analysis of variance of the segregated 
sector revealed that there was no significant main effect of the shared 
religion group membership of the base and target on children’s rate of 
inference, F(1, 103)=0.08, p=0.78, η2partial=0.001, greenhouse-geisser 
corrected, and there was also no significant interaction between children’s 
own religion group membership and the shared religion group membership of 
the base and target in their rate of inference F(2, 103)=0.53, p=0.59, 
η2partial=0.01, greenhouse-geisser corrected.   
Within the integrated school sector, 17 children were identified as 
Catholic by their parents, 11 children were identified as Protestant by their 
parents, and 22 children were identified as having no religion group 
membership by their parents.  Like the findings from the segregated sector, 
the analysis of variance within the integrated sample showed that there was 
no significant main effect of the shared religion group membership of base 
and target on children’s rate of inference, F(1, 47)=0.01, p=0.11, η2partial=0.01, 
greenhouse-geisser corrected, and there was no significant interaction 
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between children’s own religion group membership and the shared religion 
group membership of the base and target on children’s rate of inference, F(2, 
47)=0.01, p=0.17, η2partial=0.01, greenhouse-geisser corrected. 
 
3.4. Discussion 
Our initial predictions were based on the findings from the extensive 
developmental case study of ethnic essentialism conducted in Israel (e.g., 
Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et al., 2011).  Based on the Israeli findings, it 
was expected that children aged 6-11 years old in NI would display evidence 
of stronger essentialist beliefs about ethno-religious categories than about 
other categories.  It was predicted that the strength of children’s essentialist 
thinking about religion categories would decline in later childhood around 10-
11 years of age, and it was predicted that this reduction in religion 
essentialism would occur at an earlier stage within the integrated school 
sector.  Possible differences between Catholic and Protestant children in 
their essentialist thinking was also expected based on the ethnic group 
differences found between Israeli children (i.e., Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb 
et al., 2011; Diesendruck and Haber, 2009).   
 The results of this first study in NI revealed that religion was the most 
essentialised social dimension as expected; children were more willing to 
make novel inferences on the basis of shared membership in the religion 
categories Catholic or Protestant, than they were on the basis of shared 
gender group membership or shared membership of control categories 
(ownership of a goldfish or a hamster).  This is in line with children’s strong 
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essentialist reasoning about ethnicity in Israel, a country where ethnicity is 
imbued with strong social significance (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et al., 
2011; Diesendruck, Birnbaum et al., 2013; Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz et 
al., 2013; Diesendruck and ha Levi, 2006; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009).  
Likewise, ethno-religion categories are of the greatest social significance in 
NI (Gillespie, 2010), and a strong essentialist bias appears to apply to these 
categories here in childhood.  
 However, unlike the case study in Israel and contrary to our prediction, 
the results of the current study indicate that essentialist beliefs about religion 
in NI emerge at a later stage in development.  Children in NI privileged 
religion categories as the strongest basis for inference from 8 years of age.  
The youngest children in this study, at 6-7 years of age, did not prefer any 
category as a basis of inference and so were equally as likely to project a 
property from religion, gender or the control category.  This was found 
irrespective of educational context; no children at 6-7 years of age appeared 
to essentialise religion groups.  In contrast to this, children in Israel displayed 
evidence of essentialist thinking about ethnicity from as young as 5 years of 
age, and so their essentialist bias about ethnicity seems to be in place before 
they start school (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et al., 2011; Segall et al., 
2015).  Perhaps the later onset of religion essentialism in NI, as indexed by 
the current study, is not so surprising given that research by Connolly and 
colleagues in NI reported that only about one third of 6-7 year olds appear to 
have concepts of religion categories that they personally identify with.  Thus, 
it may not be until around 8 years of age that most children in NI have fully 
developed concepts of religion categories that an essentialist bias might be 
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applied to, despite children’s developing awareness of NI markers associated 
with religion categories from around 3 years of age.   
 As well as suggesting a later emergence of religion essentialism in NI 
compared to Israel, the results of the present study also found a different 
effect of educational context compared to Israel.  Contrary to the prediction 
that integrated education would have a moderating effect on essentialist 
beliefs about religion, the findings indicated that children attending integrated 
schools did not develop strong essentialist beliefs about religion group 
membership in the first place, while segregated school children did.  From 8-
11 years of age, children who attended Catholic Maintained and State 
Controlled (Protestant) schools treated shared membership in religion 
categories as the strongest basis for inference, while children in integrated 
schools did not distinguish between religion, gender or the control category 
when deciding to draw an inference.  This would suggest that homogenous 
schools in NI, which are mainly attended by children from either the Catholic 
or Protestant community, might foster an essentialist bias about these 
religion categories.  Integrated schools, on the other hand, which create an 
environment of greater social diversity and promote an ethos of inclusion and 
respect (see Gallagher, 2010; Hewstone et al., 2005; O’Connor, 2002; Smith, 
2001), might encourage children not to privilege information about social 
category membership in their reasoning about others.   
On the other hand, the differences observed between the integrated 
and segregated sectors might also be driven by the SES of the children; 
children attending segregated schools in the current study had lower SES 
than the children attending integrated schools (i.e., percentage of children 
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receiving free school meals was 61% in the State Controlled schools, 48% in 
the Catholic maintained schools, and 16% in the integrated schools).  As 
SES poses a potential confound with educational context in this study, it is 
not clear whether educational context or SES may be driving the differences 
observed between segregated and integrated school children.       
The final hypothesis put forward that differences between ethno-
religion groups in NI might exist in children’s essentialist reasoning, as has 
been found between ethnic groups in Israel (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et 
al., 2011), was not supported by the present study.  There were no 
differences found between Catholic children, Protestant children, or children 
whose parents advised they had no religion.        
 In addition to the main findings, the current study also found a 
surprising pattern of response to gender and the control categories in the 
inference task.  Gender appeared to be a relatively impotent basis for 
inference; children were more willing to draw inferences on the basis of 
membership in the control categories than gender.  This is contrary to what 
was expected; the control categories of goldfish or hamster ownership were 
intended to act as a relatively meaningless dimension for grouping people 
along, because neither is a natural category (like gender) nor a category with 
richly clustered properties.  Thus, it was assumed that being a hamster or a 
goldfish owner would present as the weakest basis for inference.  However, 
while some research has shown that gender has been essentialised as a 
highly natural category with strong innate potential, heritability, and stability 
(particularly regarding physical properties) (i.e., Gelman et al., 1986; Taylor, 
1996; Taylor et al., 2009), other studies examining essentialist beliefs about 
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how informative gender is, using inference tasks, have found that gender 
seems to have lower inductive potential than other categories (i.e., Birnbaum 
et al., 2010; Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006; Taylor & Gelman, 1993). 
Diesendruck and colleagues report that in Israel, gender was a weaker 
basis for inference than ethnicity and social status.  Taylor and Gelman 
(1993) reported that while gender was a more salient dimension than age for 
children, age was treated as the stronger basis for inductive inference.  In a 
commentary on social essentialism, Waxman (2012) pointed out that gender 
might not be as inductively powerful for children as other categories, such as 
race and ethnicity, because gender is strongly emphasised to young children 
and so is likely to be an overfamiliar dimension for them.  As such, children 
may have more knowledge and experience of gender categories, and so 
might not see it as a particularly useful basis for inference.  This is one 
possible explanation for children’s tendency to privilege the control category 
over gender in the current study. 
 Another explanation is that the results of this study may be specific to 
the forced choice inference task that was employed, rather than to the social 
and cultural input received by children in NI, and the various educational 
settings within it.  The forced-choice task required children to choose 
between information about membership in competing social dimensions 
when deciding whether to make an inference about the target character that 
was presented.  As a result of this, it was only possible to measure the rate of 
children’s inferences for each dimension relative to another dimension – so 
inferences based on shared membership in religion categories were always 
measured relative to children’s rate of inference based on shared 
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membership in gender or control categories.  Due to this, the apparent 
strength of children’s essentialist beliefs about religion compared to the other 
dimensions may have been inflated because children were required to 
choose a category.   
Moreover, the inductive impotence of gender in this study (and other 
studies elsewhere, i.e., Birnbaum et al., 2010; Taylor & Gelman, 1993) might 
only exist when it is presented alongside other categories.  Therefore, the 
results of the current study will need to be replicated before any firm 
conclusions can be drawn from them about children’s essentialist reasoning 
about social categories in Northern Ireland.  This is the aim of the second 
study of this thesis; to establish whether the pattern of inference detailed in 
this chapter is replicable using a different inference task, which does not 
force children to choose between social dimensions when drawing 
inferences.  The next study will seek to establish the validity of the current 
results, that from 8 years of age, ethno-religion categories are strongly 
essentialised social categories in NI for children attending de facto 


































The research detailed in the preceding chapter of this thesis constitutes the 
starting point of a case study examining the development of children’s 
essentialist thinking about social categories in Northern Ireland (NI).  As 
outlined in the previous study, a forced choice inference task, based on a 
similar task used in Israel (i.e., Birnbaum et al., 2010; Diesendruck & ha Levi, 
2006), was employed as an indirect measure of children’s essentialist beliefs 
about the distinctiveness of religion, gender and control categories 
(ownership of a goldfish or a hamster) in NI.   
The findings that emerged from this study suggested that children in 
NI hold stronger essentialist beliefs about religion categories than they do 
about gender or control categories.  This is similar to findings regarding 
ethnic essentialism in childhood in the Israeli studies.  However, unlike the 
Israeli studies, children’s essentialist beliefs about religion categories 
seemed to develop later, and educational context had a different type of 
effect from the one observed in Israel (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et al., 
2011; Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz et al., 2013; Segall et al., 2015).  
Essentialist beliefs about religion category membership appeared to emerge 
at 8 years of age among children who attended segregated schools, while 
children who attended integrated schools did not seem to privilege 
information about membership in any categories.  
 One limitation of the previous study is that the forced choice design of 
the inference task could only reveal the inductive potential of each dimension 
relative to another dimension.  Children did not have the option of drawing as 
many inferences as they might have been preferred based on membership in 
125 
 
each social category, thereby obscuring their absolute level of inference for 
religion, gender and the control categories.  As a result, the previous study, 
due to the use of a forced choice design, may have overestimated children’s 
preference for religion based inferences while, at the same time, 
underestimating children’s preference for inferences based on gender.  The 
current study aims to replicate the results of the previous study, and also 
address this limitation by giving children the opportunity to draw as many 
inferences as they like on the basis of shared category membership in any of 
the three categories presented to them.  Another limitation of the previous 
study was that the socio-economic status (SES) of the children tested posed 
a potential confound in interpreting the effect of educational context observed 
in Study 1; children attending segregated schools were likely to have been of 
lower SES than children attending integrated schools in Study 1, based on 
the percentage of free school meals recorded for each school type. 
 
4.1.1. The current study 
In order to measure children’s absolute levels of inference based on 
religion, gender and the control categories in the present study, the inductive 
inference task has been modified to eliminate the imperative to choose 
between information about competing category memberships.  Similar to the 
inference task conducted by Gelman and Markman (1987) that was 
described in Chapter 1, the current inference task will invite children to 
project a novel property from one base character to a target character.  The 
task is comprised of 12 trials that can be broken down into three sets of 
stimuli (each set of stimuli consists of four trials); one set presents children 
126 
 
with information about religion and gender, one set presents information 
about religion and the control categories, and one set presents information 
about gender and the control categories.  Each trial varies by whether the 
base and target characters share membership of two social categories, share 
membership in one social category, or do not share membership of any 
social categories at all.  For example, in a stimuli set that presents 
information about religion and gender, the base character might be a Catholic 
boy in all four trials, but the target would change.  In one trial, the target 
would also be a Catholic boy (membership in two categories would be 
shared).  In another trial, the target would be a Catholic girl (religion group 
membership would be shared).  In another trial, the target would be a 
Protestant boy (gender group membership would be shared).  In another trial, 
the target would be a Protestant girl (there would be no shared membership 
in either categories).  Children can decide to either project a property 
between each base and target character, or not project a property.  The 
advantage of this is that the task not only will be sensitive enough to detect 
children’s preference for one social dimension over another when drawing 
inferences (i.e., by comparing children’s rate of inference for each social 
dimension in trials where the base and target shared membership of each 
category), but it also can demonstrate whether children seem to essentialise 
these categories, as indexed by their willingness to draw novel inferences at 
all.  Furthermore, the current study may show a different pattern of inference 
based on gender and the control categories, compared to the forced choice 
task; gender might be used as a stronger basis for inference when children 
do not have to choose between it and the other categories.   
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 Based on the findings from the preceding study, it was expected that 
children in NI will display stronger evidence of essentialist thinking about 
ethno-religion categories, than about gender or the control categories.  It is 
predicted that essentialist reasoning about religion will emerge at 8 years of 
age, at a later stage than has been found by the case study in Israel 
(Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et al., 2011), and this will be found within 
segregated schools.  Integrated school children will not appear to privilege 
any social dimension as a basis for inference.  Based on the previous study, 
it is also predicted that there will be no evidence of differences between 
Catholic and Protestant children in their essentialist reasoning about ethno-
religion categories, in contrast to ethnic group differences found in Israel 




The participants were 165 children, aged 6 to 11 years, recruited from 
three different educational contexts and tested with written parental consent, 
as well as the verbal assent of all children involved.  Children were recruited 
from State controlled (majority Protestant), Catholic maintained (majority 
Catholic), and Integrated schools (religiously mixed), in Northern Ireland.  
See Table 3 for a further breakdown of the sample.  The percentage of 
children receiving free school meals in each school was similar in the current 
sample, ranging from 20-28%, removing the potential confound between SES 
and educational context in this study.  Ethical approval for this study can be 




Table 3. Further information about the sample in Study 2. 






State-Controlled 6-7 years old: N=18 
8-9 years old: N=20 










6-7 years old: N=17 
8-9 years old: N=21 








Integrated 6-7 years old: N=18 
8-9 years old: N=19 










4.2.2. Materials and Design 
Children were presented with 3 blocks or sets of coloured pictures 
portraying child characters, accompanied by verbal labels highlighting the 
group memberships of the characters depicted in the illustrations.  Set 1 
conveyed religion category membership and gender category membership, 
Set 2 conveyed religion category membership and membership of the control 
categories (i.e., pet ownership), and Set 3 conveyed gender category 
membership and control category membership (see Table 4 for a 
breakdown).  The order of set presentation was counterbalanced across 
participants.   
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Each stimulus set consisted of a base picture and four target pictures. 
On each of the four individual trials using these pictures, children were 
presented with the base picture on all four occasions and were invited to 
project a novel property from the base picture to four different target pictures 
in turn.  Across each set of trials, the target varied by whether it shared 
membership of two categories with the base, membership of one category 
with the base, or membership of no categories with the base.  An example of 
this can be seen in Figure 5; each target picture in a set varies by the 
category memberships it does and does not share with the base. Also see 
Table 4 for a further breakdown of the categories shared by the base and 
target in each stimulus set.  As Study 2 did not present children with a choice 
to make between conflicting category information as in Study 1, the current 
task allowed us to measure children’s absolute levels of inference, rather 
than children’s rate of inference on the basis of one dimension relative to 
another.  
As in Study 1, children received verbal labels for each of the three 
dimensions presented, and gender group membership was the only 
dimension that children received pictorial cues for.  The visual stimuli were 
similar to the stimuli used in the previous study; in this study the pictures 
were drawn using a computer and in Study 1 the pictures were drawn by 
hand.  (See Figure 5 for an example of the stimuli used for Set 1, which 
presented children with trials about religion categories and gender 
categories).  Again, gender was presented with the characters being drawn 
clearly as either a boy or a girl, but unlike Study 1, when gender was not one 
of the dimensions that the experimenter was inviting the participants to 
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reason about, the character was presented as an androgynous silhouette.  
This can be seen in Set 2, with gender information obscured in the pictures 
(in contrast, visual cues about gender were held constant in study 1 when 
children were not being asked to reason about gender categories).   
Rather than using different novel properties for each trial in this study, 
the experimenter used three novel properties – one property was used 
throughout each set of trials.  The reason for this is because the same base 
picture is used for each of the four trials in a particular set; the target picture 
changes throughout the trials and children are invited to project the novel 
property possessed by the base picture to each of the target pictures.  The 
properties were gleeve, sproice and chaunch.  The assignment of these 
properties to particular stimulus sets was counterbalanced across 
participants.     
 
4.2.3. Procedure 
Children participated in the experiment in a quiet corner of the 
classroom after giving their verbal assent to take part.  The experimenter 
explained to children that they would be taking part in a picture task to see 
how they think about other children and that there were no right or wrong 
answers to the questions.  The script used can be seen in Figure 5.  For each 
trial, children were presented with a base picture, they were given verbal 
information about the two categories that the base character belonged to, 
and they were told that the character possessed a novel property.  A target 
picture was then  
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Table 4. A breakdown of the categories shared by the base and target in 
each stimulus set in Study 26.  The order of presentation of the targets 
was counterbalanced within stimulus sets and across children. 
                                                          
6 Note - The letter R represents religion group membership, the letter 
G represents gender group membership, and the letter C represents 
membership of the control categories.  The + sign indicates that the base and 
target both share membership of a particular category, and the – sign 
indicates that the base and target do not share membership of a particular 
category.  For example, ‘R+/G-’ indicates a trial in which the base and target 
share membership of the same religion group but they have different gender 
group memberships.     
 
Block of Trials Target 1 Target 2 Target 3 Target 4 
Set 1: Religion & Gender R+/G+ R+/G- R-/G+ R-/G- 
Set 2: Religion & Control R+/C+ R+/C- R-/C+ R-/C- 
Set 3: Gender & Control G+/C+ G+/C- G-/C+ G-/C- 
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Figure 5. Stimuli used in Study 2, for Set 1, which conveys 
information about religion and gender.  Each target picture is labelled 
by which dimensions are shared with the base picture (see also 
Table 4), for example, R+/G- indicates that this target shares religion 
group membership with the base, but they have different gender 
group memberships. 
 
placed beside the base and children were given verbal information about the 
category memberships that the target either did or did not share with the 
base character.  Children were then asked whether they thought the target 
shared the novel property with the base.  Children were given a score of 1 for 
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each trial if they chose to make an inference, and a score of 0 when they did 
not choose to make an inference.  The order of each set of triads was 
counterbalanced across participants, and the novel properties were 




As each stimulus set consisted of four trials, in which membership of 
two categories was shared by the base and target (e.g., Religion+/Gender+), 
or membership of one category was shared (e.g., Religion+/Gender-, 
Religion-/Gender+), or in which the base and target shared membership of 
neither categories (e.g., Religion-/Gender-), children could score a maximum 
of 4 in each set of trials if they chose to draw an inference in every trial.  
However, they could only score a maximum of two for drawing an inference 
on the basis of each dimension because there were only two occasions in 
which the base and target shared membership of one of the dimensions 
presented in each set.  When collapsing across stimulus sets to examine 
children’s overall rate of inference for each dimension, children had the 
opportunity to draw an inference when the base and a target shared 
membership of each dimension on four occasions (e.g., Religion+/Gender+, 
Religion+/Gender-, Religion+/Control+, Religion+/Control-).  Thus, children 
could score a maximum of 4 for drawing an inference based on each 




4.3.2 Main findings 
A mixed analysis of variance was conducted to examine whether there 
was an effect of age group (6-7, 8-9 and 10-11 years), educational context 
(Protestant  controlled schools, Catholic maintained  schools, and integrated 
schools), and dimension (religion, pet and gender) on children’s rate of 
inference.  The analysis revealed a significant main effect of dimension on 
children’s rate of inference, F(2, 312)=22.43, p<0.001, η2partial=0.126.  Post 
hoc t tests (Bonferroni adjusted, p=0.017) revealed that children made more 
inferences based on religion category membership (M=2.61, SD=1.06), 
t(164)=6.82, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.52,  and control category membership 
(M=2.42, SD=1.11), t(164)=4.57, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.34, than they did 
based on gender category membership (M=2.05, SD=1.08), while children’s 
rate of inference on the basis of religion category membership was 
marginally greater than their rate of inference on the basis of control category 
membership, t(164)=2.042, p=0.043, Cohen’s d=0.18.  
Comparisons to chance (chance=2) showed that children’s rate of 
inference based on religion group membership, t(164)=7.4, p<0.001, Cohen’s 
d=1.56, and membership of the control categories, t(164)=4.93, p<0.001, 
Cohen’s d=0.77, was at a rate significantly above chance, but their 
inferences based on gender group membership were at a rate that did not 




4.3.3. Effects of educational context 
The results of the analysis also revealed a significant interaction 
between educational context and dimension on children’s rate of inference, 
F(4, 312)=2.66, p=0.033, η2partial=0.03, and this can be seen in Figure 6.  This 
interaction was followed up by three one-way within subject analyses of 
variance - one within each educational context.  A main effect of dimension 
was found within the Catholic maintained sector, F(2, 110)=11.17, p<0.001, 
η2partial=0.17, and within the Protestant controlled sector, F(2, 110)=14.68, 
p<0.001, η2partial=0.21.  Within the integrated sector there was no significant 
main effect of dimension, F(2, 110)=1.68, p=0.19, η2partial=0.03.   
Bonferroni adjusted paired t tests (p=0.017) were conducted within the 
samples from the segregated schools.  The results showed that children 
attending Catholic schools had a significantly higher rate of inference based 
on religion group membership (M=2.5, SD=1.13), t(53)=4.79, p<0.001, 
Cohen’s d=0.57, than they did based on gender group membership (M=1.85, 
SD=1.14), and their rate of inference based on membership of the control 
categories (M=2.2, SD=1.05) was also higher than their rate of inference 
based on gender group membership, t(53)=2.55, p=.01, Cohen’s d=0.32.  
Meanwhile, their rate of inference on the basis of membership of the religion 
categories was marginally higher than their rate of inference based on 
membership of the control categories, t(53)=2.13, p=0.04, Cohen’s d=0.28.   
For children attending Protestant controlled schools, it was found that 
children made as many inferences based on religion category membership 
(M=2.86, SD=0.96) as they did based on membership of the control 




Figure 6. Mean rate of inference (out of 4) based on religion, pet and 
gender for each school group in Study 2. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
displaying a higher rate of inference on the basis of religion group 
membership, t(55)=5.67 p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.89, and membership of the 
control categories, t(55)=3.71, p=0.001, Cohen’s d=0.5, than they did based 
on gender group membership (M=2.02, SD=0.92).   
Comparisons to chance (chance=2) revealed that Catholic maintained 
children’s rate of inference based on religion group membership, t(53)=3.26, 













rates of inference based on membership of the control categories, 
t(53)=1.42, p=0.161, Cohen’s d=0.39, and gender group membership did not 
significantly differ from chance, t(53)=0.96, p=0.344, Cohen’s d=0.26.  Within 
the Protestant controlled  sample, comparisons to chance revealed that 
children’s inferences based on religion group membership, t(55)=6.67, 
p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.8, and membership of the control categories, 
t(55)=3.46, p=0.001, Cohen’s d=0.93, were at a rate that was significantly 
above chance level, but their rate of inference based on gender group 
membership did not differ significantly from chance, t(55)=0.15, p=0.886, 
Cohen’s d=0.04.  Within the integrated sample, it was found that children’s 
inferences based on religion group membership, t(54)= 3.28, p=0.002, 
Cohen’s d=0.89, and membership of the control categories were at a rate 
significantly above chance level, t(54)=3.6, p=0.001, Cohen’s d=0.98, but 
their inferences based on gender group membership were at a rate that did 
not differ from chance, t(54)=1.77, p=0.083, Cohen’s d=0.48. 
 
4.3.4. Developmental trends 
The analysis of variance revealed that there was a marginally significant 
interaction between age group and children’s inferences from specific 
dimensions, F(4, 312)=2.09, p=0.083, η2partial=0.026, as can be seen in 
Figure 7.  There was no significant interaction between age group, 
educational context and dimension, F(8, 312)=1, p=0.43, η2partial=0.03.  
The marginal interaction between age group and dimension was followed up 















of dimension on children’s rate of inference, within each age group.  The 
three analyses revealed significant main effects of dimension on children’s 
inferences within all three age groups - 6-7 year olds: F(2, 102)=7.29, 
p=0.001, η2partial=0.12, 8-9 year olds: F(2, 102)=12.33, p<0.001, 
η2partial=0.17, 10-11 year olds: F(2, 102)=7.11, p=0.001, η2partial=0.12.  
Post hoc, Bonferroni corrected comparisons (p=0.017), showed that 6-7 year 
olds made more inferences based on religion category membership (M=2.36, 
Figure 7. Mean rate of inference (out of 4) based on each dimension, 




SD=1.19), t(52)=3.06, p=0.01, Cohen’s d=0.36, and membership of the 
control categories (M=2.47, SD=1.23), t(52)=3.8, p=0.001, Cohen’s d=0.45, 
than they did based on gender group membership (M=1.94, SD=1.15), and 
their rate of inference based on religion group membership did not differ from 
their rate of inference based on membership of the control categories, 
t(52)=0.7 p=0.49, Cohen’s d=0.09.  One sample t-tests revealed that 
children’s inferences based on religion group membership, t(52)=2.19, 
SD=0.033, Cohen’s d=0.61, and membership of the control categories, 
t(52)=2.78, p=0.008, Cohen’s d=0.77, were at a rate significantly above 
chance level, but their inferences based on gender were at a rate that did not 
significantly differ from chance, t(52)=0.36, p=0.722, Cohen’s d=0.1.  
The post hoc comparisons for children aged 8-9 years, showed a 
higher rate of inference based on religion group membership (M=2.78, 
SD=0.88), t(59)=4.7, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.72, and membership of the 
control categories (M=2.53, SD=0.93), t(59)=3.38, p=0.001, Cohen’s d=0.45, 
than their rate of inference on the basis of gender group membership 
(M=2.08, SD=1.05), but like the 6-7 year olds, they also did not distinguish 
between religion group membership and membership of the control 
categories in their rate of inference, t(59)=1.72, p=0.09, Cohen’s d=0.28.  
Comparisons to chance showed that 8-9 year old children’s rate of inference 
based on religion, t(59)=6.8, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.77, and membership of 
the control categories, t(59)=4.45, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.16, were above 
chance level, but their inferences based on gender were at a rate that did not 
significantly differ from chance, t(59)=0.62, p=0.54, Cohen’s d=0.16.  
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 For children aged 10-11 years in the present study, a different pattern 
from the younger age groups was found: children made more inferences 
based on religion group membership (M=2.67, SD=1.08) than they did based 
on gender group membership (M=2.12, SD=1.06), t(51)=3.95, p<0.001, 
Cohen’s d=0.51, and they made more inferences based on religion category 
membership than they did based on membership of the control categories 
(M=2.25, SD=1.15), t(51)=2.52, p=0.015, Cohen’s d=0.38.  They did not 
distinguish between gender group membership and membership of the 
control categories in their rate of inference, t(51)=0.88 p=0.38, Cohen’s 
d=0.12.  Comparisons to chance showed that 10-11 year old children’s rate 
of inference based on religion group membership was significantly above 
chance level, t(51)=4.5, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.26, but their rate of inference 
based on membership of the control categories, t(51)=1.56, p=0.124, 
Cohen’s d=0.44, and membership of gender categories, t(51)=0.79, p=0.436, 
Cohen’s d=0.22, was at a rate that did not significantly differ from chance.  
  
4.3.5. Exploratory analysis of religion-based inferences of each age 
group within each educational context. 
While there was no significant 3 way interaction between age group, 
educational context, and social dimension (F(8, 312)=1, p=0.43, η2partial=0.03) 
found in this study, an exploratory analysis of children’s religion based 
inferences compared to their control category based inferences revealed 
some interesting findings.  Figure 8 shows the mean difference scores 
between religion based inferences and control category based inferences 




higher religion based inferences compared to control category based 
inferences.    
Paired t tests were conducted within each age group in each 
educational context.  Across educational context, it was found that 6-7 year 
old children did not distinguish between religion and the control categories in 
their rate of inference, Catholic Maintained: t(16)=0.52, p=0.61, Cohen’s 
d=0.09, Protestant Controlled: t(17)=0, p=1, Cohen’s d=0, Integrated: 
Figure 8. The mean difference scores between religion based 
inferences and control category based inferences, within each 
educational context and age group, in Study 2.  Error bars represent 


















6-7 yr olds 8-9 yr olds 10-11 yr olds
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t=(17)=0.7, p=0.5, Cohen’s d=0.2.  However, for older children differences 
were found within the segregated school context.   
It was revealed that 8-9 year old children attending Catholic 
Maintained schools made significantly more religion based inferences than 
inferences based on the control categories, t(20)=2.55, p=0.019, Cohen’s 
d=0.73, while 10-11 year olds did not significantly distinguish between them, 
t(15)=1.46, p=0.16, Cohen’s d=0.34.  Within Protestant Controlled schools, it 
was found that 8-9 year olds treated religion categories and the control 
categories as equally useful bases for inference, t(19)=0.51, p=0.61, Cohen’s 
d=0.16, while 10-11 year olds made more inferences based on shared 
membership in religion categories than for control categories, t(17)=2.56, 
p=0.02, Cohen’s d=0.8.  Children attending integrated schools did not 
distinguish between religion and control categories as a basis for inference at 
any age, 8-9 year olds: t(18)=0, p=1, Cohen’s d=0, 10-11 year olds: 
t(17)=0.21, p=0.83, Cohen’s d=0.05.  Overall, this exploratory analysis 
indicated that within the segregated educational context, 8-9 year olds 
attending Catholic Maintained schools privileged religion categories over 
control categories in their reasoning, while this emerged later at 10-11 year 
olds within Protestant Controlled schools.     
 
4.3.6. Effect of children’s own religion group membership on their 
religion based inferences. 
Further analyses were carried out to examine the effect of children’s 
own religion group membership on their rate of inference between base and 
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target pictures of varying religion group membership.  A 2 (religion group 
membership: Catholic, Protestant) x 2 (base religion: Catholic, Protestant) x 2 
(target religion: Catholic, Protestant) mixed analysis of variance was 
conducted on the data collected from segregated schools.  Within the 
segregated school sample, 50 children were identified as Protestant by their 
parents and 51 children were identified as Catholic.  The same analysis of 
children’s own religion group membership could not be conducted within the 
integrated school sample because there were only 5 Protestant children in 
the sample compared to 29 Catholic children.     
The analysis of the segregated sample showed that there was a 
significant main effect of the target religion on children’s rate of inference, 
F(1, 99)=127.73, p<0.001, η2partial=0.56, greenhouse-geisser corrected, 
with children making more generalisations to a Protestant target (M=1.2, 
SD=0.53) than to a Catholic target (M=0.9, SD=0.52).  There was also a 
significant interaction (see Figure 9) between children’s own religion group 
membership and the religion of the target, F(1, 99)=5, p=0.028, 
η2partial=0.05.  greenhouse-geisser adjusted.  This was followed-up by two 
one-way Anova’s examining the effect of children’s own religion group 
membership on their rate of projection to different religious targets.  It was 
found that there was no significant effect of children’s own religion group 
membership on their preference for projecting novel properties to a Catholic 
target, F(1, 99)=0.25, p=0.62, η2partial=0.003, or a Protestant target, F(1, 
99)=2.15, p=0.15, η2partial=0.02.  However, comparisons to chance 
(chance=1) showed that Protestant children projected properties to a 





























Figure 9. The interaction between children’s own religion group 
membership and their mean rate of inference (out of 2) based on the 
religion group membership of the character in the target picture in 
Study 2.  Error bars represent 95% confidence interval. 
 
SD=0.5), t(49)=3.99, p<0.001,Cohen’s d=1.14, but did not differ from chance 
in their mean rate of projection to a Catholic target (M=0.87, SD=0.48), 
t(49)=1.91, p=0.06, Cohen’s d=0.55.  Catholic children did not differ from 
chance in their rate of projection to a Catholic target (M=0.92, SD=0.55), 
t(50)=1.02, p=0.31, Cohen’s d=0.29, or a Protestant target (M=1.13, 
SD=0.55), t(50)=1.67, p=0.1, Cohen’s d=0.47.    
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There was also a significant interaction between the base religion and 
the target religion, F(1, 99)=21.34, p<0.001, η2partial=0.18, greenhouse-
geisser corrected, on children’s rate of inference, with children making more 
inferences between a base and target sharing the same religion than 
between a base and target that had different religions, which can be seen in 
Figure 10.  Post hoc t tests showed that children projected marginally more 
properties between two Protestant characters (M=1.64, SD=0.78) than 
between two Catholic characters (M=1.25, SD=0.7), t(109)=4.41, p<0.001, 
Cohen’s d=0.53.  They also projected more properties between two 
Protestant characters than from a Catholic picture to a Protestant picture 
(M=0.76, SD=0.73, t(109)=8.64, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.16, or from a 
Protestant picture to a Catholic picture (M=0.54, SD=0.69), t(109)=11.49,  
more properties from a Catholic base to a Protestant target, than from a 
Protestant base to a Catholic target, t(109)=2.69, p=0.01, Cohen’s d=0.31.  
Comparisons to chance (chance=1) showed that children’s rate of inference 
from a Protestant base to a Protestant target, t(109)=8.61, p<0.001, Cohen’s 
d=1.65, and from a Catholic base to a Catholic target, t(109)=3.83, p<0.001, 
Cohen’s d=0.73, were significantly above chance level.  Their rate of 
inference from a Catholic base to a Protestant target, t(109)=3.4, p=0.001, 
Cohen’s d=0.65, and from a Protestant base to a Catholic target were 
significantly below chance level, t(109)=7.08, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.36.      
While it was not possible to conduct an analysis of children’s own 
religion group membership on their inferences within the integrated sector, it 




Figure 10. The interaction between the religion of the base picture 
and the religion of the target picture on children’s mean rate of 
inference (out of 2) in Study 2.  Error bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals.  Children made more inferences when the base and and 
target shared the same religion group membership, compared to 
when they did not. 
 
 
integrated sector as a whole.  A 2 (Base religion: Catholic, Protestant) x 2 
(Target religion: Catholic, Protestant) repeated measures analysis of 
variance was carried out.  It was found that there was a significant main 
effect of the religion group membership of the base picture on children’s rate 
of inference, F(1, 54)=4.87, p=0.03, η2partial=0.08, greenhouse- geisser 






















Protestant base picture (M=1.11, SD=0.56) than on a Catholic base picture 
(M=0.92, SD=0.49).  There was also a significant main effect of the religion 
group membership of the target picture on children’s rate of inference, F(1, 
54)=24.22, p<0.001, η2partial=0.36, greenhouse-geisser corrected.  Children 
preferred to project more properties to a Protestant target picture (M=1.06, 
SD=0.51) than to a Catholic target picture (M=0.96, SD=0.54).  There was no 
significant interaction between the religion group membership of the base 
and the religion group membership of the target, F(1, 54)=1.31, p=0.26, 
η2partial=0.02, greenhouse-geisser adjusted; integrated children were as likely 
to project properties between two characters who shared the same religion, 
as between two characters who did not. 
 
4.4. Discussion  
The aim of the present study was to replicate the results of the previous 
inference study conducted in Northern Ireland (NI), using a modified 
inference task that would allow the measurement of children’s absolute level 
of inference on the basis of each social category presented to them (i.e., 
religion, gender and control categories).  Based on the results of the first NI 
study, it was predicted that the current task would, again, reveal that children 
in NI essentialise ethno-religion categories more strongly than gender or the 
control categories.  It was predicted that essentialist thinking about religion 
categories would emerge at 8 years of age – later than has been observed in 
Israeli children’s essentialist reasoning about ethnicity (Birnbaum et al., 2010; 
Deeb et al., 2011) – and this would be observed within the segregated school 
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sector only.  There was no expectation that Catholic children and Protestant 
children would differ in their essentialist reasoning about religion categories.   
 As expected, the results of the current study indicated that children in 
NI hold stronger essentialist beliefs about religion categories, as was found in 
the preceding study and similar to Israeli children’s strong essentialist 
reasoning about ethnicity (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Diesendruck & ha Levi, 
2006; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009).  However, the current pattern of results 
differed from the previous study in that children’s stronger preference for 
drawing inferences on the basis of shared religion category membership, 
over gender and control categories, did not seem to emerge until 10 years of 
age.  This is later than the age of emergence found in the first study (and 
much later than the emergence of ethnic essentialism in Israel, Birnbaum et 
al., 2010), in which children displayed essentialist reasoning about religion 
categories from 8 years of age in NI.   
In addition to the different effect of age on the emergence of 
essentialist reasoning about religion suggested by the current study, it was 
also discovered that educational context impacted differently on children’s 
reasoning compared to Study 1.  As expected, children who attended 
segregated schools reasoned differently about the social categories, 
compared to children attending integrated schools, who did not display a 
preference for one category over another when drawing inferences.  
However, children attending segregated schools drew more inferences on 
the basis of religion and control category memberships, than they did based 
on gender, which appeared to be a weak basis for inference.  Furthermore, 
children attending Catholic maintained schools demonstrated a weak 
149 
 
preference for religion based inferences over control category based 
inferences, while Protestant controlled school children did not distinguish 
between them.   
As in the previous study, the current one also found that children 
attending segregated schools were more likely to display an essentialist bias 
towards religion categories in NI than children attending integrated schools, 
who do not appear to differentiate between religion, gender and a control 
category in their essentialist reasoning.  This finding in Study 2 indicates that 
differences in SES are unlikely to have produced the effect of educational 
context observed in Study 1, as this effect was observed in the current study 
despite children coming from a similar socio-economic background across 
educational sector in Study 2.     
In addition to this, an exploratory analysis of religion, compared to 
control category based inferences, suggested a different effect of age within 
each educational context on religion-based projections.  It was found that 8 
year olds attending Catholic maintained schools seemed to essentialise 
religion categories more so than control categories, while this distinction 
emerged at 10 years of age in children attending Protestant Controlled 
schools.  Integrated children from 6-11 years treated membership in religion 
and control categories as equally informative.   
Contrary to the expectation that no group differences would emerge 
between Catholic and Protestant children in their essentialist reasoning about 
religion categories, the current study produced some puzzling results.  While 
there were no significant differences between Protestant and Catholic 
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children’s rate of inference to each religion target presented, comparisons to 
chance showed that Protestant children favoured a Protestant target picture 
at a rate greater than chance alone would predict, while Catholic children 
showed no preference for one target over another, responding at chance 
level when projecting to either target.  It is unclear why Protestant children 
may have a preference for projecting to a Protestant Target picture. Thus, it 
will be important to see whether the effect replicates in the next experiment.  
To conclude this chapter, it should be noted that the differences 
between Study 1 and Study 2 may be attributable to the different type of 
inference task used in each study.  The forced choice task required children 
to choose between competing category information when drawing inferences, 
while the unconstrained inference task of Study 2 allowed children to draw as 
many inferences as they were willing to on the basis of shared membership 
in all three social categories presented to them.  In order to examine whether 
differences between the tasks used in Studies 1 and 2 may have caused 
differences in the findings, the results of the present, unconstrained inference 
task will need to be replicated with a different sample of children in NI. 
Additionally, a possible limitation of the present inference task needs 
to be addressed; the later emergence of essentialist reasoning about religion 
in NI, compared to that of ethnicity in Israel (i.e., Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb 
et al., 2011), may be caused by demands of the task.  Younger children, at 6-
7 years of age, may be displaying no preference for religion over the control 
categories when drawing inferences because the stimuli in both studies did 
not contain visual cues to help them track the various category memberships 
presented in each trial.  Thus, the youngest children may not have 
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distinguished between religion and the control categories because they could 
not remember all of the information they were given.  The aim of the next 
study is to examine whether the results of the current study are replicable, 
and whether including visual cues about category memberships in the task 
might reveal essentialist reasoning about religion categories at an earlier 













This third study of children’s essentialist reasoning in Northern Ireland (NI) 
consists of another inductive inference study, intended to provide an indirect 
measure of children’s essentialist beliefs about the cohesiveness and 
distinctiveness of ethno-religion categories.  As the previous two chapters 
have demonstrated, it appears that children in NI essentialise religion 
categories (and treat gender as uninformative), and this bias emerges late in 
childhood, possibly between 8 and 11 years of age, within the de facto 
segregated educational environment.  While the preceding studies agree on 
these points, there are some areas of discrepancy between the findings of 
the two studies.   
The forced choice inference task of Chapter 3 suggested that ethno-
religion essentialism emerges at 8 years of age, while the unconstrained 
inference task of Chapter 4 indicates that this happens at 10 years of age.  
Both studies found that children attending segregated schools reasoned 
differently about the categories, compared to children attending integrated 
schools, who did not seem to privilege any social category as a basis for 
inference.  However, while segregated school children in Study 1 
essentialised religion most at 8 years of age, Study 2 indicated that only 
Catholic Maintained school children did this at 8 years of age and Protestant 
Controlled children privileged religion group membership at 10 years of age.  
In addition to this, no ethno-religious group differences were found between 
Catholic and Protestant children in Study 1, but Study 2 revealed that 
segregated school children from the Protestant community showed a 
preference for projecting properties to a Protestant target, but not to a 
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Catholic target, while Catholic children did not have a preference for either 
target.  This may suggest that Protestant children in the segregated 
educational sector essentialise their outgroup – Catholics – more strongly 
than their own group, but this finding needs to be replicated.   
 The differences that exist between the results of these two studies 
may have emerged because of differences between the two inference tasks; 
the forced choice task measured children’s relative level of inference for each 
social category, while the unconstrained inference task was able to measure 
children’s absolute level of inference for each social category.  However, with 
regards to the apparent late-emergence of essentialist reasoning about 
religion categories in both studies, it is speculated that 6-7 year old children 
might not be distinguishing between membership in religion and the control 
categories because this information may be hard for them track.  As the 
stimuli that were used in Study 1 and Study 2 did not contain visual cues 
about the characters’ memberships in religion and the control categories, the 
task may have been too demanding to detect differences in essentialist 
reasoning about these categories at 6-7 years of age. 
Thus, the aim of the current study is to replicate the previous study by 
presenting children with the unconstrained inference task, but with visual 
cues about religion and control category memberships added to the stimuli.  
By doing this, the current study may show an earlier emergence of 
essentialist beliefs about religion categories in NI.  It may also continue to 
demonstrate a pattern of late emergence, but this replication will hopefully be 
able to resolve some of the discrepancies between Study 1 and Study 2.  
These discrepancies are about the exact age when essentialist beliefs about 
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religion categories in NI appear, as well as how exactly educational context 
influences children’s beliefs.  
 
5.1.1. The current study 
The current study employs the unconstrained inference task that was 
used in Study 2 to measure children’s absolute level of inference on the basis 
of each of the three dimensions presented to them (i.e., religion, gender, and 
control categories).  The only difference between the current inference task 
and the task used in Study 2 is that the current task includes visual cues 
about religion and control category memberships in the stimuli.  This is to 
make information about religion and control category memberships easier for 
6-7 year olds to remember when asked to draw an inference.  Visual cues 
about gender category membership were present in the previous two studies, 
and continue to be present in the current study (except in trials where gender 
category membership is not presented and androgynous silhouettes were 
used).  The same novel properties from Study 2 were used in the current 
task, and just like the task detailed in the previous chapter, children were 
shown trials of one base and one target character and were invited to project 
a property from the base to the target in each trial.  Each trial (e.g., 
presenting religion and gender together) varied by whether the base and 
target characters shared membership of two categories (e.g., both religion 
and gender), membership of one category (e.g., membership in religion 
category shared, but different gender, and then membership of same gender 
category shared, but different religion), or membership in none of the 
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categories (e.g., different religion category memberships and different gender 
category memberships).   
Based on the previous two studies, and similar to essentialist 
reasoning about ethnicity in Israel (Birnbaum et al., 2009; Deeb et al., 2011; 
Diesendruck & Haber, 2009), it is expected that the current study will again 
suggest that children in NI essentialise religion group membership more 
strongly than membership in gender or control categories.  It is also predicted 
that children’s essentialist reasoning about religion group membership will 
emerge later in childhood, between 8-11 years of age.  However, due to the 
inclusion of visual cues about religion and control category memberships in 
the present stimuli, it might be expected that children could show indications 
of essentialising religion categories at the earlier age of 6-7 years, if the 
added visual cues reduce the possible demands of the task for younger 
children.  This would be consistent with the early emergence of essentialist 
reasoning about ethnicity found in Israel at 5 years of age (Birnbaum et al., 
2010; Deeb et al., 2011).  Further to this, it is predicted that a bias towards 
essentialising religion categories will be influenced by attending a segregated 
school, while children attending integrated schools will show no preference 





The participants were 228 children, aged 6 to 11 years, recruited from 
three different educational contexts and tested with written parental consent, 
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as well as the verbal assent of all children involved.  Children were recruited 
from State controlled (majority Protestant), Catholic maintained (majority 
Catholic), and Integrated schools (religiously mixed), in Northern Ireland.  
See Table 5 for a further breakdown of the sample.  Ethical approval for this 
study can be found in Appendix 3. 
 
5.2.2. Design and Materials 
As the current study was a replication of the previous one, children were 
presented with the same task in the current study as they were in Study 2, 
with some minor changes to the visual stimuli.  As in Study 2, children were 
presented with 12 trials, consisting of 3 sets of pictures depicting child 
characters drawn using a computer.  The pictures were accompanied by 
verbal labels highlighting the category information that children were 
presented with in the task – religion categories, gender categories and 
control categories (pet ownership).   Each set of pictures presented children 
with information about two dimensions: Set 1 conveyed religion categories 
and gender categories, Set 2 conveyed religion categories and control 
categories, and Set 3 conveyed gender categories and control categories.  
Just like the previous study, children were invited to project a novel property 
from a base picture to four different target pictures in turn, in each set of 
trials.  The category memberships shared or not shared by each base and 
target were manipulated across trials.  The order of set presentation was 




Table 5. Further information about the sample in Study 3. 






State-Controlled 6-7 years old: N=18 
8-9 years old: N=27 









6-7 years old: N=30 
8-9 years old: N=24 




Not Religious: 3% 
 
8% 
Integrated 6-7 years old: N=25 
8-9 years old: N=27 









The stimuli presented in this study differed from the previous study by 
presenting children with pictorial cues about religion categories and the 
control categories, in addition to the pictorial cues given about gender 
category membership.  The reason for including pictorial cues for all three 
dimensions in this study was to reduce the cognitive demands placed on 
children by making the categories more salient.  In the current study, religion 
categories were represented by two visually distinct drawings of a church to 
symbolise the two religion categories of interest – Catholic and Protestant.  
The different shapes of each church were intended to represent how Catholic 
and Protestant churches differ in reality, but children did not necessarily have 
to realise this because they were also be provided with the category labels.   
Pet ownership was conveyed by drawings of a hamster or a goldfish in 
the pictures to indicate which pet the character in the picture owned.  As 
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before, gender was presented with characters was being drawn as either a 
boy or a girl, or as androgynous silhouettes for Set 2 when gender was not 
one of the social dimensions involved in these trials.  See Figure 11 for an 
example of the stimuli used for Set 1 (presenting religion categories and 
gender categories), and Figure 12 for an example of the stimuli used for Set 
2 (presenting religion categories and the control categories).   
The same three novel properties used in the previous study were used 
in this experiment, they were presented as novel attributes and one property 
was used for each stimulus set.  The properties were gleeve, sproice and 
chaunch.  These properties were counterbalanced across each set of trials 
for each participant.     
 
5.2.3. Procedure 
Children participated in the experiment in a quiet corner of the 
classroom after giving their verbal assent to take part.  Written parental 
consent was obtained for each child who participated.  The experimenter 
explained to children that they would be taking part in a picture task to see 
how they think about other children and that there were no right or wrong 
answers to the questions.  The script used can be seen in Figures 11 and 12,  
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Figure 11. Stimuli used in study 3, for Set 1, which conveys information 
about religion category memberships and gender category 
memberships.  Each target picture is labelled by which social 
categories it shares with the base, for example, R+/G- indicates that 
that this target shares religion but not gender with the base.   
  
 
and is identical to the script used in Study 2.  Just as before, in Study 2, 
children were presented with 12 trials consisting of a base picture and a 
target picture.  They were given verbal information, in addition to the visual  
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Figure 12. Stimuli used in study 3, for Set 2, which conveys information 
about religion category membership and control category membership.  
Each target picture is labelled by which category memberships it 
shares with the base - for example, R+/C- indicates that this target 
shares religion group membership with the base, but they own different 
pets.  As gender is not presented in Set 2, the characters have been 






cues in the stimuli, about the category memberships that the base and target 
characters did or did not share.  Children were then invited to project a novel 
property from the base picture to each of four target pictures presented in 
each set of trials.  Children were given a score of 1 for each trial in which 
they chose to project a property, and they were given a score of 0 for each 
trial in which they chose not to project a property.  The order that the 
category information was presented in was counterbalanced across the trials, 






Scoring was the same as in the previous study.  With a total of 12 
trials, consisting of three different sets of four trials (i.e., trials presenting 
religion categories and gender categories, trials presenting religion 
categories and control categories, and trials presenting gender categories 
and control categories), children could score a maximum of 4 for each 
dimension when collapsing across trials, because there were four occasions 
on which children had the option of making an inference based on each 
dimension (e.g., religion is shared four times in the following trials:  R+/G+, 
R+/G-, R+/C+, R+/C-).  Children’s overall scores for each dimension were 
analysed.     
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5.3.2 Main findings 
A 3 (Age group: 6-7 years, 8-9 years, 10-11 years) x 3 (School 
context: Catholic, Integrated, Protestant) x 3 (Dimension: religion categories, 
gender categories, control categories) mixed analysis of variance was carried 
out on children’s inference scores and revealed a significant main effect of 
dimension, F(1.88, 411.86)=55.07, p<0.001, η2partial=0.2, greenhouse-geisser 
corrected.  Post hoc paired t tests (Bonferroni adjusted p=0.017) were 
conducted and they showed that children made more inferences based on 
religion group membership (M=2.82, SD=1.08), t(227)=10.14, p<0.001, 
Cohen’s d=0.72, and membership of the control categories (M=2.44, 
SD=0.97), t(227)=6.24, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.39, than they did based on 
gender category membership (M=2.05, SD=1.05), and they also made more 
inferences based on membership of religion categories than they did based 
on the membership of the control categories, t(227)=5.08, p<0.001, Cohen’s 
d=0.37.  One sample t tests (chance=2) revealed that children’s religion, 
t(227)=11.37, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.51, and pet-based inferences, 
t(227)=6.85, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.91, were at a rate significantly above 
chance level, while their inferences based on gender group membership, 
t(227)=0.76, p=0.45, Cohen’s d=0.1, were at a rate that did not significantly 
differ from chance. 
There was no significant interaction between school context and 
dimension, F(3.76, 411.86)=0.24, p=0.9, η2partial=0.002, greenhouse-geisser 
corrected, and there was no significant three-way interaction between age 
group, school context and dimension on children’s rate of inference, F(7.52, 




5.3.3. Developmental effects 
While there was no significant interaction between educational context 
and dimension found, the analysis did reveal a marginal interaction between 
age group and dimension on children’s rate of inference, F(3.76, 
411.86)=2.36, p=0.056, η2partial=0.02, greenhouse-geisser corrected.  This 
was followed up by three one-way Anova’s examining children’s rate of 
inference based on each social dimension within each age group.  Figure 13 
shows the trends within each age group.  The results showed a significant 
main effect of social dimension on 6-7 year olds’ rate of inference, F(2, 
144)=31.44, p<0.001, η2partial=0.30.  Post hoc paired t tests were conducted 
and it was found that 6-7 year old children made more inferences based on 
religion group membership (M=2.74, SD=1.13), t(72)=7.11, p<0.001, Cohen’s 
d=0.83, and membership of the control categories (M=2.51, SD=1.06), 
t(72)=6.65, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.64, than they did based on gender group 
membership (M=1.82, SD=1.1), while they did not significantly distinguish 
between religion category membership and membership of the control 
categories, t(72)=1.83, p=0.07, Cohen’s d=0.21, in their rate of inference.  
Comparisons to chance were conducted and it was found that 6-7 year olds 
made significantly more inferences based on religion group membership, 
t(72)=5.59, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.32, and membership of the control 
categories, t(72)=4.1, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.97, than would be expected by 
chance, but their inferences based on gender group membership, t(72)=1.39, 





The results of the Anova for 8-9 year olds also revealed a significant 
main effect of social category on children’s rate of inference, F(2, 
154)=21.52, p<0.001, η2partial=0.22.  At 8-9 years of age, children preferred to 
make more inferences based on religion- (M=2.81, SD=1.12) than they did 
based on control category membership (M=2.31, SD=0.92), t(77)=3.81, 
p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.49, or membership of gender categories (M=2.01, 
SD=1.04), t(77)=6.2, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.74, while making marginally 











Figure 13. Mean rate of inference (out of 4) based on each dimension 
in comparison to chance (chance=2), within each age group in Study 
3.  Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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on gender group membership, t(77)=2.77, p=0.007, Cohen’s d=0.31.  Single 
sample t tests showed that 8-9 year olds’ inferences based on religion 
category membership, t(77)=6.39, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.46, and 
membership of the control categories, t(77)=2.97, p=0.004, Cohen’s d=0.68, 
were at a rate significantly above chance level, and their inferences based on 
gender group membership, t(77)=0.11, p=0.91, Cohen’s d=0.03, did not 
significantly differ from chance. 
Finally, the Anova for the 10-11 year old age group showed a 
significant main effect of social dimension of children’s inferences, F(2, 
152)=11.91, p<0.001, η2partial=0.14.  The 10-11 year old children preferred to 
make more inferences based on religion category membership (M=2.9, 
SD=1) than they did based on gender group membership (M=2.31, 
SD=0.98), t(76)=4.41, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.6, or membership of the control 
categories (M=2.51, SD=0.93), t(76)=3.07, p=0.003, Cohen’s d=0.4, but they 
did not distinguish between membership of the control categories and 
membership of gender categories, t(76)=1.86, p=0.067, Cohen’s d=0.21, in 
their rate of inference.  One sample t tests revealed that 10-11 year olds’ 
based inferences on religion group membership, t(76)=7.8, p<0.001, Cohen’s 
d=1.79, membership of the control categories, t(76)=4.8, p<0.001, Cohen’s 
d=1.1, and membership of gender categories, t(76)=2.8, p=0.006, Cohen’s 




5.3.5. Effect of children’s own religion group membership on children’s 
religion based inferences. 
To explore the effect of children’s own religion group membership on 
their rate of projection between base and target pictures of varying religion 
group membership, two 2 (religion group membership: Catholic and 
Protestant) x 2 (base religion: Catholic, Protestant) x 2 (target religion: 
Catholic, Protestant) mixed analyses of variance were conducted within each 
educational context.  Within the segregated sample, 67 children were 
identified as Catholic by their parents and 78 children were identified as 
Protestant by their parents.  In the integrated sample, 32 children were 
identified as Catholic by their parents, 20 children were identified as 
Protestant by their parents, and 17 children were described as having no 
religion by their parents (as the ‘no religion’ group of children was a 
respectable size, this group was also included in the analysis). 
The analysis of the segregated school sample displayed a significant 
main effect of the base religion group membership on children’s rate of 
inference, F(1, 143)=5.46, p=0.021, η2partial=0.04, greenhouse-geisser 
corrected, and a significant main effect of the target religion group 
membership, F(1, 143)=154.58, p<0.001, η2partial=0.52, greenhouse-geisser 
corrected.  Children made more inferences from a Protestant base picture 
(M=1.02, SD=0.48) than they did from a Catholic base picture (M=0.92, 
SD=0.46).  They also projected more properties to a Protestant target (M=1, 
SD=0.48) than to a Catholic target (M=0.95, SD=0.49).  There was no 
significant interaction between the religion of the base picture and the religion 
of the target picture on children’s rate of inference, F(1, 143)=0.96, p=0.33, 
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η2partial=0.01, greenhouse-geisser adjusted.  There were also no significant 
interaction between children’s own religion group membership and their rate 
of inference (Base x Own religion interaction: F(1, 143)=1.77, p=0.19, 
η2partial=0.01, greenhouse-geisser corrected, Target x Own religion 
interaction:  F(1, 143)=0, p=0.99, η2partial=0, greenhouse-geisser adjusted, 
Base x Target x Own religion interaction: F(1, 143)=0.47, p=0.5, 
η2partial=0.003, greenhouse-geisser corrected). 
With regards to the integrated sample, the analysis of variance 
showed a main effect of the religion group membership of the target on 
children’s rate of inference, F(1, 66)=72.04, p<0.001, η2partial=0.52, 
greenhouse-geisser corrected, with children preferring to project more 
properties to a Protestant target picture (M=0.99, SD=0.45) than to a Catholic 
target picture (M=0.92, 0.53).  There was no significant main effect of the 
base on children’s rate of inference, F(1, 66)=2.43, p=0.12, η2partial=0.04, 
greenhouse-geisser corrected, and there were no two-way or three-way 
interactions between children’s own religion group membership and their 
projections from the base or to the target (Base x own religion interaction: 
F(1, 66)=0.59, p=0.56, η2partial=0.017, greenhouse-geisser corrected, Target x 
own religion interaction:  F(1, 66)=0.29, p=0.75, η2partial=0,01, greenhouse-
geisser adjusted, Base x Target x own religion interaction: F(1, 66)=0.39, 





The current study of children’s essentialist reasoning about social categories 
in Northern Ireland (NI) employed the unconstrained inference task detailed 
in Study 2, with the addition to the stimuli of visual cues representing 
memberships in religion and the control categories.  The presentation of 
visual cues about memberships in all three categories – religion, gender, and 
control categories – was intended to make these social dimensions more 
salient for 6-7 year old children, who might possibly have found the task too 
cognitively demanding when expected to track category memberships during 
the task using verbal information alone (with the exception of gender, which 
was represented pictorially and verbally in all three inference studies). 
It was predicted that the current study would again indicate strong 
essentialist thinking about religion in NI, but this might emerge earlier than 8-
10 years of age when religion and the control categories were made more 
salient and easier to track with visual cues.  It was also expected that 
integrated school children would show no preference for religion categories, 
while children attending segregated schools would.   
 The main finding that, overall, religion was the strongest dimension for 
inference compared to gender and the control categories, emerged more 
strongly in this study (similar to Study 1) than in Study 2.  This is in line with 
the hypothesis, and with the case study conducted in Israel, which 
demonstrated that ethnicity was essentialised more strongly than other 
categories by children there (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et al., 2011; 
Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006; Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz et al., 2013; 
Diesendruck & Haber, 2009).   
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However, in contrast to the Israeli findings, the current study continued 
to suggest that the emergence of essentialist thinking about religion 
categories in NI occurs later in childhood.  Children aged 6-7 years still did 
not distinguish between religion and the control categories as a basis for 
inference, despite the inclusion of visual cues to represent these dimensions.   
It was at 8-9 years of age that children privileged religion group membership 
when drawing inferences and 10-11 year olds displayed this preference also.   
Thus, the current study seems to resolve the discrepancy between 
Study 1 and Study 2 with regards to the onset of strong essentialist 
reasoning about ethno-religion categories in NI.  The present study suggests 
that the emergence of religion essentialism occurs at 8 years of age, rather 
than 10 years of age.  This is supported by research suggesting that while 
children start to show an awareness of signs and symbols associated with 
religion group membership in NI from the age of 3, it is not until middle to late 
childhood that children appear to have an understanding of religion 
categories and even identify with them.  Therefore, 6-7 year old children in 
the current research might not be distinguishing between religion and the 
control categories as a basis for inference because the labels Catholic and 
Protestant may be relatively novel for most children.  The control categories 
(ownership of a goldfish or a hamster) may also seem highly novel to 
younger children, as owning a goldfish or a hamster is not a meaningful 
distinction that would normally be drawn between people.  The possible 
novelty of these two dimensions may have made them an interesting basis 
for inference.  Meanwhile gender, which continued to have weak inductive 
potential, is an overly familiar dimension for young children, so their 
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extensive experience with this category may have made it a weak basis for 
novel inference (for the weak inductive potential of gender see also, 
Birnbaum et al., 2010; Taylor & Gelman, 1993; and discussion by Waxman, 
2012).  Further to this, while gender remained the weakest basis for 
projecting properties at all ages, 10-11 year olds in this study did not 
distinguish between gender and the control categories when drawing 
inferences.  This indicates that the control categories lost some of their 
inductive power with the oldest children. 
Contrary to expectations, the current study did not show the same 
effect of educational context on children’s essentialist reasoning about social 
categories in NI, as the preceding two studies have.  Children attending 
segregated and integrated schools did not differ in their pattern of inference.  
Further to this, the current study did not find any interaction between 
children’s own religion group membership and their religion-based 
inferences; thus, Protestant children’s preference for projecting to a 
Protestant target was not replicated in this study.  
One limitation of the current study is the inability to draw firm 
conclusions about whether 6-7 year old children found the task too 
demanding or not.  Because we did not directly examine how demanding 
children found the task to be, it is impossible to tell whether the inclusion of 
pictorial cues in the stimuli to highlight religion and control category 
memberships had any effect on their responses.  However, as the 
distinctions that children drew between the three dimensions in the current 
study were stronger than they were in Study 2 (which presented only verbal 
information about religion and control categories), it is speculated that 
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inclusion of pictorial cues did make religion and the control categories more 
salient for all children.  Therefore, it seems reasonable to speculate that 6-7 
year olds in the current research may have treated membership in religion 
and the control categories as equally useful bases for inference because 
both dimensions may have been novel to them.   
The way in which children are reasoning about the social dimensions 
presented to them in these studies will be explored in a different way, using a 
different measure of essentialist thinking, in Chapter 7.  However, before 
doing so, it was deemed important to examine children’s inferences from 
religion categories in a different social and cultural context from Northern 
Ireland.  The reason for doing so is to examine whether children’s essentialist 
reasoning about religion categories in NI is specific to the region’s social, 
historical and political context (Gillespie, 2010; Gough et al., 1992; Nolan, 
2014), or whether children from another country might also reason about 
these religion categories in the same way.  The focus of the next chapter is 













Thus far, the research detailed in this thesis has focused on obtaining 
evidence of essentialist reasoning about ethno-religion categories across 
childhood in Northern Ireland (NI).  This has taken the form of three inference 
studies, used as an index of children’s essentialist beliefs about how 
informative and distinct different social groups are in comparison to one 
another.  These studies have suggested that from 8 years of age, children in 
NI essentialise the ethno-religion categories Catholic and Protestant more 
strongly than other available categories (i.e., gender and control categories), 
and this is influenced by the de facto segregated educational context. 
This is similar to findings from a case study in Israel, which has shown 
that ethnicity is the most essentialised social dimension in childhood, and this 
is unique to Israel’s socio-political and historical context of inter-ethnic bias 
and conflict (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Diesendruck, Birnbaum et al., 2013; 
Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz et al., 2013; Diesendruck & Menahem, 2015; 
Segall et al., 2015).  It appears that the application of children’s essentialist 
bias to social categories is constrained by the cultural input children receive 
about which categorical distinctions between people are the most important 
to draw (see also, Astuti et al., 2004; Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Pauker et al., 
2016; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).  Therefore, it has been assumed thus far 
that NI children’s strong essentialist reasoning about religion categories is 
unique to the region’s history of sectarian conflict between Catholics and 
Protestants (Gillespie, 2010; Gough et al., 1992).  The importance that 
continues to be attached to these ethno-religion categories is evident in the 
segregation of the education system, housing, public space, marriage, and 
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cultural events and activities (Nolan, 2014), and has been found to impinge 
on NI children’s awareness from as young as 3 years of age (Connolly, 2009; 
2011; Connolly et al., 2009; Connolly et al., 2002).    
 However, the possibility that children from other cultural contexts 
might also strongly essentialise religion categories cannot be ruled out.  It 
may be that the inductive power of religion categories for children in NI does 
not derive from the intergroup-bias and historical conflict between Catholics 
and Protestants.  To explore this possibility, the current study examined the 
religion-based inferences of children raised outside NI – children from 
Boston, USA.   
 
 6.1.1. The cultural context of the current study 
 The current study is a preliminary exploration of children’s essentialist 
reasoning about religion, gender and control categories in the city of Boston 
in the United States.  This exploratory research examined children’s 
inferences, based on these categories, using the unconstrained inference 
task detailed in the preceding two chapters.  This replication of the task was 
conducted in Boston because this city does not share the same history with 
NI of violent ethno-religious political conflict between Catholics and 
Protestants, but it is similar to Northern Ireland in other ways that make it a 
good basis for comparison. 
Boston is one of the oldest cities in America, founded by Protestant 
Puritans during Colonial times in the 17th century (Quinlin, 2013), but over the 
centuries it became home to a large number of Irish, Scottish and English 
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immigrants (these groups made up approximately half the population by the 
end of the 19th century, see Bushee, 1899), with the Irish becoming the 
largest migrant group in the city due to mass migration during and after the 
famine in Ireland from 1846 to 1860.  Because of this, the city of Boston has 
strong Irish heritage to this day, and Catholicism is the largest religion in the 
city, with one third of the population identifying as Catholic (Boston’s People 
and Economy, 2013).  While historical records report that anti-Irish prejudice 
was once prevalent among the native Bostonians during the 18th and 19th 
centuries (see O’Connor, 1995), the city now celebrates its Irish sporting and 
cultural heritage (see Quinlin, 2013).   
While Boston and Northern Ireland share obvious historical and 
cultural links, Boston does not share Northern Ireland’s history of ethno-
religious conflict over the constitutional status of NI (i.e., Gillespie, 2010; 
O’Connor, 1995; Nolan, 2014).  Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that the 
categories Catholic and Protestant would not have the same social 
significance and salience in Boston that they do in NI.  This assumption 
seems even more likely due to research suggesting that Christian religion 
categories in the US do not hold the religious significance that they once had 
for many American people (see PEW Research Centre, 2015).  Across 
America, religious affiliation has declined, with the number of people 
identifying as having no religion rising. In addition to this, while lessons about 
religion can be taught in public schools in the US, religion is not practiced as 
part of the ethos of public school life in America (The PEW Forum on 
Religion & Public Life, 2007).  In contrast, most segregated schools in NI 
incorporate prayers and religious practice into school life, and the Catholic 
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and Protestant Churches in NI are heavily involved in the running of separate 
schools (see Smith, 2001).  
There is a distinct lack of research in the US that has examined what 
children know about various religion categories; one study examining the age 
at which US children acquire knowledge of a range of words reports that US 
children have concepts of religion categories at around 9 years of age (see 
Kuperman, Stadthagen-Gonzalez & Brysbaert, 2012).  Only one study has 
explored whether American children essentialise religion categories (i.e., 
Chalik et al., 2017).  This study by Chalik et al. (2017) was conducted with 
Christian and Jewish children and adults in New York.  Participants were 
presented with the switched-at-birth task, which measures essentialist beliefs 
about the innate potential of category membership and how resistant 
category membership is to change.  The religion categories examined were 
Christianity, Judaism, and novel religion categories (e.g., the flurpish 
religion).  The authors reported that 5 year old children, regardless of religion 
group membership, seemed to strongly essentialise familiar and novel 
religion categories equally; they believed that a child raised by members of a 
different religion group would not change religion group membership.  This 
tendency declined across childhood and into adulthood, with differences 
emerging between groups at 10 years of age.  Ten year olds and adults, who 
were religious Jews, essentialised religion categories over novel categories, 
and Judaism more than Christianity, compared to less religious Jewish 
participants and Christian participants.  This study indicates that Jewish 10 
year olds’ and adults’ religion group membership and level of indoctrination 
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into their own religious practices led them to essentialise religion more 
strongly than others. 
In a US study with adults, essentialist beliefs about religion groups 
were examined by Toosi and Ambady (2011) in Boston, who found that 
essentialist beliefs about Catholicism and Protestantism were weaker in 
comparison to essentialist beliefs about the naturalness, cohesiveness and 
objectivity of Islam, Judaism and Hinduism.  One explanation for this may be 
that Islam, Judaism and Hinduism are reasoned about as ethnic as well as 
religious categories, while research has found that Christian religion groups 
in the US are not and so are perceived as more belief-based than as natural 
categories (see research by Cohen and Hill, 2007). Thus, it seems 
reasonable to expect religion categories to be essentialised more strongly in 
NI, where concepts of the religion categories, Catholic and Protestant, are 
conflated with differences in beliefs about politics, nationality and ethnicity 
(see Connolly et al., 2002; Gough et al., 1992; and see Stringer & Cairns, 
1983, for a study of adolescents’ willingness to state that physical differences 
in appearance exist between Catholics and Protestants in NI).     
 
6.1.2. The current study 
Due to the different cultural context surrounding religion categories in 
the US, it is expected that the pattern of results found with American children 
will be different from the pattern of essentialist reasoning that has emerged 
with NI children.  The current study will examine children’s inferences using 
the unconstrained inference task detailed in Chapter 4 with half the sample, 
179 
 
and the unconstrained inference task detailed in Chapter 5 with the other 
half.  The only difference between the two tasks is the inclusion of visual 
cues about religion and control category memberships in the stimuli for half 
the children, while the other half received pictorial cues only for gender 
category membership.  This was carried out to examine potential differences 
between US children, which may exist due to differences between the two 
sets of stimuli, in the salience of the social categories presented.  Like the 
preceding two studies, the current research invited US children to project a 
novel property from a base character to a target character, based on the 
category memberships that the two characters did or did not share. 
Due to the declining numbers of American adults who identify as 
practising Christians (The PEW Forum on Religion & Public Life, 2007), and 
the weaker essentialist reasoning that has been found in relation to Christian 
categories, compared to other religions in the US (i.e., Chalik et al., 2017; 
Toosi & Ambady, 2011), it is predicted that overall, older American children 
will not essentialise Catholicism or Protestantism any more than the control 
categories in the present study.  It is also predicted that 6-7 year old children 
might essentialise religion and the control categories the most, as found by 
Chalik et al. (2017) when they invited children to reason about familiar and 
novel religion categories.  Further to this, it is expected that 10-12 year olds 
might distinguish between religion and the control categories, similar to the 
pattern found by Chalik et al. (2017), who found that older US children 
distinguished between familiar and novel religion categories in their 




6.2. Method  
6.2.1. Participants 
The participants were 67 children, aged 5 to 12 years, recruited from 
public schools in Boston, USA.  See Table 6 for a further breakdown of the 
sample.  The ethnic and racial diversity of children in Boston public schools is 
90% European American, 2% African American, 5% Asian American and 3% 
Latino (see Pew Research Centre, 2014).  Written parental consent was 
provided for every child who participated, as well as verbal assent by each 
child.    
 
Table 6. Further information about the sample in Study 4. 
 
 
6.2.2. Design and Materials 
The design of the task used in the current study, conducted with a 
sample of children from the US, was exactly the same as in the previous two 
School Type Age Group Religion 
Percentage of 
Students Receiving 
Free or Subsidized 
Meals 
Public 
5-7 years old: 
N=30 
 
8-9 years old: 
N=16 
 














studies in Chapters 4 and 5. Children were presented with 12 trials, 
consisting of 3 sets of computer-drawn, coloured pictures, accompanied by 
verbal labels highlighting the categories being presented in the pictures.  In 
this study all children participated in the same inference task, but 35 children 
received stimuli presenting pictorial cues about category membership like the 
children in Study 3, and 32 children received pictorial cues only about gender 
category membership like the children in Study 2.  The aim of this was to 
examine whether the different stimuli sets might affect children’s patterns of 
inference, so that the findings from this study could be compared to the same 
studies conducted in NI.    
As in the previous two studies, each set of pictures in this study 
presented information about two categories: Set 1 conveyed religion group 
membership and gender group membership, Set 2 conveyed religion group 
membership and membership of the control categories, and Set 3 conveyed 
gender group membership and membership of the control categories.  The 
order of set presentation was counterbalanced across participants.  Children 
were asked to project a property from a base picture to each of four target 
pictures in each set, and the category memberships shared by each base 
and target were manipulated across trials.     
 The materials used in this study were the same materials used in 
Study 2 and Study 3.  The stimuli set presenting pictorial cues for each 
dimension conveyed religion group membership by two different drawings of 
a church to symbolise the two religion dimensions – Catholic and Protestant.  
The control categories were conveyed by drawings of a hamster or a goldfish 
in the pictures to indicate which pet the character in the picture owned.  
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Gender group membership was clearly drawn as either a boy or a girl, or the 
character was presented as an androgynous silhouette in Set 2 when gender 
group membership was not one of the dimensions presented in these trials.  
The same three novel properties used in the previous two studies were used 
in this experiment.  As before, properties were counterbalanced across each 
set of trials.     
 
6.3.3. Procedure 
The data in the current study was collected by a collaborator from 
Northeastern University in Boston who directed his research assistants to 
carry out the experiment in Boston public schools so that it could be included 
in this thesis.  The aim of the collaboration was to compare children’s 
essentialist reasoning about religion categories in Boston to children’s 
essentialist reasoning about religion categories in Northern Ireland.  
Just like children who were tested in Northern Ireland, children in 
Boston participated individually in the experiment in a quiet corner of the 
classroom after giving their verbal assent to take part.  The procedure used 
in Boston was the same as the procedure used in Northern Ireland.  The 
experimenter explained to children that they would be taking part in a picture 
task to see how they think about other children and that there were no right 
or wrong answers to the questions.  The script used can be seen in Figures 
11 and 12, and is identical to the script used in Study 2 and Study 3.  In each 
trial, children were presented with a base picture and a target picture, and 
they told which category memberships the target did or did not share with the 
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base.  Children were then invited to project a novel property from the base to 
each of the four target pictures in each set.  Children were given a score of 1 
for each trial in which they made an inference on and a score of 0 for every 





There were 12 trials and children could score a maximum of 4 for each 
dimension when collapsing across the trials, just like the previous two 
studies.  Children were given a score out of four for each dimension because 
they had four opportunities to draw an inference based on each dimension.   
 
 6.3.2. Preliminary analysis of stimuli version 
 Before moving on to the main findings, the effect of each stimuli 
version on children’s inferences was examined.  Approximately half the 
children in the sample (N=35) received the stimuli that included pictorial cues 
for all three dimensions included in the study, while half the children (N=32) 
received the reduced version of the stimuli that only included pictorial cues 
about gender group membership (religion categories and the control 
categories were not pictorially represented).  A 2 (stimuli set: full pictorial 
version and reduced pictorial version) x 3 (dimension: religion categories, 
gender categories, control categories) mixed analysis of variance was carried 
out.  The results showed that there was a significant main effect of 
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dimension, F(2, 130)=11.33, p<0.001, η2partial=0.15, but no significant 
interaction between the stimuli version presented and children’s inferences 
based on each dimension, F(2, 130)=1.26, p=0.13, η2partial=0.03.  There was 
also no significant main effect of stimuli version on children’s general rate of 
inference (collapsed across dimension), F(1, 65)=0.08, p=0.78, η2partial=0.001.  
As the difference between the two sets of stimuli did not have an effect on 
children’s pattern of inference, the subsequent analyses were conducted on 
the data as a whole, collapsing across stimuli sets.  
 
 6.3.3. Main findings 
 Children’s scores out of 4, collapsed across trial type, for each 
dimension, were analysed.  A 3 (age group: 5-7yrs, 8-9yrs, 10-12yrs) x 3 
(dimension: religion, gender, control) mixed ANOVA was conducted.  A 
significant main effect of dimension was found, F(2, 128)=9.53, p<0.001,  
η2partial=0.13.  There was no significant interaction between age and 
dimension, F(4, 128)=0.72, p=0.58, η2partial=0.02.  Post hoc paired t tests 
(Bonferroni corrected, p=0.0167) showed that children made more inferences 
based on religion group membership (M=2.63, SD=1.2), t(66)=4.87, p<0.001, 
Cohen’s d=0.55, and membership of the control categories (M=2.51, 
SD=1.13), t(66)=3.74, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.45, than they did based on 
gender category membership (M=2.01, SD=1.07), and they did not 
distinguish between religion group membership and membership of the 
control categories, t(66)=0.8, p=0.43, Cohen’s d=0.1.  One sample t tests 
revealed that children’s rate of inference based on religion group 
membership, t(66)=4.26, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.05, and membership of the 
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control categories, t(66)=3.67, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.9, were significantly 
above chance level.  Their rate of inference based on gender group 
membership, t(66)=0.12, p=0.91, Cohen’s d=0.03, did not significantly differ 
from chance level. 
 
 6.3.4. Comparisons to chance within each age group. 
 Comparisons to chance were carried out within each age group, and 
can be seen in Figure 14.  It was found that at 5-7 years of age, children’s 
inferences based on religion group membership (M=2.83, SD=1.09), 
t(29)=4.21, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.05, and membership of the control 
categories (M=2.8, SD=1.06), t(29)=4.12, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.53, were at 
a rate significantly greater than chance level, while their inferences based on 
gender group membership (M=2.1, SD=1.03), t(29)=0.53, p=0.6, Cohen’s 
d=0.2, did not significantly differ from chance level.  
At 8-9 years of age, children’s rate of inference based on membership 
of the control categories (M=2.63, SD=1.15), t(15)=2.18, p=0.05, Cohen’s 
d=1.36, was significantly above chance level, but their rate of inference 
based on religion group membership (M=2.5, SD=1.21), t(15)=1.65, p=0.12, 
Cohen’s d=0.85, and gender group membership (M=2.19, SD=1.11), 
t(15)=0.68, p=0.51, Cohen’s d=0.35, did not significantly differ from chance 
level.   
At 10-12 years of age, children’s rate of inference based on religion 
group membership (M=2.43, SD=1.36), t(20)=1.44, p=0.17, Cohen’s d=0.64, 













Figure 14. Mean inferences (out of 4) based on each dimension 
(chance=2), within each age group, in Study 4. 
 
 
d=0, and gender group membership (M=1.76, SD=1.09), t(20)=1, p=0.33, 





The present study was a replication of the unconstrained inference task used 
in Study 2 and Study 3 of this thesis, conducted with children living in Boston, 
USA. Like the previous two studies detailed in this thesis, the current study 
showed no differences between US children depending on whether they 
received stimuli with full pictorial cues or not.  With regards to the 
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hypotheses, it was predicted that children in the US would not appear to 
essentialise religion categories as strongly as children in NI, and that younger 
children would be more likely than older children to show a preference for 
religion and the control categories when drawing inferences.  This is based 
on the findings of Chalik et al. (2017) who reported that 5 year olds in the US 
showed essentialist reasoning equally about familiar (Judaism and 
Christianity) and novel religion categories.  Moreover, it was predicted that 
like Chalik et al. (2017), the current study would find that older children, 
around 10 years of age, would distinguish between religion and the control 
categories when drawing inferences.   
 The results of the current study mostly supported these expectations.  
It was found that American children displayed an overall pattern of reasoning 
that was similar to NI children in Study 2; US children preferred to draw 
inferences equally on the basis of shared religion and control category 
memberships, while gender was inductively weak.  However, when each age 
group was examined individually, a different pattern of reasoning from NI 
appeared to emerge.  From 8-12 years of age – the age at which essentialist 
reasoning in NI appears to emerge – US children did not show a preference 
for religion categories over the control categories.  In fact, at 8-9 years of 
age, US children showed a greater preference for the control dimension than 
they did for religion.   
Further to this, like Chalik et al. (2017) found, 5-7 year old children in 
the current study privileged religion and control categories equally in their 
pattern of essentialist reasoning at this age.  This is similar to the pattern of 
reasoning shown by 6-7 year olds in NI in the first three studies of this thesis.  
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The youngest children in NI and the US were willing to project properties 
based on shared memberships in the dimensions presented to them, so long 
as that dimension was not gender.        
In contrast to the findings from NI and Chalik et al. (2017), 10 year old 
children in the current study did not privilege religion categories over 
novel/control categories when drawing inferences.  The oldest children in the 
current study treated religion and control categories (as well as gender) as 
equivalent in their inductive potential, and they also treated membership in 
these categories as less informative than 6-7 year old children did.  This 
finding suggests that children from Boston did not essentialise the religion 
categories, Catholic and Protestant, and this is supported by research 
indicating that Christianity has declined across the USA in recent decades 
(PEW Research Centre, 2015).  This finding is also supported by research 
showing that children (Chalik et al., 2017) and adults (Toosi & Ambady, 
2011) hold weaker essentialist beliefs about Christian religion groups than 
they do about religions such as Judaism, Islam and Hinduism.   
Regarding children’s high and equal preference for religion and control 
categories at 6-7 years of age on both sides of the Atlantic, it is suspected 
that children at this age might find these categories inductively powerful 
because they are novel to them.  Because an essentialist bias emerges early 
in childhood, from at least 4 years of age (see Gelman, 2003), it is likely that 
children are willing to apply it to a range of social categories that are 
presented to them, until cultural input across development directs children to 
essentialise some categories more than others.  If this is the case, then 6-7 
year olds may have been willing to essentialise religion and pet ownership 
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categories because they were unfamiliar.  By 8 years of age, children’s 
concepts of these categories are likely to be more developed.  As a result, 8-
11 year old children from NI are likely to have essentialised religion 
categories most strongly in the preceding studies, because cultural input 
highlights this dimension as socially significant in the Northern Irish context 
(while owning a goldfish or hamster is not such a meaningful distinction to 
draw between people) (Connolly et al., 2002; Gough et al., 1992; Nolan, 
2014).  Meanwhile, children from Boston, by 8 years of age, are likely to have 
developed concepts of religion categories, but the labels Catholic and 
Protestant are unlikely to carry the social significance for these children that 
they do in NI (see O’Connor, 1995; Quinlin, 2013 for socio-political and 
historical context of Boston). Thus, at 8 years of age children in Boston 
preferred to make inferences based on the control categories rather than on 
religion categories, and by 10-12 years of age, they did not show a 
preference for any dimension (religion, gender and control categories), and 
no inferences differed from chance level.        
While differences seem to emerge between NI and US children at 8 
years of age in their reasoning about religion categories, children in both 
contexts and at all ages treated gender as inductively impotent.  This shows 
that a reluctance to base inferences on membership in gender categories is 
not specific to Northern Irish participants; US children did not treat gender as 
a useful basis for novel inference either.  As discussed in Chapter 3, other 
inference studies have also found that children do not treat gender as 
particularly informative in comparison to other social dimensions (e.g., 
Birnbaum et al., 2010; Taylor & Gelman, 1993).  This pattern may be artefact 
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of the inference tasks that have been used, or as Waxman (2012) pointed 
out, children may be overly familiar with gender categories, which may cause 
gender to lose inductive potential.  Other measures of essentialist reasoning 
need to be employed to construct a fuller picture of children’s reasoning 
about gender categories, as well as religion and control categories.  
Particularly because essentialism is not a unitary construct, more than one 
index of essentialism needs to be examined.  Previous research has 
demonstrated that at least two main components seem to underlie 
essentialist reasoning; the extent to which categories are treated as naturally 
occurring with an objective reality and the extent to which they are seen as 
cohesive, unitary or entitiative (see Demoulin et al., 2006; Haslam et al., 
2000).  The next chapter in this thesis will examine NI children’s essentialist 
reasoning about religion, gender and control categories further, using a 
different index of essentialist thinking.     
 To summarise, the results of the current study suggest that the 
emergence of strong essentialist beliefs about religion categories from 8 
years of age in Northern Ireland is specific to the unique socio-political and 
historical context of this region.  Meanwhile, children in Boston increasingly 
treat religion category membership as no more informative than gender or 
control category membership across childhood. Thus, any social significance 
that Christian religion group membership may have for children in Boston is 
not as strong as it is for children in NI.  Further to this, the current study 
provided insight into NI children’s reasoning about membership in religion 
and control categories at 6-7 years of age.  Boston children at this age 
showed the same pattern of reasoning, treating both dimensions as equally 
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informative, suggesting that the youngest children in both cultural contexts 
may have perceived membership of religion and the control categories as 
relatively novel, unfamiliar categorisations. This is supported by the 
differences that emerged at 8 years of age in both contexts with NI children 
treating religion group membership as the most significant distinction to draw, 
while Bostonian children treated religion group membership as having less 
significance than they did at 5-7 years of age.  Gender group membership 
was treated as inductively impotent in both cultural contexts, which may be 
because children do not see gender as particularly informative or it may be 
an artefact of inductive inference tasks.  The following chapter will examine 
these possible explanations for children’s use of religion, gender and control 














The studies detailed in this thesis so far have examined children’s 
essentialist reasoning about religion, gender and control categories using 
children’s category based inferences as an index of their beliefs.  The picture 
that has emerged from the preceding studies (three conducted in Northern 
Ireland (NI) and one conducted in the US) suggest that essentialist reasoning 
about religion categories emerges at 8 years of age in NI, primarily within the 
segregated school context.  Meanwhile, children from Boston do not show 
strong essentialist reasoning about religion categories across development, 
suggesting that the findings from NI are likely due to the greater emphasis 
that is placed on religion group membership in this region (i.e., Gillespie, 
2010; Nolan, 2014; Pew Research Centre, 2015; Quinlin, 2013).   
The developmental pattern of ethno-religion essentialism in NI is 
different from the pattern revealed by the case study of the development of 
ethnic essentialism across childhood in Israel (see Birnbaum et al., 2010; 
Deeb et al., 2011; Diesendruck, Birnbaum, et al., 2013; Diesendruck, 
Goldfein-Elbaz, et al., 2013; Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006; Diesendruck & 
Haber, 2009; Diesendruck & Menahem, 2015; Segall et al., 2015).  While the 
case study in Israel and the findings in this thesis both indicate that the most 
strongly emphasised social categories in these cultural contexts are also the 
most essentialised (i.e., ethnicity and religion), they differ with this effect 
being found from 5 years of age in Israel, but not until 8 years of age in NI.  
Further to this, the influence of educational context took different forms within 
each cultural context.  In Studies 1 and 2 NI children attending de facto 
segregated schools appeared to essentialise ethno-religion categories more 
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than other categories from 8 years of age, while integrated children preferred 
not to draw distinctions between social dimensions.  Meanwhile in Israel, 
Jewish children attending integrated schools held weaker essentialist beliefs 
about ethnicity at an earlier age compared to children attending de facto 
segregated schools (Deeb et al., 2011). 
These differences between the case study in Israel and the case study 
in Northern Ireland thus far, suggest that social essentialism does not 
develop in the same way across different cultural and educational contexts, 
as other studies have also found (i.e., see Astuti et al., 2004; Kinzler & 
Dautel, 2012; Pauker et al., 2016; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).  While it is 
assumed that the differences between the case study in NI and the case 
study in Israel are specific to the different social categories emphasised in 
the particular cultural contexts they were examined in, further research is 
needed to rule out the possibility that the different findings may be due to 
methodological differences between the two case studies. 
Methodological differences between the forced choice inference study 
detailed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, and the forced choice inference studies 
conducted in Israel (i.e., Birnbaum et al., 2010; Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006) 
are that in NI different properties were used and the way that category 
membership was presented was also different.  In Northern Ireland, novel 
properties were presented as an attribute, such as ‘this child is gleeve’ or 
‘sproice’, rather than as a novel activity or game, such as ‘plays zigo’.  For 
this reason, the difference in the pattern of inference between NI and Israel 
may be because children in NI did not find the novel attributes projectable.  
However, this seems highly unlikely, as 6-7 year old children in NI, as well as 
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the US, displayed a high rate of inference based on both religion and the 
control category membership using these properties.   
In addition to the difference in properties used, category membership 
was explicitly labelled for children in Israel, for example ‘is a Jewish Boy’, 
while children in NI were given behavioural descriptions about religion and 
control category membership, such as ‘this child goes to a Catholic church’ or 
‘this child owns a hamster’ (only gender categories were explicitly labelled).  
For this reason, 6-7 year olds in NI and the US may have found the task 
more demanding than older children because they had to infer category 
membership from the behavioural descriptions.  This could account for 6-7 
year olds’ lack of differentiation between religion and the control categories in 
their rate of inference (but does not explain the inductive impotency of 
gender, which was explicitly labelled).    
However, this alternative account for the developmental pattern 
observed thus far seems unlikely, given similar findings reported by Chalik et 
al. (2017) who also discovered that at around 5 years of age, US children 
were highly willing to endorse essentialist beliefs about familiar religion 
groups (i.e., Judaism and Christianity) and novel religion groups (i.e., the 
flurpish religion) at an equal rate.  The fact that it was later in childhood when 
children began to distinguish between familiar and novel categories in the 
research by Chalik et al. (2017) (and in the present research in NI and the 
US), suggests that perhaps younger children view both religion categories 
and novel/control categories as highly unfamiliar dimensions at around 6 
years of age, which may be why they did not differentiate between them.  
Consequently, these categories may also have been viewed as highly novel 
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by young children due to their unfamiliarity, which may have made religion 
and the control categories an attractive basis for inference, but not a socially 
meaningful one. 
With regards to the usefulness of gender as a basis for inference in 
this thesis research, children within every age group in NI and the US agreed 
that gender was not a good basis for inference.  Moreover, children in Israel 
have also been found to treat gender as inductively weak (Birnbaum et al., 
2010; Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006).  This might seem surprising because 
gender is a strongly emphasised dimension to young children (see, Halim & 
Ruble, 2010), however, it may be that young children are overly familiar with 
the gender dichotomy and have so much experience with this dimension that 
it does not hold as much inductive power for them as other social categories. 
Further to this, it is possible that children may essentialise gender 
more strongly as a natural category than they do along entitative lines.  
Research, such as that of Haslam et al. (2000), has demonstrated that 
essentialist reasoning is underscored by two main constructs; how naturally 
occurring a category is perceived to be, and how cohesive or entitative it 
seems.  Haslam et al. found that some social categories are viewed as more 
natural, while others are seen as more cohesive and unified.  Thus, it is 
possible that children in the current research might view gender as more 
natural than cohesive.  This was found by Taylor (1996) and Taylor et al. 
(2009), who conducted switched-at-birth studies and reported that children 
held strong essentialist beliefs about the heritability and innate potential of 
gender traits.  Meanwhile, Taylor and Gelman (1993) found that children treat 
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age as a stronger basis for inference, and thus a more cohesive dimension, 
than gender group membership.     
In order to be able to draw stronger conclusions about NI children’s 
essentialist reasoning about religion, gender, and the control studies in the 
preceding chapters, it is necessary to conduct further research using a 
different measure of essentialist thinking.  The aim of the current study is to 
further examine NI children’s essentialist reasoning about these categories 
using a different methodological approach.  This will provide greater insight 
into the findings detailed in the preceding experimental chapters by revealing 
whether they are specific to inference tasks alone, or whether children in NI 
show indications of essentialist reasoning about ethno-religion categories in 
other ways.  It is possible that NI children might view ethno-religion 
categories as particularly cohesive groups, and therefore inductively potent, 
but not necessarily as a natural, objective, stable and heritable social 
dimension.  Moreover, the current study should also provide further insight 
into how exactly NI children are reasoning about gender and the control 
categories.           
   
 7.1.1. The current study 
 The current study takes a questionnaire approach to the examination 
of essentialist beliefs about social categories, based on the Essentialism 
Components Questionnaire (ECQ) developed by Diesendruck and 
colleagues in their research with children in Israel (see, Deeb et al., 2011; 
Diesendruck & Haber, 2009).  Diesendruck and colleagues asked children 
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questions about social categories designed to probe their essentialist thinking 
about the distinctiveness of various categories and the discreteness of 
category boundaries, about how stable and immutable they viewed 
membership in various categories to be, and about the perceived innate 
potential and heritability of various category memberships.  Diesendruck and 
Haber (2009) found the emergence of two main factors underlying 
essentialist thinking; ‘distinctive properties’ and ‘stable membership’.  They 
reported that children held essentialist beliefs along these two dimensions 
about ethnicity, gender, race and socio-economic status (SES).  Further to 
this, there was an effect of religious sector with orthodox Jewish children 
essentialising ethnicity more strongly than secular Jewish children.  Following 
this, Deeb et al. (2011) examined the reasoning of children within different 
educational contexts and reported the emergence of four factors underlying 
ethnic essentialism in their questionnaire study: the ‘distinctiveness of 
psychological characteristics’, the ‘distinctiveness of physiological 
characteristics’, the ‘inheritance of category membership’, and the ‘stability of 
category membership’.  Deeb and colleagues found that children’s 
endorsement of essentialist beliefs about ethnicity declined across childhood 
from 5 to 11 years of age.  They also found that Jewish children attending 
integrated schools showed less ethnic essentialism at the younger age of 7 
compared to children attending de facto segregated schools, who did not 
show a similar level of reduction in ethnic essentialism until 11 years of age. 
 In the current research, seven questions from the ECQ were adopted 
to probe essentialist reasoning about ethno-religion categories, gender 
categories, and control categories with children in Northern Ireland.  Twenty-
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one questions in total were put to children; seven questions asked in relation 
to each of the three social dimensions.  These questions pertained to the 
distinctiveness of categories along these dimensions, and to the stability and 
immutability of membership in those categories (the questions can be seen in 
Table 8 below).  Five questions about category distinctiveness invited 
children to consider how different they thought two groups were (e.g., 
Catholics and Protestants, or goldfish owners and hamster owners) in their 
personal preferences, behaviour, physical appearance, biology and 
cognition.  Two questions about the stability/immutability of category 
membership invited children to consider whether it was possible to change 
membership from one group to another (e.g., for a boy to become a girl), and 
whether a person could have dual membership in two groups (e.g., own both 
a hamster and a goldfish).   
Given that questions about the distinctiveness and stability of 
categories are more likely to tap into beliefs about the naturalness of 
categories - rather than beliefs about cohesion/entitativity of categories as 
found in prior research conducted by Haslam et al. (2000) in their exploration 
of the factor structure underlying essentialist reasoning - it is expected that 
the current study might reveal more about the way in which children in NI 
essentialise categories, by moving beyond measurements of inductive 
potential alone, which could be viewed as a stronger marker of essentialist 
reasoning about category cohesion/entitativity.  This is because induction 
tasks invite people to reason about how similar two category exemplars are 
(Murphy, 2002) – which is a characteristic of enititativity (Campbell, 1954; 
Hamilton, 2007; Hamilton et al., 2004; Haslam et al., 2000) – while questions 
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about category distinctiveness (asking people to reason about differences 
between groups) and discreteness of category boundaries have been found 
to index a more naturalised perception of categories (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 
2011; Demoulin et al., 2006; Gil-White, 2001; Haslam et al., 2000; Haslam & 
Ernst, 2002; Haslam & Levy, 2006; Taylor et al., 2009) 
 Based on the pattern of reasoning found in the previous inference 
studies detailed in this thesis, it is predicted that NI children in the current 
research will show strong essentialist reasoning about ethno-religion 
categories from 8 years of age. Moreover, it is predicted that this 
developmental pattern will interact with school type such that children 
attending an integrated school will show less evidence of essentialist beliefs 
about ethno-religious categories.  It is also expected that children may show 
more essentialist reasoning about gender in the current study than they did in 
the prior inference studies, given that other research has found that children 
strongly endorse essentialist beliefs about the naturalness of gender 




 Participants were 94 children recruited from Catholic maintained and 
integrated primary schools in Northern Ireland, aged 6-11 years.  There were 
47 children in the sample from each school sector.  Written parental consent 
was given for every child who participated, as well as verbal assent from 
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each child.  Further information about the participants can be seen in Table 7 
below.  Ethical approval for this study can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
Table 7. Demographic information about the sample in Study 5. 
 
 
7.2.2. Design and Materials 
This study consisted of an essentialism questionnaire based on the 
Essentialism Components Questionnaire (ECQ), which has been used by 
Diesendruck and colleagues (Deeb et al., 2011; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009; 
Segall et al., 2015) in previous studies with young children.  Particular items 
from the ECQ were adapted to measure children’s beliefs about the 
distinctiveness and stability of categories.  Measuring these beliefs about 
School Type Age Group Religion 
Catholic 
6-7 years old: N=16 
 
8-9 years old: N=15 
 
10-11 years old: N=16 
 










6-7 years old: N=16 
 
8-9 years old: N=15 
 
10-11 years old: N=16 
 
Catholic: 45%  
 








religion categories, gender categories and the control categories is an 
alternative method of assessing children’s essentialist beliefs about these 
categories in comparison to studies of their inductive potential, which focuses 
on the perceived cohesiveness of categories.  
 There were six versions of the questionnaire.  Each questionnaire 
consisted of 21 questions, presented to children verbally.  Seven questions 
were asked pertaining to each dimension – religion, gender and control 
categories – and the questions were blocked by dimension.  Accompanying 
the questionnaire were hand-drawn pictures of child characters that were 
used to provide children with a visible reference point during the testing 
session.  Other than gender cues, the pictures contained no pictorial cues 
about category memberships.  Children were told verbally what categories 
the characters belonged to: Catholic or Protestant, boy or girl, and hamster or 
goldfish owners. 
 For each dimension, the same block of seven questions were asked.  
The first five questions asked children to consider the distinctiveness of each 
dimension, with each question focusing on a different property.  Using 
religion as an example (see Table 8), the first item asked children to consider 
how different Catholic and Protestant children are in their personal 
preferences, the second question asked how different these groups are in 
their behaviour, the third question asked how different these groups are in 
physical appearance, the fourth question asked how different these group are 
in what they have inside their bodies, and the fifth question asked how 
different Catholic children and Protestant children are in what they think.  The 
exact same questions were asked about gender (boys and girls), and the 
203 
 
control categories (children who own hamsters and children who own 
goldfish).  Questions 6 and 7 asked children to consider how stable 
membership is in the categories presented to them.  Using gender as an 
example, the sixth question asked how possible it is for a girl to become a 
boy, and the seventh question asked children to consider how possible it is 
for a child to be a boy and a girl. 
 There were six versions of the questionnaire so that the order in which 
each block of questions was presented could be counterbalanced.  As well 
as counterbalancing the distribution of the six questionnaire versions among 
participants, the order in which each category was mentioned in each 
question was also counterbalanced, so that children did not always hear the 
same category label first in each question.  For example, if children were 
asked “how much are Catholic children and Protestant children different in 
what they like?”, then the following question would be “how much are 
Protestant children and Catholic children different in how they behave?” – so 
children were not presented with the same religion category first in every 
question. 
 For each question asked, children were presented with a visual rating 
scale on which to give their answers.  This scale, which can be seen in 
Figure 15, shows four stick characters, each sitting at a table.  Before 
beginning with the experimental questions, the experimenter introduced 
children to the rating scale by explaining what each picture in the scale was 
supposed to represent.  Children were told that they would be asked 
questions about how different they think people are, or how possible they 
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Table 8. The questions asked about each social dimension in the ECQ 
used in Study 5. 
  Religion 
  
Gender Control Category 
Q.1. 
What they like? 
How much are 
Catholic children 
and Protestant 
children different in 
what they like? 
How much are 




How much are 
children who own 
goldfish and 
children who own 
hamsters different 




How much are 
Protestant children 
and Catholic 
children different in 
how they behave? 
How much are 




How much are 
children who own 
hamsters and 
children who own 
goldfish different in 
how they behave? 
Q.3. 
How they look? 
How much are 
Catholic children 
and Protestant 
children different in 
how they look? 
How much are 




How much are 
children who own 
goldfish and 
children who own 
hamsters different 
in how they look? 
Q.4. 
What they have 
inside their 
body? 
How much are 
Protestant children 
and Catholic 
children different in 
what they have 
inside their body? 
How much are 





How much are 
children who own 
hamsters and 
children who own 
goldfish different in 
what they have 




How much are 
Catholic children 
and Protestant 
children different in 
what they think? 
How much are 




How much are 
children who own 
goldfish and 
children who own 
hamsters different 





How possible is it 
for a Protestant 
child to become a 
Catholic child? 
How possible 
is it for a girl to 
become a 
boy? 
How possible is it 
for a child who 
owns a goldfish to 







How possible is it 
for a child to be a 
Catholic and a 
Protestant? 
How possible 
is it for a child 
to be a boy 
and a girl? 
How possible is it 
for a child who 
owns a hamster to 




thought it would be for people to change from one group to another.  They 
were told that the first stick character that had its arms down meant ‘not at 
all’, and they should pick this picture if they thought members of two different 
groups were not at all different, or that altering category membership was not 
at all possible.  They were told that the second stick character with the 
smallest raised arms meant that they thought members of two different 
groups were ‘a little bit’ different, or that changing group membership was a 
little bit possible.  The third stick character with wider raised arms meant that 
they thought members of two different groups were ‘a lot’ different, or that 
there was a lot of possibility for altering group membership.  Finally, children 
were told that the fourth stick character with the widest raised arms meant 
that they thought members of two different groups were ‘completely’ different 
from each other, or that it was completely possible to change category 
membership.   
The responses that each stick character represented were worded so 
that the scale would be transferrable between the questions asking about the 
amount of difference between categories and the questions asking about 
how possible it is to alter category membership.  This meant that children’s 
responses to both types of questions would be comparable.       
 
7.2.3. Procedure/Script 
Each participant was tested for 10 minutes in a quiet area of the 
school/classroom, with the verbal assent of each child.  Before beginning  
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Figure 16. Materials used for the response scale in Study 5.  The first 
picture was labelled as ‘not at all’, the second picture was labelled as 
‘a little’, the third was labelled as ‘a lot’, and the fourth picture was 
labelled ‘completely’. 
Figure 15. Example of the picture exemplars used in Study 5: There 
were no pictorial cues as to category membership, except for gender, 
as children were told the category labels of the characters. 




children were told that they would be asked some questions about different 
people.  They were told there were no right or wrong answers to the 
questions, and the experimenter said that they were just interested in how 
they think about other children.  Children were assured that they could return 
to class at any time if they no longer wanted to take part.   
Before beginning, the children were introduced to the rating scale, as 
seen in Figure 16, and they were told what answers each of the four pictures 
represented (i.e., ‘not at all different/possible’, ‘a little bit different/possible’, ‘a 
lot different/possible’, ‘completely different/possible’).  Children were then 
shown hand-drawn pictures (for an example, see Figure 15) of characters 
and were told that these were examples of people from the categories that 
the first questions would be about.  Children were shown different example 
pictures of characters from different categories for each block of questions 
that they were given – so children had a different visual reference point to 
focus on for the religion questions, the gender questions, and the control 
category questions.  The experimenter then went through each block of 
questions in the questionnaire (the order of which differed depending on 
which version of the questionnaire they received), which can be seen in 
Table 8.  After asking each question, such as ‘how much are boys and girls 
different in how they look?’, the experimenter went through each option of the 
four point scale (pointing at each character in turn), for example, ‘they are not 
at all different’, ‘they are a little bit different’, ‘they are a lot different’, ‘they are 
completely different’.  All of the children chose a response to each question.  





Children’s answers were scored from 1-4, with 1 indicating that 
children thought there was no difference between groups/no possibility of 
group membership being fluid, and 4 indicating that children thought the 
groups were completely different/changing group membership was 
completely possible (see Figure 16 for the 4 response options presented to 
children).  Thus, higher scores on each item meant that children perceived 
these categories as more distinct or stable in comparison to lower scores 
(children’s responses to the questions about the possibility of changing group 
membership were reverse scored so that higher scores would reflect stronger 




7.3.1. Factor analyses  
Three principal axis factor analyses with varimax rotation were carried 
out to explore underlying factors in the data from each of the three blocks of 
seven questions given to each participant (i.e., the block of religion 
questions, the block of gender questions, and the block of control category 
questions).  As can be seen from Table 9, two distinct factors loaded onto the 
questions for each dimension.  These factors were named distinctiveness 
and stability, because for each dimension, one factor loaded strongly onto 
the questions exploring beliefs about the distinctiveness of category 
boundaries, while the other factor loaded strongly onto the questions 
exploring beliefs about the stability of category boundaries. 
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The first factor analysis examining children’s beliefs about religion 
categories, showed that factor 1 – distinctiveness – accounted for 34% of the 
variance and factor 2 – stability – accounted for 17% of the variance.  The 
second factor analysis examined children’s responses to the questions about 
the control category (pet ownership).  Again, the results indicated that two 
main factors were underlying the data, accounting for a large amount of the 
variance.  Factor 1 – distinctiveness – accounted for 33% of the variance and 
factor 2 – stability – accounted for 19% of the variance.  Finally, the third 
factor analysis exploring children’s responses to the questions about gender, 
again, indicated that two main factors accounted for a large amount of the 
variance.  Factor 1 – distinctiveness – accounted for 30% of the variance and 
factor 2 – stability – accounted for 23% of the variance.  (An initial analysis 
showed that a third factor accounted for an additional 15% of the variance, 
but given the results for the other dimensions, a two factor structure was 
imposed on the data).   
 
7.3.2. Analysis of category distinctiveness and category stability 
Two analyses of variance were conducted for children’s ratings of 
each category along the dimensions of category distinctiveness and category 
stability.  Children’s mean distinctiveness and stability ratings were calculated 






Table 9. Factor loadings onto the seven questions from each of the 
three factor analyses (one factor analysis for each social dimension) in 
Study 5. 
Question Religion Gender Control (Pet) 
Distinctive Stable Distinctive Stable Distinctive Stable 
1. What they 
like 
.70 -.33 .72 .03 .70 .09 
2. How they 
behave 
.53 -.42 .49 .12 .68 -.01 
3. How they 
look 
.65 -.01 .77 -.21 .64 -.11 
4. What they 
have inside 
their body 
.66 -.009 .44 .008 .74 .11 
5. What they 
think 








-.16 .65 .004 .91 .10 .79 
 
 
7.3.2.1. Category Distinctiveness 
A 3 (age: 6-7 years, 8-9 years, 10-11 years) x 2 (educational context: 
Catholic and Integrated) x 3 (dimension: religion, gender, control categories) 
mixed analysis of variance was conducted on children’s ratings of 
categorydistinctiveness.  The findings showed a main effect of dimension on 
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children’s ratings, F(2, 176)=17.99, p<0.001, η2partial=0.17.  Post hoc paired t 
tests (Bonferroni corrected, p=0.017) revealed that children treated gender 
category membership (M=2.73, SD=0.59) as more distinctive than religion 
category membership (M=2.39, SD=0.68) (t(93)=5.03, p<0.001, Cohen’s 
d=0.53) or membership in the control categories (M=2.44, SD=0.69) 
(t(93)=4.72, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.45), while they did not differentiate 
between religion category membership and membership in the control 
categories (t(93)=0.76, p=0.45, Cohen’s d=0.07).     
 Results of the analysis of variance also showed a significant 
interaction between age group and dimension on children’s ratings of 
distinctiveness, F(4, 176)=4.45, p=0.002, η2partial=0.92.  The means involved 
in this interaction can be seen in Figure 17.  The interaction between 
educational context and dimension was non-significant, F(2, 176)=1.12, 
p=0.33, η2partial=0.013, as was the interaction between age, educational 
context and dimension, F(4, 176)=0.18, p=0.95,  η2partial=0.004).  There also 
was no significant main effect of age group, F(2, 88=1.69, p=0.19,  
η2partial=0.037) or educational context, F(1, 88)=0.75, p=0.39,  η2partial=0.008) 
on children’s general rate of inference, nor was there was a significant two-
way interaction between age group and educational context, F(2, 88)=0.71, 
p=0.5,  η2partial=0.016).  The significant interaction between age group and 
dimension was followed up by three 2 (school: Catholic, integrated) x 3 
(dimension: gender, religion, control categories) mixed analyses of variance 
– one for each age group.   
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Figure 17. Children’s ratings of category distinctiveness (out of 4) 
within each age group in Study 5. 
 
The analysis of variance for 6-7 year olds showed that there was no 
significant main effect of dimension on children’s ratings of distinctiveness, 
F(2, 60)=0.76, p=0.47, η2partial=0.03; they treated religion categories 
(M=2.66, SD=0.6), gender categories (M=2.71, SD=0.53) and the control 
categories (M=2.56, SD=0.67) as equivalent in how distinctive membership in 
each of these social dimensions was perceived to be.  There was also no 
significant interaction between educational context and social dimension at 6-













significant main effect of educational context on children’s general rate of 
inference, F(1, 30)=1.4, p=0.25, η2partial=0.045.      
This changed at 8-9 years of age, with the analysis of variance for this 
group showing a significant main effect of dimension, F(2, 56)=4.64, p=0.01, 
η2partial=0.14.  Paired t tests (Bonferroni corrected, p=0.006) revealed that 
children treated gender categories (M=2.7, SD=0.62) as more distinctive than 
religion categories (M=2.39, SD=0.72) (t(29)=3.05, p=0.005, Cohen’s 
d=0.46), but they did not distinguish between gender categories and the 
control categories (M=2.5, SD=0.75) (t(29)=1.76, p=0.09, Cohen’s d=0.29), 
or between religion categories and the control categories in their ratings 
(t(29)=1.23, p=0.23, Cohen’s d=0.15).  The analysis did not reveal a 
significant interaction between educational context and social dimension on 
childrens’ mean ratings of category distinctiveness, F(2, 56)=0.31, p=0.74, 
η2partial=0.011, and there was no significant main effect of educational 
context on children’s general rate of inference, F(1, 28)=0.77, p=0.39, 
η2partial=0.027.  
At 10-11 years of age, an analysis of variance also showed a 
significant main effect of dimension on children’s ratings of distinctiveness, 
F(2, 60)=29.34, p<0.001, η2partial=0.49.  Paired t tests (Bonferroni corrected, 
p=0.006) showed that children rated gender categories (M=2.79, SD=0.64) 
as more distinctive than religion categories (M=2.13, SD=0.63) (t(31)=7.23, 
p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.04), and they rated gender categories as more 
distinctive than membership in the control categories (M=2.26, SD=0.64) 
(t(31)=5.36, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.83),  They did not distinguish between 
religion categories and the control categories in their ratings of 
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distinctiveness (t(31)=1.53, p=0.14, Cohen’s d=0.2).  There was no 
significant interaction between educational context and social dimension in 
this age group, F(2, 60)=0.87, p=0.42, η2partial=0.028, and there was also no 
significant main effect of educational context on children’s general rate of 
inference, F(1, 30)=0.21, p=0.65, η2partial=0.01.   
 
7.3.2.2. Category stability  
A 3 (age: 6-7 years, 8-9 years, 10-11 years) x 2 (educational context:  
Catholic maintained and Integrated) x 3 (dimension: gender, religion and 
control categories) mixed analysis of variance was conducted on children’s 
ratings of category stability.  This revealed a main effect of dimension on 
children’s ratings, F(1.8, 158.78)=20.86, p<0.001, η2partial=0.19, greenhouse-
geisser corrected.   
Paired sample (Bonferroni adjusted, p=0.0167) t tests revealed that 
children rated gender category membership (M=3.17, SD=1.03) as higher in 
stability than religion category membership (M=2.77, SD=0.83) (t(93)=3.64, 
p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.43) and control category membership (M=2.36, 
SD=0.93) (t(93)=5.18, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.83), and they rated religion 
category membership as more stable than membership in the control 
categories (t(93)=3.16, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=0.47). 
 The analysis of variance also showed that there was a significant 
interaction between age group and dimension on children’s ratings, which 
can be seen in Figure 18, F(3.61, 158.78)=7.2, p<0.001, η2partial=0.14, 
greenhouse-geisser corrected, and there was a marginally significant  
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Figure 18. The interaction between age group and social dimension on 
children’s mean ratings of category stability (out of 4) in Study 5. 
 
interaction between school context and dimension, which can be seen in 
Figure 19, F(1.8, 158.78)=2.76, p=0.072, η2partial=0.03, greenhouse-geisser 
corrected.  The three-way interaction between age group, educational 
context and dimension, F(3.61, 158.78)=0.86, p=0.49, η2partial=0.02, was non-
significant. greenhouse-geisser corrected.  There was no significant main 
effect of age group, F(2, 88)=0.022, p=0.98, η2partial=0.001, or educational 
context on children’s general rate of inference, F(1, 88)=0.003, p=0.96, 
η2partial=0.00, nor was there a significant two-way interaction between age 














The significant interaction between age group and dimension, and the 
marginal interaction between school context and dimension, were followed 
up by three 2 (school: Catholic, integrated) x 3 (dimension: gender, religion, 
control category) mixed analyses of variance – one for each age group.   
 
 
Figure 19. The marginal interaction between educational context and 
social dimension on children’s mean ratings of category stability (out of 
4) in Study 5. 
 
For 6-7 year olds, the analysis of variance found that the main effect of 














60)=1.81, p=0.17, η2partial=0.06, indicating that 6-7 year olds did not 
distinguish between gender categories (M=3.02, SD=1.18), religion 
categories (M=2.58, SD=1) and the control categories (M=2.75, SD=0.94).  
The interaction between school context and dimension on 6-7 year old 
children’s ratings of stability was also non-significant, F(2, 60)=0.4, p=0.67, 
η2partial=0.01, indicating that children in both educational contexts did not 
distinguish among the categories in their ratings of stability (see means in 
Table 10 below).  There was also no significant main effect of educational 
context on children’s general rate of inference, F(1, 30)=0.78, p=0.38, 
η2partial=0.025. 
 
Table 10. Children’s mean ratings of category stability within each age 














6-7 year olds 
8-9 year olds 





























6-7 year olds 
8-9 year olds 





















 For 8-9 year olds, the main effect of dimension on ratings of stability 
was non-significant, F(1.51, 42.23)=2.5, p=0.09, η2partial=0.08, greenhouse-
geisser corrected; children did not distinguish between gender categories 
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(M=2.92, SD=1.15), religion categories (M=2.93, SD=0.78) and the control 
categories (M=2.42, SD=0.91) in their ratings of stability.  The interaction 
between school context and dimension was also non-significant, F(1.51, 
42.23)=0.28, p=0.76, η2partial=0.01, greenhouse-geisser corrected (see means 
in Table 10).  This analysis also showed no significant main effect of 
educational context on children’s general rate of inference in this age group, 
F(1, 28)=1.19, p=0.29, η2partial=0.041. 
For 10-11 year olds, the analysis showed that there was a significant 
main effect of dimension, F(2, 60)=67.11, p<0.001, η2partial=0.69.  Paired t 
tests (Bonferroni corrected, p=0.006) showed that this age group rated 
membership in gender categories (M=3.56, SD=0.54) as more stable than 
membership in religion (M=2.8, SD=0.65) (t(31)=6.03, p<0.001, Cohen’s 
d=1.27) and the control categories (M=1.91, SD=0.75) (t(31)=10.19, p<0.001, 
Cohen’s d=2.52), and they rated religion category membership as more 
stable than control category membership (t(31)=4.86, p<0.001, Cohen’s 
d=1.27). 
In addition to the main effect of dimension, the analysis of variance for 
10-11 year olds also revealed a significant interaction between dimension 
and school context, F(2, 60)=8.45, p=0.001, η2partial=0.22, which can be seen 
in Figure 20.  There was no main effect of educational context on children’s 
general rate of inference, F(1, 30)=0.01, p=0.94, η2partial=0.000.  Post hoc t 
tests (Bonferroni adjusted, p=0.003) showed that children attending Catholic 
schools rated membership in gender categories as more stable than 
membership in religion categories, t(15)=4.96, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.69, 















the control categories, t(15)=11.67, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=4, and they rated 
religion category membership as more stable than membership in the control 
categories, t(15)=5.46, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=2.2.   
Like the 10-11 year olds attending Catholic schools, their counterparts 
in integrated schools also rated gender category membership as more stable 
than religion category membership, t(15)=3.62, p=0.003, Cohen’s d=1.09, 
 
Figure 20. The interaction between educational context and social 
dimension on children’s mean ratings of category stability at 10-11 
years of age in Study 5. 
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and control category membership, t(15)=5.89, p<0.001, Cohen’s d=1.76.  
However, 10-11 year olds attending integrated schools differed from this age 
group in the Catholic schools by not distinguishing between religion category 
membership and control category membership in their ratings of category 
stability, as can be seen in Figure x, t(15)=1.93, p=0.07, Cohen’s d=0.6. 
 
 
7.4. Discussion  
The aim of the current study was to examine children’s essentialist beliefs 
about religion, gender and a control category in Northern Ireland, using a 
questionnaire approach based on Diesendruck et al.’s Essentialism 
Components Questionnaire (ECQ) (Deeb et al., 2011; Diesendruck & Haber, 
2009).  A different approach was taken in the current chapter in order to 
obtain converging evidence of late emerging essentialist beliefs about 
religion categories among NI children.  Additionally, the current study aimed 
to provide greater insight into the way children essentialise religion 
categories, as well as further exploring how exactly they are perceiving and 
reasoning about the control categories in this thesis research.   
Based on the results of the inference studies detailed in earlier 
chapters, it was expected that NI children would show further evidence of 
essentialising ethno-religion categories, that such evidence would emerge 
later in childhood at around 8 years of age, and that essentialist endorsement 
of religion categories would be more pronounced within the segregated 
school context than within the integrated sector.  In addition to this, owing to 
the nature of the questionnaire, it was predicted that children might show 
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more essentialist thinking about gender categories in the current study than 
they appeared to during the prior inference tasks.  This is because earlier 
studies (e.g., Taylor, 1996; Taylor & Gelman, 1993) suggest that children 
hold strong essentialist beliefs about the naturalness of gender categories, 
and the ECQ may be more sensitive to essentialist beliefs about category 
naturalness as it invites children to reason about how distinct property 
differences between categories are, as well as how impermeable and stable 
group boundaries and membership in categories may be.   
 The pattern of results that emerged from the current study supported 
these expectations.  Similar to the findings reported by Diesendruck and 
Haber (2009), NI children’s responses to the questionnaire items formed two 
main factors, ‘distinctiveness’ and ‘stability’.  It was found that from 10 years 
of age, NI children held stronger essentialist beliefs about the stability of 
membership in ethno-religion categories (Catholic and Protestant) than they 
did about membership in the control categories (ownership of a goldfish or a 
hamster).  Moreover, children’s stronger essentialist beliefs about the stability 
of religion categories compared to the control categories emerged at 10 
years of age only in the de facto segregated school context.  In the integrated 
school context, children did not distinguish between religion and the control 
categories in their endorsement of essentialist beliefs about the stability and 
inflexibility of membership in these categories.  This pattern of essentialist 
reasoning about religion categories, in comparison to the control categories, 
supports the previous inference findings, suggesting that essentialisation of 
religion categories in NI emerges late in childhood and is more likely to 
emerge within the context of de facto segregated school context.  This is in 
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contrast to children’s essentialist reasoning about ethnicity in Israel, which 
emerged at 5 years of age (Deeb et al., 2011; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009) 
and declined in strength across childhood (Deeb et al., 2011), while children 
attending integrated schools in Israel differed by showing an earlier decline in 
their endorsement of ethnic essentialism (Deeb et al., 2011).  Thus, the 
current study reinforces the findings of the previous experimental chapters, 
showing that essentialisation of ethno-religion categories emerges later in NI 
compared to Israel – and this was found using a different measure of 
essentialism in the present study.  Additionally, the present study also 
indicates that NI children are less willing to endorse essentialist beliefs about 
the control dimension (pet ownership) as they get older, just as they are less 
willing to draw inferences based on the control categories in the preceding 
studies.  ‘Pet Ownership’ appears to be treated increasingly like a control 
category as children get older – perhaps as their concepts of all of these 
categories continue to develop.   
 While supporting the findings of the preceding chapters, with regards 
to children’s pattern of reasoning about religion and the control dimensions, 
the current study revealed a different pattern of essentialist reasoning about 
gender.  In contrast to the prior studies, the current study showed gender 
emerging as the most strongly essentialised dimension, compared to religion 
and the control categories.  That gender was essentialised more strongly 
than religion categories in the current study was somewhat surprising 
because, based on the earlier results, it was assumed that religion would be 
the most strongly essentialised category in NI.  One explanation for this 
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finding may be that children in NI essentialise gender and religion categories 
to different degrees along different dimensions of essentialist thought.   
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, researchers, such as Haslam et 
al. (2000), demonstrated that essentialism is not a unitary construct.  They 
found that essentialist thinking is comprised of two dimensions – naturalness 
and entitativity/cohesion – and different social categories tend to be 
essentialised more strongly along one dimension than the other (see also, 
Demoulin et al., 2006; Gelman et al., 2007; Rangel & Keller, 2011; Rothbart 
& Taylor, 1993).  Other research has also found that gender is treated as 
inductively impotent in comparison to other social categories (i.e., Birnbaum 
et al., 2010; Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006; Taylor & Gelman, 1993), while 
strongly endorsing essentialist beliefs about the naturalness of gender (i.e., 
Diesendruck & Haber, 2009; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009; Taylor, 1996; Taylor 
et al., 2009) in different types of measures.  Perhaps children essentialise 
gender more strongly along the dimension of ‘naturalness’ rather than along 
the dimension of ‘cohesion/entitativity’.  It is likely that the ECQ taps into 
beliefs about category naturalness more than the inference task. 
In contrast, religion may be essentialised more strongly by NI children 
along the dimension of cohesion/entitativity than along the naturalness 
dimension.  This would account for the strong inductive potential of religion 
for children in NI, as the inference tasks in the preceding chapters were a 
measure of how cohesive children viewed certain categories to be, and how 
informative they found membership in religion categories to be.  The 
inference tasks might not be a good measure of how natural children 
perceive these social dimensions to be; the ECQ may be a better index of 
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category naturalness as it invites children to consider how distinctive 
membership in different categories is, as well as how impermeable and 
stable group boundaries and membership in categories may be – these are 
aspects of a more naturalised view of categories (Haslam et al., 2000).  
One issue in interpreting the results of this study is that although 
religion category membership was judged more stable than membership in 
the control categories, it was not perceived as more distinctive than the 
control category. This is problematic if one interprets category distinctiveness 
items in the ECQ to measure cohesiveness (as do Diesendruck & Haber, 
2009). However, the category distinctiveness items asked children to reason 
about how different they thought each category was from another, and how 
sharp they viewed the boundaries between different category memberships.  
In contrast, cohesion or entitativity refers to beliefs about how similar all 
members of the same category are perceived to be and how unified a 
category seems to be as a whole (for a discussion of entitativity, see 
Campbell, 1954).  Thus, the distinctiveness items appear more likely to tap 
into beliefs about how natural categories are rather than how similar 
members of a particular category are to one another (as induction scenarios 
invite us to do, Murphy, 2002). 
With regards to the control dimension of pet ownership in the current 
study, children did not strongly endorse essentialist beliefs about the 
distinctiveness or the stability of this dimension as assessed by the ECQ.  
Thus, children did not treat this category as a natural kind, and so the 
dimension of pet ownership only seems to feature strongly as a basis for 
inference for children at around 6 years of age.  As the preceding studies in 
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this thesis have shown, the control category becomes a weaker basis for 
inference in comparison to religion categories across development in NI and 
the USA.  This supports our view that interest in the control dimension may 
be due to its novelty for young children.  Across development, children may 
have lost interest in it because their essentialist bias becomes constrained by 
cultural input, and the significance of ethno-religion categories in NI becomes 
more strongly impressed upon them.  Meanwhile, the control category of pet 
ownership may become increasingly viewed as a socially meaningless 
category, as children’s concepts of various categories develop with age.  This 
is further supported by the finding that children in this questionnaire study did 
not distinguish between any of the three social dimensions in their 
endorsement of essentialist beliefs at 6 years of age – differentiation between 
these categories emerged from 8 years of age.   
Thus, in conclusion to this chapter, it would seem that the addition of 
the ECQ to this thesis research was useful in confirming that essentialist 
beliefs about religion categories in NI are late emerging in comparison to the 
case study of ethnic essentialism in Israel (i.e., Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb 
et al., 2011; Segall et al., 2015).  It has also reinforced the conclusion that 
educational context does influence the development of social essentialist 
reasoning in NI (at least along the aspect of category stability in the current 
chapter).  The ECQ has also been able to reveal that children in NI do hold 
essentialist beliefs about gender, but perhaps along the dimension of 
naturalness rather than entitativity/cohesion.   
New effects to emerge from this study were the findings that gender 
categories were essentialised as the most distinctive and stable groups.  
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Religion was not essentialised as strongly in this study as it was in the 
previous research in NI; here it was essentialised more than the control 
dimension as a more stable, naturally occurring and unmalleable category, 
but not as a more distinctive dimension than the control.  However, while 
essentialist beliefs about religion were weaker in this study, they still 
supported the pattern of results from the inference tasks, indicating that 
religion group membership is essentialised more than control group 
membership from around 8 years of age, and this is more likely to be 
observed within the segregated educational context.   
The current study also highlights the importance of taking more than 
one approach to examining essentialist thinking, because different categories 
may be essentialised along different dimensions of essentialist thought.  
Using more than one measure of essentialist thinking can reveal a fuller 
picture of how categories are being reasoned about.   
In relation to the influence of educational context on children’s 
essentialist reasoning, it should be noted that this effect has not been entirely 
consistent across each of these studies detailed in this thesis.  Therefore, 
while this chapter is the final experimental chapter of this thesis, the next 
chapter will consist of a secondary analysis of the data from the preceding 
chapters before moving on to the general discussion chapter.  The following 
chapter will describe the results of a meta-analysis of the data obtained from 
each school in NI that participated in this case study in an attempt to clarify 
the effect of educational context on children’s essentialist reasoning about 
religion in NI.   
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The results presented in this thesis support two claims. First, they suggest 
that essentialist beliefs about religion categories emerge relatively late in 
Northern Irish children. Second, they suggest that the likelihood that a child 
will develop essentialist beliefs about religion categories is greater if that child 
is attending a segregated school. However, the evidence does not appear to 
support each of these claims equally strongly. Thus, in this brief chapter I will 
describe a meta-analysis that seeks to ascertain the strength of the evidence 
in favour of the weaker of these claims.  
The evidence about the age at which essentialist beliefs emerge is 
strong. For example, Study 1 indicated that essentialist beliefs about religion 
categories emerge at 8 years of age. Using a different experimental task, 
Study 2 indicated that religion essentialism emerges later at around 10 years 
of age for children attending Protestant controlled schools, and at 8 years of 
age for children attending Catholic maintained schools.  Study 3 suggested 
that essentialist reasoning about religion emerges at 8 years of age and 
Study 5 suggested that religion categories in NI are essentialised more 
strongly than control categories by 10 years of age. Thus, an effect of age 
has been found in each of the studies summarised here, such that children 
appear to develop essentialist belief about religion categories no earlier than 
eight years of age.  
However, the evidence in favour of the second claim,that essentialist 
beliefs about religion categories are more likely to appear amongst children 
attending segregated schools is not so consistent. Although there is evidence 
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of such beliefs amongst children attending segregated schools but not 
amongst children attending integrated schools in Studies 1, 2 and 5, both 
integrated and segregated school children in Study 3 displayed essentialist 
beliefs about religion categories. It is possible, therefore, that children 
attending integrated schools develop essentialist beliefs about religion 
categories, but our studies did not have sufficient statistical power to detect 
such effects. Accordingly, in this chapter we will describe a meta-analysis 
designed to assess the evidence for essentialist beliefs about religion 
categories amongst integrated and segregated school children across all of 
our Northern Irish studies.  
A second aim of the meta-analysis was to test an alternative 
explanation for any findings of an association between essentialist beliefs 
and school type. Because schools are set in communities, it is possible that it 
is community diversity rather than school diversity which is the important 
factor in determining whether children develop essentialist beliefs about 
religion categories. Thus, we might find that the communities in which 
integrated schools are located tend to be more religiously diverse than are 
the communities in which segregated schools are located. More importantly, 
we might find that, collapsed across school type, children attending schools 
located in more diverse areas tend to show more evidence of essentialist 
beliefs about religion categories than children attending schools located in 




8.1.1 Meta-analysis Overview 
Although it is common for meta-analyses to be carried out over 
discrete studies, a different approach was taken here. Instead of taking 
experiment, or experimental condition, as the unit of analysis, school was the 
basic unit in the meta-analysis to be reported here. Thus, our hypotheses 
concerned whether significant effects of essentialist beliefs about religion 
categories were seen in the segregated and integrated schools that 
participated in this project. Moreover, the meta-analysis allowed an 
examination of whether there was a statistical relationship between the 
religious diversity of the community in which each school was located, and 
the size of the essentialism effect that was observed in that school. 
 
8.2. Method 
 8.2.1. Data selection  
 Studies 1, 2, 3, and 5 of this thesis were selected for meta-analysis 
(Study 4 was conducted with children in the US and so was excluded).  For 
the data collected from each of the 20 schools in Northern Ireland (N=24 
segregated schools and N=6 integrated schools), effect sizes were 
calculated in relation to the difference in children’s essentialism scores 
between religion and the control dimension.   
As Study 1 was a forced-choice study, children’s religion essentialism 
score, on trials where religion was put into conflict with the control category, 
were used and chance (i.e., score of 2 was chance) was subtracted from it.  
This was done because there were no absolute essentialism scores for the 
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dimensions in Study 1, as children’s category based inferences were all 
relative.  For the two unconstrained inference tasks in Studies 2 and 3, 
children’s absolute essentialism scores were available, so the overall 
essentialism score for the control category was subtracted from the 
essentialism score for the religion category.  With regards to Study 5, the 
ECQ study, children’s overall essentialism score for the control category was 
subtracted from their overall essentialism score for religion.  When these 
difference scores and their associated effect sizes for each school were 
entered into the Comprehensive Meta-Analysis Software (Borenstein, 
Hedges, Higgins & Rothstein, 2009), the schools were grouped by 
educational sector (i.e., segregated or integrated) as school type was the unit 
of analysis that we were interested in.    
 With regards to the analysis of community diversity as a predictor of 
children’s essentialism scores, information about the areas in which children 
lived was not obtained at the time of data collection.  Due to this, an estimate 
of the level of community diversity that children were likely to be exposed to 
in their local community had to be made.  This was carried out by examining 
the ethno-religion composition of the ward that each school was located 
within, because proximity to schools is one of the selection criteria for being 
admitted to a primary school in NI, so it is likely that children lived in the 
same area where their school was located.  The number of people living in 
each electoral ward ranged from 1000 to 9000.   
Using census data (obtained from Northern Ireland Neighbourhood 
Information Service, 2012) showing the percentage of people from Catholic 
and Protestant backgrounds in each ward area, community diversity scores 
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were calculated by subtracting the percentage of Protestants from the 
percentage of Catholics.  This produced community diversity scores that 
could range between 0 and 100, with 0 signifying that the proportion of 
Catholics and Protestants in an area was equal (i.e., greater community 
diversity), and with scores closer to 100 indicating that an area was mostly 
Catholic or Protestant (i.e., little community diversity).  These community 
diversity scores were used in a meta-regression examining community 
diversity as a predictor of children’s essentialism scores.   
 
   8.3. Results 
8.3.1. Meta-Analysis  
 The results of the mixed effect meta-analysis, which can be seen in 
Figure 21, revealed that across all of the Northern Irish schools that 
participated in this project, children showed significantly more essentialist 
reasoning about ethno-religion categories than they did about the control 
categories (standard mean difference = 0.27, standard error = 0.05, 95% CI 
= [0.19,0.36], Z(20) = 6.02, p <0.001).  Further to this, the analysis showed 
that children attending segregated schools displayed evidence of significantly 
higher levels of essentialist beliefs about religion categories than about 
control categories (standard mean difference = 0.30, standard error = 0.05, 
95% CI = [0.20, 0.40], Z(14) = 6.00, p<0.001). Importantly, children attending 
integrated schools did not show a significant difference between levels of 
essentialist beliefs about religion and control categories (standard mean 
difference = 0.15, standard error = 0.11, 95% CI = [-0.07, .37], Z(6) = 1.34, p 
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types was not significant, Q(1) = 1.56, p = 0.21.  That is, the size of the effect 
in segregated schools was not significantly bigger than in integrated schools.   
 
8.3.2. Meta-Regression 
Analysis of the community diversity scores showed that scores ranged 
from 0.05 to 86.4.  The mean community diversity score for wards where 
integrated schools were located was 29.0 (SD=20.27), and it was 43.2 
(SD=26.41) for wards where segregated schools were located.  Although the 
difference between these means was not significant, t(19)=1.17, p=0.26, 
Cohen’s d=0.6, the direction of the difference suggests that integrated 
schools tend to be located within more religiously mixed areas.  However, the 
results of the meta-regression analysis, which can be seen in Table 11 and 
Figure 22, revealed that level of community diversity was not a significant 
predictor of children’s essentialist beliefs about religion categories in NI 
(regression coefficient=0.002).    
 
Table 11. Results of the meta-regression examining community 











Intercept 0.19 0.10 [-0.001, 0.380] 1.95 0.051 
Community-
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Figure 22. Scatterplot showing the relationship between the religious 
diversity of the community in which each school was located in the 
present research, and the standardized difference between children’s 
religion and control category based responses.  Higher community 
diversity scores indicate areas that were more homogeneous in their 
religious composition (lower scores indicate more religiously mixed 




The results of the secondary analysis in this chapter support the conclusions 
drawn from the preceding studies about the effect of educational context on 
children’s essentialist reasoning about religion categories.  Namely, only 
children who attend de facto segregated schools in Northern Ireland hold 
stronger essentialist beliefs about ethno-religion categories than about the 
control categories.  Children who attend integrated schools do not distinguish 
between the two social dimensions.  Further to this, the current analysis also 
suggested integrated schools were located in electoral wards that were more 
religiously mixed than the wards where segregated schools were situated.  
Nonetheless, the results indicated that the level of community diversity in the 
areas where the schools were located was not related to children’s 
essentialist beliefs about religion categories.  This supports the conclusion 
that educational context, not community diversity, influences the 
development of children’s essentialist beliefs about social categories in NI.   
 Limitations of the current analysis were that the community diversity 
scores were only an indicator of how integrated children’s local communities 
might be, as children’s addresses were not obtained at the time of data 
collection.  Moreover, an analysis of age group within each educational 
sector could not be carried out because the number of participants was not 
large enough.  Despite these limitations, the secondary analysis of the data 
compiled from this case study in Northern Ireland was still able to clarify that 
there do appear to be differences in the effects of different educational 
contexts on children’s essentialist reasoning about social categories. It also 
indicated that community diversity is not a predictor of children’s religion 
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essentialism scores.  This reinforces the conclusions drawn from the results 
of the preceding experimental chapters, which future research can continue 
to build upon.  Having drawn together the data from the previous studies for 
meta-analysis in the current chapter, the next and final chapter of this thesis 
will summarise the findings, consider their implications and outline directions 












The aim of the current research was to conduct a case study of children’s 
essentialist beliefs about ethno-religion categories in Northern Ireland (NI).  
We explored the developmental trajectory of children’s essentialist beliefs 
from 6-11 years of age, within different educational contexts, using a series 
of inference tasks and a modified version of the Essentialism Components 
Questionnaire (ECQ) (see, Deeb et al., 2011; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009) as 
an index of beliefs about religion, gender and control categories.  This 
research was based on a case study in Israel, examining children’s 
essentialist beliefs about the ethnic categories, Arab and Jew (e.g., Birnbaum 
et al., 2010; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009; Deeb et al., 2011; Goldfein-Elbaz et 
al., 2013; Segall et al., 2015).  The Israeli research demonstrated that 
ethnicity is strongly essentialised by Jewish children from 5 years of age, 
declining in strength across childhood, and at the earlier age of 7 years within 
the integrated school sector, compared to 10 years of age within the 
segregated school sector.   
Based on the Israeli findings, it was hypothesised that children in NI 
would essentialise ethno-religion categories from 6 years of age and this 
tendency would decline in strength across childhood, and at an earlier stage 
of development within the integrated school sector than within the de facto 
segregated school sector in NI.  It was assumed that children in NI and Israel 
might reason similarly about the most strongly emphasised social categories 
within their respective cultures – religion in NI and ethnicity in Israel – 
because the history surrounding these categories in both cultural contexts is 
one of violent, intergroup conflict between Catholics and Protestants in NI 
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and between Arabs and Jews in Israel (Bekerman, Zembylas & McGlynn, 
2009; Deeb et al., 2011; Gelvin, 2014; Gillespie, 2010; Goldfein-Elbaz et al., 
2013; Nolan, 2014; Spangler, 2015).  The results that emerged from the case 
study in Northern Ireland revealed that this was not the case; a different 
pattern of reasoning across childhood was found in NI with children 
displaying strong essentialist beliefs about religion categories from 8 years of 
age onwards, with no sign of these beliefs declining at 10 years of age.  
Moreover, children’s essentialist beliefs about religion were more likely to 
emerge within the context of segregated schools, with children attending 
integrated schools showing a lack of preference for religion over the control 
category, and in some cases (i.e., the inference tasks), gender.   
In this general discussion chapter, I will provide a summary of the 
studies detailed in the preceding chapters of this thesis and I will discuss how 
the Northern Ireland case study relates to the existing social essentialism 
literature – in particular, to the case study of ethnic essentialism in Israel – 
and I will address the possible limitations of the present research and 
questions that have emerged for consideration in future research. 
 
9.1.1. Summary of the present studies 
The aim of the present section is to provide a brief recap of the 
preceding studies before discussing the findings in detail.  To summarise, 
Studies 1-4 were inference studies which aimed to index the strength of 
children’s essentialist reasoning about religion, gender and a control 
dimension by assessing their willingness to project novel attributes between 
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characters of the same and differing group memberships.  This has 
commonly been used as an index of essentialist bias (e.g., see Birnbaum et 
al., 2010; Gelman & Markman, 1986; 1987) towards categories based on the 
reasoning that a stronger essentialist bias towards certain categories leads 
individuals to view members of such categories as more similar to one 
another and likely to share more obvious and nonobvious properties7 
(Gelman, 2003).   
Study 1 consisted of a forced-choice task in which children had to 
choose between conflicting membership in two categories when choosing 
whether to draw an inference, while the other inference studies (Studies 2-4) 
employed an unconstrained version of the inference task in which children 
did not have to choose between competing category information when 
deciding whether to project a property.  Children in this study could decide to 
project, or not project a property, based on whether two characters shared 
membership of the same social categories or not.  Therefore, this task had 
the advantage of being able to measure children’s absolute level of inference 
from each social dimension.   
Studies 1-3 indicated that NI children essentialise ethno-religion 
categories from 8 years of age across a forced-choice task (Study 1) and 
unconstrained inference tasks (Studies 2-3), as well as in the absence and 
presence of additional visual cues about religion and control category 
memberships in the stimuli.  Study 4 tested children in Boston and suggested 
                                                          
7 This is the case unless some social categories are not essentialised 
along all of the aspects that underpin essentialist thinking, but rather are 
essentialised along one dimension of essentialism, such as entitativity or 
naturalness (e.g., as found by Haslam et al, 2000).  
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the opposite pattern of reasoning about religion categories to that observed 
within NI, with US children displaying weaker essentialist reasoning about the 
religion categories, Catholic and Protestant, across childhood.     
   Study 5 (see Chapter 7) consisted of the ECQ (Deeb et al., 2011; 
Diesendruck & Haber, 2009), which examined essentialist beliefs about the 
distinctiveness and stability of religion, gender and the control categories in 
NI.  Using this measure of essentialism reinforced the conclusions drawn 
from the inference studies that ethno-religion essentialism emerged at 8 
years of age in NI, and that attendance at a segregated school influences 
this.  In contrast to the preceding findings, the ECQ approach suggested that 
different dimensions of essentialist thinking were underlying children’s 
reasoning about the categories in this research.  The findings indicated that 
gender was more strongly essentialised than religion along the aspects of 
distinctiveness and stability, while the stronger inductive potential of religion 
suggests religion is essentialised more strongly along the aspects of 
cohesion and entitativity. 
Due to some of the inconsistences that emerged between the three 
induction studies conducted in NI – i.e., Study 1 indicated effects of 
educational context from 8 years of age, Study 2 showed weaker effects of 
educational context compared to Study 1, and no effect of educational 
context was found in Study 3 – it was decided that a secondary analysis (see 
Chapter 8) of all data collected in NI (i.e., Studies 1, 2, 3 & 5) might clarify the 
effect of educational context on children’s reasoning about religion 
categories.  This analysis supported the conclusion that essentialist 
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reasoning about religion categories in NI is influenced by attending religiously 
homogeneous schools, rather than by level of community diversity.   
Before moving on to the discussion of these findings, it should be 
noted that in analysing the data from Studies 1-5 in this thesis I conducted 
both paired sample t tests and one sample t tests.  This was done in order to 
provide a more complete picture of the trends running through the data, 
which conducting one of these analyses alone would not have provided.  This 
is because the paired t tests showed children’s preferences for one category 
relative to another, while the one sample t tests revealed whether children’s 
essentialist reasoning about each category could be predicted by chance 
alone.  For example, in Study 3 the paired t tests showed that children made 
more inferences based on religion categories than they did based on gender 
across development.  However, the one sample t tests provided further 
insight into how children reasoned about gender across development.  From 
6-9 years of age children’s rate of inference based on gender group 
membership did not significantly differ from chance, while at 10-11 years of 
age children’s rate of inference based on gender group membership was 
significantly greater than chance level.  This suggests that as children got 
older there was an increase in the value they placed on information about 
gender group membership when drawing inferences, even though children 
continued to view gender as a less informative basis for inference than 
religion group membership. 
In the next section, I will discuss how the NI case study fits with 
previous research, and the findings from the Israeli case study in particular, 




9.2. The constraints of cultural context  
The first question that the current research aimed to address was the 
question of whether children living in Northern Ireland hold stronger 
essentialist beliefs about religion categories than they do about other 
available categories, given the region’s history of sectarian conflict.  This is 
exactly what the present research has found, similar to previous research in 
the literature, which has shown that cultural input about the importance of 
specific categories can lead children and adults to essentialise those 
categories more than others (Astuti et al., 2004; del Rio & Strasser, 2011; 
Giles et al., 2008; Kim, 2013; Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Pauker et al., 2016; 
Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).  For example, in Chile it has been reported that 
children there hold stronger essentialist beliefs about poverty than they do 
about other categories (i.e., del Rio & Strasser, 2011), in the US children 
living in a rural, conservative area essentialise gender and race strongly from 
10-17 years while their counterparts in an urban area do not (i.e., Rhodes & 
Gelman, 2009), and in Israel children essentialise ethnicity more strongly 
across childhood than children in the US (i.e., Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz et 
al., 2013).  In comparison to the case study of ethnic essentialism in Israel, 
the main similarity between children in NI and Israel is that both highly 
essentialise the most strongly emphasised social categories within each 
cultural context; children in NI strongly essentialise religion categories and 
children in Israel strongly essentialise ethnic categories (e.g., Birnbaum et al., 
2010; Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz, 2013, Diesendruck & Menahem, 2013).   
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Children in NI essentialised the ethno-religion categories, Catholic and 
Protestant, more strongly than gender or a control dimension, which was 
expected given Northern Ireland’s history of sectarian conflict between these 
two religion groups (see Gillespie, 2010), and the ethno-religious polarisation 
and intergroup tension that persists to this day (Gough et al., 1992, Nolan, 
2014).  Despite the end of The Troubles, as brought about by The 1998 
Good Friday Agreement, NI peace reports (e.g., Nolan, 2014) periodically 
point out that Northern Ireland by no means functions as a successful post-
conflict society.  Similarly, Israel and the Palestinian territories have a history 
of violent inter-ethnic conflict between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, 
which continues to this day (see Gelvin, 2014; Spangler, 2015) – in contrast 
to NI, Israel is not a post-conflict society.  This would account for children’s 
strong essentialist beliefs about ethnicity in Israel (e.g., Birnbaum et al., 
2010; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009).  Another similarity between the NI and 
Israeli research is that both case studies include data obtained from US 
children on the eastern coast (Boston and New York), and it was found that 
children in the US did not reason about religion categories in the same way 
as children from NI, and children in the US did not reason about ethnic 
categories in the same way as children from Israel (i.e., Diesendruck, 
Goldfein-Elbaz et al., 2013).  In Study 4 of the present research, essentialist 
beliefs about religion categories were found to become weaker across 
childhood in the US.  Meanwhile, Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz et al. (2013) 
found that Israeli children essentialised ethnicity strongly across childhood (at 
5 and 10 years of age), while US children did not but showed an increase in 
essentialist reasoning about ethnicity between 5 and 10 years of age.  These 
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findings suggest that American children may receive input indicating that 
religion or ethnicity is not as important as other social categories in their 
culture – for example, in comparison to race (Hirschfeld, 1995; 1996; Kinzler 
& Dautel, 2012; Pauker et al., 2016) – which could account for their weaker 
essentialist beliefs about Catholics and Protestants, and Arabs and Jews.       
Thus, the current research in NI fits with the previous research in the 
literature and in Israel, suggesting that children are sensitive to cues 
highlighting particular group memberships as highly salient and especially 
important social categories to rely on for drawing distinctions between 
people.  However, the age at which NI children’s essentialist bias becomes 
constrained by cultural input about ethno-religion categories appears to be 
later in development in comparison to the development of Jewish, Israeli 
children’s essentialist reasoning about ethnicity (e.g., Birnbaum et al., 2010).  
The following section will discuss the developmental trajectory of essentialist 
reasoning about ethno-religion categories in NI.  
 
9.3. Developmental trajectory 
 The second aim of the current research was to explore the developmental 
trajectory of NI children’s essentialist beliefs about religion categories.  In 
Israel, evidence of strong ethnic essentialism in childhood is apparent from at 
least 5 years of age (this is the youngest age that has been tested there), 
and appears to decline in strength across childhood (Birnbaum et al., 2010; 
Deeb et al., 2011; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009).  In contrast, strong 
essentialist reasoning about religion categories emerges at 8 years of age 
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amongst children in Northern Ireland, and shows no sign of declining at 10-
11 years of age.  This is contrary to our initial expectations on beginning this 
case study; it was hypothesised that children in NI and Israel would be likely 
to show a similar pattern of essentialist reasoning about religion and ethnicity 
respectively, because of their similar histories of intergroup conflict and the 
continued polarisation of ethno-religion groups within both societies (see 
Gelvin, 2014; Gillespie, 2010; Gough et al., 1992; Nolan, 2014; Spangler, 
2015).  However, this was not the case, and as I will now discuss, there are 
also differences between the Northern Ireland and Israeli contexts that might 
account for the different patterns of social essentialism observed. 
One explanation for the difference in developmental trajectory 
between NI and Israel may be that children in NI might not have well 
developed concepts of religion until around 8 years of age, due to religion 
group membership not being salient to very young children.  The post-conflict 
research in NI conducted by Connolly and colleagues supports this view 
(Connolly, 2009; 2011; Connolly et al., 2009; Connolly et al., 2002), as a 
series of studies have reported that while children as young as 3 years of age 
show a developing awareness of cultural markers associated with their own 
religion group membership (i.e., such as a preference for certain flag colours, 
cultural activities and sports), it is not until around 6-7 years of age that 
approximately one third of children categorized themselves as Catholic or 
Protestant, with some children even displaying negative attitudes towards the 
other group.  So while children in NI may begin to internalise symbols of 
ethno-religion group membership in early childhood, it may not be until later 
in childhood that the majority of children in NI are explicitly aware of the 
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significance of religion group membership in this society.  Thus, for many 
children at 6 years of age in NI, the labels Catholic and Protestant may be 
relatively novel categories to them until cultural input can influence the 
conceptual development of these categories.     
One reason why religion group memberships might not be especially 
salient to children in Northern Ireland during early childhood, is that there are 
no physical differences in appearance between Catholics and Protestants in 
NI (although this has not stopped adolescents in the past from believing that 
there are, i.e., see Stringer & Cairns 1983 for research on this) that might act 
as cues to category membership. Other theorists in the social essentialism 
literature (e.g., Gil-White, 2001; Hirschfeld, 1995; 1996) have previously 
conjectured that physical or visual cues to category membership (e.g., for 
race) could be an important factor in directing essentialist beliefs onto human 
categories, because people may process physical differences between social 
groups in the same way they do physical differences between species of 
animal.  In contrast to NI, ethnic categories in Israel do have distinguishing 
visual markers (e.g., such as clothing), and Arabs and Jews in Israel also 
speak different languages, which is likely to make ethnicity more salient to 
children there from a younger age (Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et al., 2011; 
Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006), and lead children in Israel to essentialise 
ethnicity from at least 5 years of age (e.g., Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et al., 
2011; Diesendruck & Menahem, 2013; Segall et al., 2015). 
Recent research on religion categories in the US has also suggested 
that essentialist beliefs about religion categories emerge in middle childhood 
there, and supports the current research conducted in NI and Boston.  Chalik 
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et al. (2017) examined 5 and 10 year old children’s essentialist reasoning 
about Christianity and Judaism and found that found that US children did not 
distinguish between each religion category and the control category (e.g., the 
flurpish religion)  at 5 years of age.  Constraints appeared later in childhood 
and persisted into adulthood; Jewish 10 year olds and adults who practised 
their religion endorsed essentialist beliefs about familiar religion groups more 
than novel religion groups, and they also essentialised their own religion 
more than Christianity, in comparison to children and adults who were 
Christian or non-religious Jews.  This, along with the current case study, may 
reflect a universal pattern of late-emerging essentialist beliefs about religion 
categories when there are no visible cues that make religion categories 
salient to young children, but future research would need to confirm this.   
Another reason why religion group membership might not be as 
salient for younger children in NI is that religion might not be as strongly 
emphasised to all children in NI society today as it perhaps was during The 
Troubles, as NI is now considered a post-conflict society since The 1998 
Good Friday Agreement (see Gillespie, 2010; Nolan, 2014). Due to this, it is 
possible that religion categories are less salient to young children in NI, if 
there is less explicit discussion about religion categories by parents or in the 
media than there would have been during The Troubles (i.e., research in the 
essentialism literature has demonstrated a strong link between parents’ 
generic language, parental labelling of categories, and the development of 
essentialist thinking about natural and social categories in early childhood, 
see Gelman, 2003; Gelman et al., 2008; Goldin-Meadow et al., 2005; Pappas 
& Gelman, 1998; Rhodes et al., 2013).  However, as this was not measured 
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in the current research, there is no way to know how much influence parental 
talk – or the possible lack of it – about religion categories may have 
influenced children’s essentialist reasoning in the present research.  In 
contrast to the situation in NI, Israel and the Palestinian territories still have 
no resolution to the conflict there (see Gelvin, 2014; Spangler, 2015), so it is 
likely that children in Israel are exposed to talk about ethnicity and the conflict 
there from early in childhood.  Indeed, recent research by Segall et al. (2015) 
examined this and found that Jewish parents who held stronger essentialist 
beliefs about ethnicity, labelled ethnic categories more, and held more 
negative attitudes towards negotiating with Palestinian Arabs.  They also had 
children who exhibited stronger essentialist beliefs and negative attitudes 
towards Arabs at 5 years of age.   
In addition to the late emergence of essentialist reasoning about 
religion categories in NI, the present research also differs from the case 
study in Israel by showing no sign of a decline in the strength of children’s 
essentialist beliefs about religion categories at 10 years of age.  In fact, in the 
present research, religion essentialism became stronger from 8 to 10 years 
of age in NI, while in Israeli children show a decline in the strength of their 
essentialist beliefs about ethnicity between 7 and 10 years of age (i.e., 
Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et al., 2013).  This may be because knowledge 
and essentialist beliefs about religion categories in NI emerges relatively late 
in comparison to ethnic essentialism in Israel, so it may follow that ethno-
religion essentialism in NI also declines later in childhood, if it eventually 
does.  There is also the possibility that ethnic essentialism does not really 
decline from middle childhood onwards in Israel but only appears to.  It may 
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be that as Jewish children get older they realise that stereotypical thinking 
about ethnic categories is not socially acceptable and so they modify their 
responses and choose to privilege ethnicity less when reasoning about 
others, and show a more similar pattern of reasoning to the adult participants 
(Birnbaum et al., 2010; Deeb et al., 2011; Diesendruck & ha Levi, 2006; 
Diesendruck & Haber, 2009).  Research that has demonstrated this has been 
reported by Eidson and Coley (2014) who discovered that when US adults 
participate in the switched at birth task under time pressure, they endorse 
essentialist beliefs about the behavioural properties associated with gender 
categories, while adults who do not have a limited time to respond do not 
show this bias.  This is in contrast to studies that have suggested that US 
children view the stereotypical behavioural properties associated with gender 
as flexible by 10 years of age and into adulthood (i.e., Rhodes & Gelman, 
2009; Taylor, 1996; Taylor et al., 2009).  Thus, older children and adults in 
Israel may continue to hold strong essentialist beliefs about ethnicity, but 
modify their responses on essentialism tasks when they are under no time 
pressure to respond.  This has been observed in other research that has 
examined how children respond to tasks under norms of social inclusion or 
exclusion (Fitzroy & Rutland, 2010; Nesdale, 2011; Rutland, Cameron, Milne 
& McGeorge, 2005).  Meanwhile, children who essentialise religion group 
membership in NI may continue explicitly to do so throughout adolescence 
and adulthood, but this is as yet unexplored.      
Evidence of essentialist reasoning about ethnicity in adulthood – 
including explicit expressions of inter-ethnic bias – has been found among 
Jewish adults in Israel, and these views appeared to impact on their children 
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(i.e., Segall et al., 2015).  Further to this, not all of the studies in Israel have 
shown a decline in ethnic essentialism by 10 years of age; Diesendruck, 
Goldfein-Elbaz et al. (2013) found that Jewish children treated ethnicity as 
highly natural and objective at 5 years of age as they did at 10 years of age.  
Diesendruck, Birnbaum et al. (2013) discovered two different patterns of 
reasoning about ethnicity in Israel depending on the measure of essentialism 
used; it was found that children did not privilege ethnicity over other 
categories (social status, occupation and body build) until 7-11 years of age 
when asked to reason about the heritability of categories in a forced-choice 
paradigm, while 5-7 year olds essentialised ethnicity more strongly than 11 
year olds when asked to reason about its innate potential in a switched-at-
birth task.  The difference between the two tasks was that the forced-choice, 
heritability task measured children’s essentialist reasoning about one 
dimension relative to another (similar to the forced-choice inference task in 
Study 1 of this thesis), while the switched-at-birth task did not require children 
to choose between competing social dimensions and so children’s absolute 
level of ethnic essentialism could be measured.  Thus, this study in Israel 
(Diesendruck & Birnbaum et al., 2013), like the current NI case study, 
highlights the importance of employing different measures of essentialist 
reasoning in conjunction with each other in order to obtain a fuller picture of 
how children reason about categories – a point which will be discussed 
further in section 9.1.5. on children’s reasoning about gender in the NI case 
study.  In the next section, I will discuss the effect of educational context on 




9.4. The effect of educational context 
The third aim of the current case study in NI was to examine the potential 
effects of different educational contexts on children’s essentialist reasoning 
about religion.  Northern Ireland offers a unique context for exploring the 
effects of intergroup contact on children’s developing social cognition due to 
the largely segregated school system in place, along with the smaller 
integrated sector, attended by approximately 5% of children in NI (Gallagher, 
2010, Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency, 2014).  In this way, 
Northern Ireland is also similar to Israel, which has a minority of bilingual, 
integrated schools attended by both Arabs and Jews; another factor making 
the Israeli case study a good basis for comparison (Bekerman & Shhadi, 
2003; Bekerman, Zembylas & McGlynn, 2009; O’Connor, 2002).  Based on 
the findings from Israel, it was expected that children in the integrated sector 
would display weaker essentialist beliefs about ethno-religion categories at 
an earlier age than their counterparts in segregated schools.  However, this 
was not the case in NI; essentialism of religion categories emerged at 8 
years of age within the segregated sector, while children in the integrated 
sector did not show a preference at any age.  
One explanation for this finding may be that differences between the 
unique social contexts of NI and Israel that the integrated and de facto 
segregated education systems operate within may be responsible.  As 
differences between religion groups are not visually salient in NI, and there is 
no longer a violent conflict between the two groups, attendance at a school 
with a religious ethos and relatively homogenous student population might 
actually serve to highlight religion as a highly cohesive category, and as an 
254 
 
important social dimension used to draw distinctions between people.  In 
contrast, attending an ethnically homogeneous school in Israel may do 
nothing to make ethnicity more salient if young children are already highly 
aware of ethnicity before they begin school (i.e., Deeb et al., 2011, Segall et 
al., 2015), due to the visual and linguistic markers that are likely to make 
ethnicity more salient in this society. Further to this, Israel constitutes a much 
more highly segregated society than NI (e.g., Schnell, Abu Baker Diab & 
Benenson, 2015) in terms of residential and social segregation; while 
residential segregation persists in NI, the level of segregation varies in 
degree across different areas.  While many towns and villages are extremely 
homogeneous and insular, others are highly mixed in religious/community 
background, and both sides of the community are willing to share public 
space (e.g., Gallagher, 2010; Gough et al., 1992; Lloyd & Shuttleworth, 2012; 
Nolan, 2014).  
Thus, attendance at an integrated school in Israel may be the first time 
Jewish and Arab children have ever had contact with each other, and this 
contact might be responsible for attenuating ethnic essentialism among 
integrated school children at an earlier age, if it is experienced under optimal 
conditions (see Everett, 2013; Pettigrew, 1998) (for positive effects of 
physical, and even imagined, intergroup contact on school children, see 
Hughes, 2014; Turner et al. 2013).  Meanwhile, many children in NI may 
have had intergroup contact before beginning school, but might not be 
particularly aware of it, until they start attending a segregated school where 
religion group membership is strongly emphasised to them.  Meanwhile 
children who attend integrated schools are less likely to be conditioned to 
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view religion group membership as a highly meaningful social dimension due 
to the inclusive ethos of integrated schools and the cross-group friendships 
they form with other children (Bekerman & Shhadi, 2003; Bekerman et al., 
2009; O’Connor, 2002).     
This would explain why NI children in the integrated sector never 
distinguished between religion and the control categories (as well as gender 
in the inference studies), and often responded at chance, in their 
endorsement of essentialist beliefs about these categories, while stronger 
essentialist reasoning about religion categories emerged at 8 years of age 
among children attending segregated schools.  This interpretation is further 
supported by the results of the meta-regression, which revealed that the level 
of religious diversity in children’s local communities did not predict their 
essentialist reasoning about religion categories, indicating that the effects of 
educational context in this research cannot by attributed to level of 
community diversity.  However, future research should attempt to replicate 
this finding, as the level of community diversity in children’s local areas was 
an estimate obtained on the assumption that all children lived in close 
proximity to their school.  While proximity to school is one of the selection 
criteria for school admissions in NI, the community diversity scores are still 
an estimate based on the electoral wards that school were located within.  It 
would have been preferable to have had children’s postcodes to work out the 
religious composition of their local community, which was not obtained at the 
time of data collection in the current research.   
Alternately, it may be the case that parents who are less essentialist in 
their reasoning about religion categories prefer to send their children to an 
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integrated school, and the opportunities for socialization that they provide for 
their children outside of school are more diverse than those of children 
whose parents prefer a segregated school.  Thus, it may be the parents who 
are influencing the development of essentialist reasoning about religion 
categories within the different educational contexts, rather than the 
educational contexts themselves per se.  Future studies need to unpick the 
exact mechanisms by which educational context comes to influence the 
development of children’s social essentialist reasoning, and whether it is the 
educational context itself that is driving this finding.  There are a number of 
explanations that may account for the observed differences in reasoning 
between children within the different educational sectors in the current 
research. 
One possibility may be that exposure to social diversity causes 
children to develop weaker essentialist beliefs about social categories, while 
a lack of exposure to social diversity may exacerbate essentialist reasoning – 
similar to the effect that successful intergroup contact has on attitudes and 
emotions (e.g., Hughes, 2014; Hughes et al., 2013; Turner & Crisp, 2009; 
Turner et al., 2013).  If an essentialist bias constitutes one of the potential 
socio-cognitive mechanisms underpinning the development of stereotyping 
and prejudice, then it is reasonable to assume that any intervention that 
reduces stereotyping and prejudice might operate by challenging essentialist 
reasoning about the social world or particular social categories.  This 
interpretation is supported by research, which has shown that cross-group 
contact can effect change at a cognitive level by causing people to engage in 
de-categorization (Crisp & Turner, 2011; Everett, 2013; Prati, Crisp, Meleady 
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& Rubini, 2016), which occurs when people view others as individuals rather 
than as members of groups.  De-categorization is likely to occur in socially 
diverse environments when people are faced with multiple social categories 
that another individual belongs to (e.g., a Muslim person might also be a 
female, a young person, a feminist, a doctor, a mother) and simple, binary 
categorization is not easy to perform.   
For example, Prati et al. (2016) reported that when university students 
were presented with complex, multiple category information about students 
from another university or about immigrants, they viewed those people more 
as individuals, they attributed more secondary human emotions to them, and 
they viewed them as less of a threat.  This was compared to the responses of 
participants who were presented with simple category information about 
others, in which case participants dehumanized other university students and 
immigrants more and felt more threatened by them.  Thus, if being presented 
with multiple category information encourages people to engage in less 
category-based reasoning about others, it is likely that the process of de-
categorization also challenges and breaks down essentialist beliefs about 
categories, maybe even encouraging an anti-essentialist view of social 
categories instead (however, as Crisp & Turner, 2011 pointed out, people 
need to feel motivated to engage in de-categorization, or they will dismiss 
personal information about others that contradict their stereotypes, or will not 
engage in contact, as found by Hughes, 2014 in certain schools in NI 
participating in the Shared Education Programme).  This may be one of the 
ways that attendance at an integrated school in NI might have influenced 
children’s lack of endorsement of religion over gender and the control 
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categories in the inference studies detailed in this thesis, and the lack of 
distinction drawn between religion and the control categories when reasoning 
about the stability of these categories by integrated school children in Study 
5.   
Another mechanism by which educational context in NI might impact 
on the development of social essentialist beliefs is through the operation of 
school norms.   Integrated education is an intergroup contact initiative 
established with the goal of improving intergroup attitudes and intergroup 
relations in NI (Gallagher, 2010; Gallagher & Coombs, 2007; Hewstone et al., 
2005; O’Connor, 2002; Smith, 2001).  As such, the ethos of an integrated 
school is one that promotes inclusion, tolerance, and respect for others as 
individuals.  In this way, integrated schools set values and norms for social 
behaviour that children are aware of and know they are expected to adhere 
to (NI children as young as 6 years of age are aware of the ethos of their 
integrated school, see Montgomery, Fraser, McGlynn, Smith & Gallagher, 
2003).   These school values and norms may have led integrated school 
children to view religion group membership as equal in importance to the 
other categories in the present studies.  Previous research has demonstrated 
the power of environmental input over children’s developing social cognition; 
Astuti and colleagues (2004) found that protracted environmental input de-
emphasising the biological basis of ethnic group membership in Madagascar 
eventually overrides children’s essentialist instinct to view ethnicity as 
biologically innate and heritable by the time they reach the end of 
adolescence.  Thus, the values and norms of the integrated sector may be 
internalised by children and moderate their essentialist bias.  Prior research 
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(e.g., Cameron, Rutland, Hossain & Petly, 2011; Turner et al., 2013) has 
found that the creation of ingroup norms favouring cross-group contact can 
lead to more positive attitudes and feelings towards the outgroup and the 
idea of direct contact.  This would account for the present findings that 
integrated children did not endorse stronger essentialist beliefs about religion 
at any age, while segregated school children privileged religion categories 
from 8 years of age.   
Another way that the school norms of the integrated sector might have 
influenced children’s responses in the current research is by leading children 
to modify their answers during the tasks; it is possible that integrated children 
may not have been answering questions honestly, but rather in line with their 
school norms about socially acceptable ways to think about others.  Previous 
research has demonstrated that social norms can have a powerful impact on 
social cognition, social behaviour, and the responses children give to 
experimenters (see Fitzroy & Rutland, 2010; Nesdale, 2011; Pauker, 
Apfelbaum & Spitzer, 2015; Rutland et al., 2005).  For example, research by 
Fitzroy and Rutland (2010) reported evidence that 6-9 year old children 
modify their expressions of ingroup bias and outgroup bias under different 
levels of scrutiny by others; when children believed that their teacher and 
other children in their class would see their responses to tasks measuring 
intergroup bias they gave more socially acceptable responses in line with 
anti-prejudice social norms.  Older children (8-9 year olds) who had a better 
understanding of others’ emotions seemed to internalise norms more and 
made more effort to control their intergroup bias under conditions of both high 
accountability (scrutiny of peers and teacher) and low accountability 
260 
 
(accountable only to the experimenter).  If children who participated in the 
current studies in NI were sensitive to the fact that we were most interested 
in how they think about Catholics and Protestants, then it is possible that 
from 8 years of age (the age when children attending separate schools begin 
to essentialise religion more strongly), children attending integrated schools 
may have controlled their responses to the inference tasks and the ECQ to 
present themselves as placing the same value on religion group membership 
as they do on other categories, in line with the ethos of their school.   
Future research should examine the role of school and ingroup norms 
on the development of children’s essentialist beliefs about religion categories 
in NI.  It would be interesting to see how children respond to measures of 
essentialism within different educational contexts under low accountability 
(experimenter only) and higher accountability of different types, for example, 
when they think school peers will see their responses, when they think 
teachers will see their responses, when they think their parents will see their 
responses, and when they think their friends in their neighbourhood will see 
their responses.  It would also be interesting to know if children internalise 
the norms of their school and whether this is related to differences in explicit 
and implicit intergroup attitudes, as well as explicit and implicit essentialist 
thinking about religion categories (explicit and implicit essentialist reasoning 
could perhaps be measured using an adaptation of the computerized task 
employed by Eidson & Coley, 2014, who examined essentialist reasoning 
under time constraints and under no time constraints at all).          
A final explanation for the current pattern of results may be that 
educational context is not the driving force behind the differences in 
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children’s essentialist reasoning about religion categories.  It may be that 
parental input determines the direction of children’s reasoning about others, 
and parents who choose an integrated school may be less essentialist about 
religion categories than parents who choose a segregated school for their 
child.  This was found in a recent study by Segall et al. (2015), who reported 
that Jewish parents who preferred segregated schools in Israel displayed 
stronger essentialist beliefs about ethnicity – as did their children -  than 
parents (and their children) who chose integrated schools.   Parents who 
preferred segregation also labelled ethnic categories more and expressed 
more negative stereotypes about the outgroup.  Prior research has shown 
that generic language about natural kinds influences the development of 
essentialist beliefs about natural categories in childhood, for example, in 
observational studies of parent-child talk and story-telling (Cimpian & 
Markman, 2011; Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka & Flukes, 2008; Gelman & 
Heyman, 1999; Goldin-Meadow, Gelman & Mylander, 2005; Pappas & 
Gelman, 1998; Rhodes, Leslie & Tworek, 2012).  However, Segal et al.’s is 
one of few studies in the social essentialism literature that has demonstrated 
a link between essentialist beliefs and prejudicial attitudes of parents, and the 
social essentialist reasoning of their children (see also, Gelman, Taylor, 
Nguyen, Leaper & Bigler, 2004; Rhodes et al., 2012).  Future research into 
the development of children’s reasoning about religion categories in NI (and 
in other cultural and social contexts) should explore the potential impact of 
parental talk on the development of children’s essentialist reasoning.  While 
the meta-analyses ruled out varying levels of community diversity influencing 
children’s essentialist reasoning in the current studies, it is possible that 
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parental input about religion categories in NI may have had a large impact on 
the development of their essentialist beliefs about religion.  Thus, perhaps 
parents who chose integrated schools in NI, may have done so because they 
themselves are less essentialist about religion categories.  Alternatively, it 
may be the case that it is particular aspects of the differing school 
environments (level of social diversity, school norms) that influence 
essentialist reasoning, as past research has reported a number of reasons 
why NI parents choose an integrated school - the integrated ethos of the 
school is not always the primary motivating factor (see Morgan, Dunn, Cairns 
& Fraser, 1993).  Other reasons parents choose integrated schools are: that 
class sizes tend to be smaller so teaching is more ‘child-centred’, the school 
has a good reputation, older siblings attended the school, and the location of 
the school was convenient.  Thus, if intergroup contact is not the reason why 
many parents choose an integrated school, then parental input alone might 
not be what constrains integrated children’s essentialist reasoning about 
religion categories. 
As highlighted in this section, there are various reasons why children 
educated in different sectors in this research may have shown differences in 
essentialist reasoning.  The exposure to social diversity within the integrated 
sector is one mechanism that may have prompted de-categorization, and 
prevented children from developing stronger essentialist beliefs about religion 
categories at 8 years of age, in contrast to segregated school children.  
Alternatively, it may be that the inclusive ethos and pro-contact norms of the 
integrated sector may have moderated children’s essentialist beliefs about 
religion categories in the current studies, via the internalisation of these 
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norms or by prompting children to respond in a socially acceptable way in 
line with the ethos of the school.  Additionally, it may be that children who 
attend integrated schools are less essentialist about religion categories 
because their parents are also less essentialist about religion categories, 
which is why they have chosen an integrated school for their child.  In this 
case, it may be parental input and socialization de-emphasising the 
importance of religion categories that causes integrated children to 
essentialise religion less.  Further to this, it should be noted that while the 
present research found no evidence that community diversity influences 
children’s essentialist reasoning about religion categories, this finding should 
be replicated by future research.  The most likely answer is that a 
combination of these factors mediates and moderates the development of 
essentialist beliefs about religion categories across childhood in NI.  Future 
research needs to examine these mechanisms together to find how much 
each one influences children’s essentialist beliefs about religion categories.  
In the next section, I will discuss the findings that emerged in relation to the 
dimensions underpinning children’s essentialist reasoning about gender and 
religion categories in the current research.   
 
9.5. The underpinnings of children’s essentialist reasoning about 
gender and religion categories 
In examining the development of children’s essentialist reasoning about 
religion categories in NI, the current research sought to obtain converging 
evidence of essentialist reasoning by using more than one measure.  Thus, 
the inference studies measured children’s beliefs about how informative and 
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cohesive religion categories are, and the modified Essentialism Components 
Questionnaire (ECQ) measured children’s beliefs about how distinctive and 
stable religion categories are.  By examining different essentialist beliefs 
about social categories, the current case study revealed that religion and 
gender categories were essentialised in different ways.  Children appeared to 
essentialise religion categories along the dimension of cohesion more than 
naturalness, while they essentialised gender in terms of naturalness more so 
than cohesion. 
It was initially surprising that children in NI and Boston did not treat 
gender categories as a strong basis for inference.  This is because it is a 
well-established finding that gender is a highly important social dimension to 
young children (for reviews, see Halim & Ruble, 2010; Leaper & Friedman, 
2007)  Gender research has shown that in the first year of life, infants 
discriminate between male and female voices and faces, in their second year 
children frequently use gender labels and display preferences for 
stereotypically gendered toys, clothes and games (Halim & Ruble, 2010; 
Leaper & Friedman, 2007), and from 3-4 years of age children prefer to play 
with other children of the same gender (Maccoby, 1988; 2002) and even use 
gender categories to make inferences about the predicted toy preferences of 
other children (Martin, Eisenbud & Rose, 1995),  Research on gender 
essentialism has also demonstrated that children hold strong essentialist 
beliefs about gender categories from 4-5 years of age (Gelman et al., 1986; 
Taylor, 1996; Taylor et al., 2009; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).   
However, while research examining gender socialization has 
highlighted the importance of this social dimension in early childhood, it has 
265 
 
also shown that across childhood children become more flexible in their 
reasoning about gender stereotypes (Halim & Ruble, 2010; Leaper & 
Friedman, 2007) and the behavioural properties associated with gender (as 
does gender essentialism research, i.e., Taylor, 1996; Taylor et al., 2009).  
Moreover, Trautner, Ruble, Cyphers, Kirsten, Behrendt and Hartmann (2005) 
examined gender stereotyping from 4-9 years of age and found that gender 
stereotyping peaks in middle childhood and is then typically followed by 
increased flexibility in reasoning about gender categories (although there can 
be individual differences in the exact age at which gender stereotyping peaks 
before becoming less rigid).  Based on this research on the development of 
gender socialization, it seems possible that children’s reasoning about 
gender may have reached peak rigidity by 6-7 years of age in the current 
research, and therefore, children may have been less willing to draw novel 
inferences on the basis of gender group membership if they had already 
began reasoning about gender in less stereotypical ways.   
Further to this, children who participated in the current inference 
studies may also have been extremely familiar with gender categories, 
causing this social dimension to lose inductive potential.  If children have a 
great deal of knowledge and experience with gender categories by 6-7 years 
of age (when gender constancy has developed, Halim & Ruble, 2010), then 
children may be highly aware that only the biological properties associated 
with gender are fixed and that there can be as much variability between 
members of the same gender in behavioural properties, as there is between 
members of different genders.  Thus, extreme familiarity with gender 
categories might lead children to view gender categories as less cohesive 
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and inductively potent than other social dimensions (for more on this see 
Waxman, 2012), and increase the perception of within group variability.  
Other inference studies have found similar results when gender has been 
presented alongside other social categories that children could choose to 
base an inference on (for age versus gender see Taylor & Gelman, 1993; for 
ethnicity, social status and religiosity versus gender see Diesendruck & ha 
Levi, 2006; Birnbaum et al., 2010).       
 While children who participated in the current research did not treat 
gender categories as particularly cohesive and informative, they did perceive 
gender as a highly natural category as revealed by our modified version of 
the ECQ.  The ECQ suggested that from 8 years of age, children in NI 
viewed gender categories as highly distinct, discrete in their category 
boundaries and stable across time and different situations.  These are all 
aspects of essentialist reasoning that tend to be associated more with a 
naturalized view of categories (e.g., see Haslam et al., 2000; Taylor, 1996).  
In contrast to children’s reasoning about gender, children only essentialised 
religion group membership over membership of the control categories in 
terms of stability from 10 years of age within the segregated school sector.  
Religion categories were not essentialised as particularly distinct or discrete 
categories, as measured by the ECQ.  This is consistent with prior research 
that has reported that an essentialist perception of different social categories 
tends to be underpinned by different aspects of essentialist thinking, which 
do not always cohere (i.e., Demoulin et al., 2006; Gelman et al., 2007; 
Haslam et al., 2000; Rangel & Keller, 2011).  For example, Haslam and 
colleagues (2000) examined adults’ essentialist endorsements of 40 different 
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social categories and found that participants’ essentialist beliefs formed two 
main components – naturalness and entitativity.  For categories such as 
gender or race, Haslam et al. found that adults endorsed more essentialist 
beliefs about the naturalness of these categories, while categories such as 
occupation, religion or political orientation were essentialised more strongly 
along the dimension of entitativity (or cohesion).  Thus, the current case 
study of essentialist reasoning about social categories in NI would suggest 
that religion categories are viewed by children as being highly cohesive, 
homogeneous and informative categories, while gender categories are seen 
as more naturally occurring, stable, and distinctive in their boundaries.  
These findings highlight the need for future studies of social essentialist 
reasoning to take more than one approach to measuring essentialist beliefs, 
as different approaches tap into different aspects of essentialist thinking.  
Thus, converging evidence of essentialist reasoning is needed to provide a 
more complete picture of the ways in which children and adults essentialise 
different categories.   
 To summarise, the current research is consistent with prior research 
(e.g., Demoulin et al., 2006, Diesendruck & Haber, 2009; Haslam et al., 
2000; Rangel & Keller, 2011) in finding two main factors or dimensions of 
thought underlying an essentialist perception of social categories.  
Interestingly, we found that gender was essesntialised strongly along the 
dimension of naturalness, while religion appeared to be essentialised more 
strongly along the dimension of entitativity.  In the next section of this general 
discussion chapter, I will address the limitations of the current research 
studies and the questions that remain unanswered for future research.      
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9.6. Limitations and future directions 
Although a strong argument can be made for the positive contribution made 
by the studies described in this thesis, nonetheless, these studies, like all 
studies, suffer from certain limitations. In addition, certain assumptions on 
which they are based might be called into question. Accordingly, before 
discussing suggestions for future research, it is important to assess the 
potential limitations of the current findings. 
 
9.6.1. Limitations of the current research 
One limitation faced by all research examining essentialist thinking is 
that essentialism cannot be directly measured; all approaches to studying 
essentialism are comprised of indirect measures of essentialist reasoning 
(Gelman, 2003).  Indices of essentialist reasoning that are commonly cited in 
the literature are:  inductive inference tasks measuring the inductive potential 
of categories (e.g., Birnbaum et al., 2010; del Rio & Strasser, 2011; Gelman 
& Markman, 1986; 1986), transformation scenarios examining the 
discreteness and stability of category boundaries (e.g., del Rio & Strasser, 
2011; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Keil, 1989; Mahalingam, 2003), switched-at-
birth tasks measuring the perceived innate potential and heritability of 
category membership (e.g., Astuti et al., 2004; Diesendruck, Birnbaum et al., 
2013; Hirschfeld, 1995; 1996; Taylor, 1996; Taylor et al., 2009), and 
questionnaire approaches exploring a range of essentialist beliefs (e.g., Deeb 
et al., 2011; Diesendruck & Haber, 2009; Haslam et al., 2000).   
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As research in this area continues to grow, more researchers need to 
explore the development of essentialist beliefs using more than one of these 
approaches within the same project, in order to provide stronger, converging 
evidence of essentialist thinking (e.g., Diesendruck, Birnbaum et al., 2013; 
del Rio & Strasser, 2011, are examples of recent research that has explored 
social essentialism using a variety of approaches).  Doing so provides 
stronger evidence of essentialist thinking, and as the current research in NI 
has demonstrated, different approaches can reveal that all social categories 
are not essentialised equally along the same dimensions.  The current 
research suggests that children in NI essentialise religion categories more 
strongly along the dimension of entitativity or cohesion, while gender is 
essentialised more strongly along the dimension of naturalness.  If the 
present case study had focused only on exploring the development of social 
essentialism across childhood using inference tasks, the emerging picture 
would have suggested that children in NI essentialised ethno-religion 
categories and did not essentialise gender at all.  Our adapted version of the 
Essentialism Components Questionnaire revealed that this was not the case; 
children endorsed essentialist beliefs about gender more strongly than they 
did about religion categories when we asked children to reason about the 
distinctiveness of these categories, and the discreteness and stability of 
category boundaries.  However, the two approaches used in the current 
research need to be extended upon with future research in NI continuing to 
explore the development of social essentialism across childhood using other 
additional measures of essentialist thinking (e.g., the switched-at-birth task, 
transformation scenarios, and stability tasks) in order to provide more 
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converging evidence and a fuller picture of children’s essentialist thinking 
about ethno-religion categories in NI. 
Another criticism that might be made of the current research is that the 
findings may indicate that religion categories have strong inductive potential 
in NI, but this does not necessarily mean that children essentialise religion 
categories.  Other research examining children’s socio-cognitive 
development has found support for the theory that social categories can have 
strong inductive potential because members of certain groups are seen as 
being bound by loyalty and strong moral obligations to one another (i.e., 
Chalik & Rhodes, 2014; Rhodes, 2013; 2014; Rhodes & Chalik, 2013).  For 
example, Chalik and Rhodes (2014) conducted experiments in which children 
were told about individual members of two groups – a red team and a blue 
team – coming into conflict with one another (e.g., one team member taking 
bricks from another team member in a competition to build a tower, or one 
child pushing another child in a situation involving no competition between 
groups), and they were asked to make inferences about future cross-group 
interactions between the two teams.  Chalik and Rhodes found that 4 year 
old children expected others only to be friends with members of their own 
group following cross-group conflict, and they also predicted that members of 
the offending group would continue to commit offenses (e.g., stealing 
cookies) against members of the other group (but not members of their own 
group).  Furthermore, Rhodes and Chalik (2013) also reported that 3-9 year 
old children judge anti-social behaviour between members of the same group 
more harshly than anti-social behaviour between members of different 
271 
 
groups – intergroup conflict was only judged to be wrong when children were 
told there was a rule against it.   
Thus, Rhodes (2013) maintains that social essentialism is not the only 
naive theory that children might bring to bear on their developing concepts of 
social categories; they might also perceive social category membership as 
bestowing social obligations on all of its members, which could make certain 
social categories inductively powerful.  This is an alternative view that could 
be taken of the inference data presented in the current research on religion 
categories in Northern Ireland.  Given the extreme polarisation of people 
along ethno-religious lines in NI through tribal politics, expressions of culture, 
the split education system, and varying levels of residential segregation, it 
seems likely that children and adults would view religion categories as 
marking strong interpersonal obligations between members of the same 
groups (Gallagher, 2010; Gillespie, 2010; Gough et al., 1993; Nolan, 2014).  
It would also explain the weak inductive potential of gender categories in the 
present research if children take a more naturalized view of gender, but do 
not view members of the same gender groups as being particularly obligated 
to one another.  Moreover, 6 year olds in the current research may have 
been more willing than older children to base inferences on shared 
membership of the control categories if they viewed ownership of a particular 
pet as conferring social obligations between pet owners.  However, while this 
is an interesting aspect of children’s naïve theories about social categories 
that future research should explore alongside social essentialism, there are 
some issues with this interpretation of the current data.      
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The first is that the current research did not only find that religion was 
an inductively powerful social dimension for children in NI.  The ECQ study 
(Study 5) also showed that from 10 years of age, children attending 
segregated schools endorsed essentialist beliefs about the stability of religion 
group boundaries and the immutability of religion group membership more 
strongly than they did for the control category.  Children attending integrated 
schools did not distinguish between religion and the control categories at any 
age in relation to the stability and immutability of group membership.  This 
shows that membership of the categories Catholic and Protestant were 
viewed as informative by de facto segregated children in NI, as well as being 
seen as exclusive and unchangeable (although not as exclusive and 
unchangeable as gender).   
The second issue is that the social obligations lay theory and the 
social essentialism lay theory predict different kinds of inferences on the 
basis of religion group membership.  The social obligations perspective alone 
supports inferences about the behaviour of group members, not the 
psychological properties or preferences of group members (Rhodes, 2013).  
The social essentialism perspective supports the projection of psychological 
properties and preferences between group members on the basis that a 
common, underlying category essence confers greater within group similarity 
(Gelman, 2003; Haslam, 1998).  The current inference studies employed 
novel properties that were presented to children in the form of personal 
attributes or psychological characteristics – for example, “this child is gleeve. 
Do you think this child (alternate picture) is also gleeve?”.  Given the framing 
of the properties in this research as novel attributes, it seems unlikely that the 
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perception of religion categories as denoting interpersonal obligations would 
support the projection of these properties.  If the properties had been framed 
as novel interpersonal behaviours, then this could indicate a bias for viewing 
religion group members as obligated towards one another.  Therefore, this 
would suggest that children’s category based inferences in the current 
research are supported by the perception of within group similarity, and thus 
can be taken as an index of children’s essentialist reasoning about social 
categories.  Future research should examine the effect that different types of 
properties might have on children’s pattern of category based inferences in 
NI. 
Additional limitations of the current case study might also be 
methodological in nature.  One concern might be about how projectable the 
novel properties presented in the inference tasks were; as the properties 
consisted of novel attributes that children were not familiar with and had 
never used before, it is possible that children may not have interpreted the 
properties as legitimate attributes to be projected on the basis of category 
membership.  The pattern of results observed both in Northern Ireland and in 
Boston (Study 4) suggest that children did not have any issues with 
projecting the novel attributes presented to them; children projected novel 
properties at a rate greater than chance level based on religion and control 
category memberships across two national contexts, and they each showed 
different patterns of inference using these properties.  At 6 years of age 
children in NI and Boston both drew inferences based on religion and control 
category memberships at a similar rate and above chance level.  Across 
childhood, children in NI increasingly distinguished between religion and the 
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control dimensions and chose to make more inferences based on religion 
group membership over time (within the segregated school sector).  
Meanwhile, children in Boston did not increasingly privilege religion 
categories as a basis for induction across childhood; they treated religion and 
the control categories as less informative across childhood, basing 
inferences on these categories at chance level by 10 years of age.  If the 
novel properties were not projectable to children, all of their category based 
inferences would have been at chance level or below chance level, and 
different patterns of category based reasoning are unlikely to have been 
found between the two different national contexts. 
Another criticism that might be made of the current research is that the 
control category employed was not interpreted as a blank, arbitrary 
dimension – particularly by the youngest children tested – in both NI and the 
US.  In the current inference studies, the control category was often treated 
as a more informative social category then gender.  While this was 
unexpected, the inclusion of the control dimension did still act as an 
interesting basis for comparison on examination of children’s pattern of 
inference, and their responses to the ECQ.  The inference studies showed NI 
children reasoning similarly about religion categories and the control 
categories at 6-7 years of age, and then at 8 years of age stronger 
essentialist reasoning about religion categories seemed to emerge with 
children drawing stronger religion-based inferences than control category 
based inferences, with the control dimension being treated as less 
informative across childhood.  This suggested that religion categories and the 
control categories may be relatively unfamiliar, novel categories to children at 
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6 years of age, which may have made them an interesting basis for 
inference.  Meanwhile, by 8 years of age, children may have more fully 
developed concepts of these social dimensions, and social and cultural input 
may have constrained their essentialist beliefs about religion and the control 
dimensions, affecting how useful each dimension was viewed as a basis for 
inference.  This was supported by the pattern of inference found with the 
sample in Boston, in which children may have treated membership in religion 
and control categories as a strong basis for inference due to the novelty of 
these categories at 6 years of age, while across childhood they treated both 
social dimensions as increasingly less informative, perhaps because they 
also had more fully developed concepts of these social dimensions by 8-12 
years of age, and social and cultural input about these categories may have 
led them to view these categories as relatively unimportant.  Further to this, 
the findings from the ECQ study provided further insight into children’s 
reasoning about religion, gender and the control dimension of pet ownership.  
NI children’s responses to this questionnaire revealed that they did not 
endorse strong essentialist beliefs about the distinctiveness of pet ownership 
categories or the stability and immutability of pet ownership categories.  In 
particular, the items measuring category stability showed that children viewed 
pet ownership categories as the most flexible and unstable social dimension, 
compared to religion and gender categories from 10 years of age (in the 
segregated school sector).   
A final point to make on the potential limitations of the current research 
is that proponents of a primarily feature-based model of children’s category-
based induction might maintain that the labelling of categories and the visual 
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stimuli used in the current studies may have elicited the current pattern of 
inference among children in NI and Boston (see Sloutsky, 2003; Sloutsky & 
Lo, 1999; Sloutsky, Lo & Fisher, 2001; Godwin & Fisher, 2015).  It is possible 
that perhaps the youngest children tested at 6-7 years of age in the current 
research may have relied on verbal labels and the visual stimuli to aid them 
in drawing inferences, however, it seems unlikely that children relied on 
perceptual features for the following reasons.  Firstly, category labelling was 
not explicit in the current research; group memberships of religion and the 
control dimensions were presented to children as descriptions.  For example, 
“this child goes to a Catholic Church and owns a hamster”.  Only gender was 
labelled explicitly (e.g., “this child is a boy”).  Therefore, it seems unlikely that 
children relied on a label matching strategy in their responses, and if they 
had then it seems more likely that children would have drawn more 
inferences on the basis of gender group membership than based on 
membership of religion and the control categories.  Secondly, the visual 
stimuli were manipulated between Studies 2 and 3 (which were both 
unconstrained inference tasks); in Study 2 only gender categories were 
presented visually in the pictures, while in Study 3 all three social dimensions 
were represented pictorially.  Despite this, Studies 2 and 3 still revealed a 
similar pattern of results.  Moreover, in Study 4, conducted in Boston, half the 
sample received full pictorial cues for all social dimensions, while half the 
sample received reduced pictorial cues only for gender, and no statistical 
difference was found between the two stimuli conditions.  Thus, the pattern of 
inferences observed in the current studies cannot be attributable to the 
perceptual features (auditory labels or visual stimuli) of the task. 
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Having addressed the possible limitations of the present case study in 
Northern Ireland, the following section will discuss the questions raised for 
future research into the development of essentialist reasoning about religion 
categories in NI. 
  
9.6.2. Questions for future research  
The present case study of the development of children’s essentialist 
reasoning about religion categories in NI constitutes a series of five studies 
that make an original contribution to the literature on social essentialism.  
This area of research has not previously been studied in NI, and so it 
contributes to the essentialism literature by expanding on what is known 
about the development of social essentialism across cultures, within a 
previously unexplored national and cultural context.  Further to this, the 
current case study also makes a valuable contribution to understanding the 
development of children’s knowledge and reasoning about the two dominant 
religion categories in NI, and the effect that different educational contexts 
may be having on children at a socio-cognitive level.  Much of the 
developmental research concerned with religion categories in NI focuses on 
intergroup contact initiatives and changes in children’s attitudes and feelings 
towards their perceived outgroup (Cairns & Dawes, 1996; Cairns, Wilson, 
Gallagher & Trew, 1995; Trew, 2004), as well as the negative impact that the 
legacy of the Troubles continues to have on intergroup relations and mental 
health (Cairns, 1987; Cairns & Darby, 1998; Cairns et al., 1995).  The current 
research provides interesting evidence of how environmental input in NI 
constrains the development of essentialist reasoning about religion 
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categories, which may be one important cognitive basis of negative 
intergroup attitudes and emotions (see Diesendruck & Menahem, 2015 
Segall et al. 2015).  It also raises a number of questions for future research.  
First of all, the current studies constitute a starting point for studying 
the development of social essentialism within Northern Ireland.  Additional 
research is needed to replicate the current findings and expand on them by 
using additional converging measures of essentialist reasoning that were not 
included in the current research project.  Future research also needs to 
extend the age range of participants tested.  It would be interesting to 
examine the essentialist reasoning of 4-5 year old children in NI to find out if 
their reasoning is similar to the 6-7 year old children in NI, who we suspect 
may be drawn to making inferences on the basis of religion group 
membership and membership of the control categories because these may 
be relatively novel social dimensions to them, and cultural input has not yet 
exerted constraints on children’s reasoning about religion categories at this 
age.  Further to this, the age range examined should also be extended to 
include adolescent and adult participants so that the developmental course of 
essentialist reasoning about religion categories in NI can be charted across 
the lifespan.  Variations between participants due to socio-economic status 
(SES) and the type of residential areas that participants may live in should 
also be taken into account.  In the current research we could only obtain 
estimates of SES and level of community diversity using free school meals 
and ward information as indices.  In future research, it would be preferable to 
ask parents for this information.  As recruiting participants for this project 
proved challenging at times due to the topic of religion, we did not want to 
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ask parents for too much information when seeking parental consent for 
children to participate.   
Secondly, future research also needs to investigate the mechanisms 
that transmit environmental messages about various social categories to 
children.  The social essentialism literature has demonstrated that different 
social and cultural input about the importance of various social dimensions 
directs essentialist beliefs about these categories (i.e., Astuti et al., 2004; 
Chalik et al., 2017; Deeb et al., 2011; Diesendruck, Goldfein-Elbaz et al., 
2013; Kinzler & Dautel, 2012; Mandalaywala & Rhodes, 2017; Rhodes & 
Gelman, 2009).  However, the ways in which environmental input about 
social categories is transmitted to children has not yet been well researched, 
with the exception of a few studies that have begun examining the link 
between parental input (i.e., labelling, generic language) and essentialist 
reasoning about social categories (i.e., Mandalaywala & Rhodes, 2017; 
Rhodes et al., 2012; Segall et al., 2015).  As well as mapping the 
development of essentialist beliefs about religion categories in NI across the 
lifespan, research should also explore how cultural input is transmitted to 
children and how much impact different modes of transmission have on 
constraining the development of essentialist thinking.  The current research 
began to do this by exploring the impact of educational context on children’s 
essentialist reasoning and found that children in the integrated and 
segregated sectors reason differently.  Using meta-analysis, the current 
research ruled out level of community diversity in children’s residential areas 
as producing the observed effects of educational context.  However, it was 
beyond the scope of the current research to investigate parental input about 
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religion categories in NI and the mechanisms by which the different 
educational sectors come to influence children’s essentialist beliefs. 
As previously discussed, children attending integrated schools did not 
privilege religion group membership over membership of the control 
categories, while from 8 years of age children attending segregated schools 
did.  This may have been because exposure to social diversity and intergroup 
contact within the integrated sector may have led integrated children to 
engage in de-categorization (see Prati et al., 2016), and thus perceive less 
variability between social groups and more variability within social groups, 
causing children to place less importance on religion group membership (see 
Turner et al., 2013).  It may also be due to the integrated ethos of these 
schools establishing school norms of tolerance, respect and friendship 
towards all other children.  If internalised, these norms might lead children to 
place less importance on membership of social categories.  Alternatively, 
children attending integrated schools might be conforming to the norms of 
their school – as previous research on school norms has found (Nesdale, 
2011) - and so choose not to endorse stronger essentialist beliefs about 
religion in comparison to the control category because they believe this 
would not be socially acceptable.  Future research should investigate these 
possibilities by examining children’s explicit and implicit (e.g., see the 
speeded time task used as an implicit measure in Eidson & Coley, 2014) 
endorsement of essentialist beliefs about religion categories under conditions 
of differing group and school norms (e.g., see Fitzroy & Rutland, 2010; 
Rutland et al., 2005), and different levels of accountability for their responses 
(e.g., accountability to school peers, teachers, neighbourhood peers and 
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parents).  As well as this, investigators should also examine the possibility 
that children in NI do not only essentialise religion categories but may also 
hold an additional theory about the nature of religion categories in which they 
view religion group membership as dictating loyalty and moral obligations 
between group members (Chalik & Rhodes, 2014; Rhodes, 2013; 2014; 
Rhodes & Chalik, 2013).  If children in NI reason about religion categories in 
both of these ways, research should ascertain to what extent each of these 
naïve theories are endorsed about religion (and other) categories, and also 
continue to collect cross-cultural data from other national contexts for 
comparison (perhaps from England and the Republic of Ireland).    
Finally, a third avenue for future research to pursue is how the current 
research could be applied to form an intervention targeting the development 
of essentialist beliefs about religion categories across childhood.  An 
interesting study would be to explicitly and implicitly measure the social 
essentialist beliefs of children and adolescents participating in the Shared 
Education Program (SEP) in Northern Ireland (see Hughes, 2014; Hughes, 
Lolliot, Hewstone, Schmid & Carlisle, 2012).  The Shared Education Program 
is a contact initiative created to bring children together who attend separate 
schools in NI, due to the low percentage of the population that chooses the 
integrated sector (see Hughes & Donnelly, 2012).  SEP aims to provide 
opportunities for contact that may be more successful than past schemes 
(e.g., EMU, Hughes & Donnelly, 2012) because it meets more of the optimal 
conditions for contact by having children work together towards a common 
goal – i.e., their GCSEs or other academic goals – rather than bringing 
children together with contact as the only goal.  It would be interesting to find 
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out if children’s level of essentialist thinking about religion categories 
changes after participation in Shared Education, and whether this is related 
to changes in their intergroup attitudes.  If implicit essentialist beliefs were 
found to be related to children’s intergroup attitudes in NI, this would suggest 
that interventions aimed at challenging the development of essentialist beliefs 
about religion from early childhood could be one route to improving 
intergroup attitudes between Catholic and Protestant children in NI.  For 
example, research has found that extended contact and imagined contact 
can be effective in improving children’s thoughts and feeling towards 
outgroups and towards cross-group contact (Cameron, Rutland, Turner, 
Holman-Nicolas & Powell, 2011; Cameron, Rutland, Hossain & Petley, 2011; 
Turner et al., 2013).  If research was to find that indirect contact has an 
impact on social essentialist beliefs, this might be one way to achieve 
prejudice reduction through the use of story books about children engaging in 
cross-religion group contact in NI.  At the very least it might help to prepare 
children for engaging in direct contact later in their school life.  This could 
have a positive effect on determining successful outcomes for SEP in 
particular areas, as according to Hughes (2014) the program is not as 
successful in areas of NI that experienced high levels of conflict during the 
troubles and where tension between communities is still high.  For example, 
Hughes reports that children living near peacelines in Belfast were more 
anxious about and resistant to participating in Shared Education than 
children living in rural areas.  Children living near peacelines were not 
‘contact-ready’ and the intervention did not help establish cross-group 
friendships or massively improve intergroup attitudes.  
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To summarise, the current section on recommendations for future 
research has identified three key areas for further examination: 1. Extending 
the age range and demographics of the participants taking part in research 
exploring social essentialism in NI, so that essentialist beliefs about religion 
categories can be fully mapped across the lifespan.  2. Investigating how 
essentialist beliefs about religion categories in NI are transmitted (i.e., 
parental input, community input, the differing social composition of the two 
education sectors, the ethos and norms of different schools), and which 
factors moderate the strength of children’s social essentialist beliefs.  3. 
Exploring essentialist beliefs about religion categories as one potential 
cognitive mechanism leading to stereotyping and negative intergroup 
attitudes in NI, with the challenging of social essentialist thinking in NI 
offering one possible means of early intervention.   
Having discussed the findings from the present case study in NI, and 
examined the limitations of the current work and considered directions for 
future research in this area, the next section will conclude this final chapter.           
 
9.7. Conclusion 
To summarise, this PhD thesis has presented a series of studies examining 
the association between educational context and the development of 
essentialist reasoning about religion categories across childhood in Northern 
Ireland.  This series of studies constitutes an original case study of social 
essentialism within a previously unexplored cultural context.  As such, it 
makes an original contribution both to the social essentialism literature and to 
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research examining intergroup contact and the impact the education system 
has on children’s developing social-cognition in NI.  As a starting point, the 
current research has found that essentialist beliefs about ethno-religion 
categories in NI emerge quite late in childhood at around 8 years of age.  
Further to this, attending a religiously homogeneous school may influence 
the emergence of essentialist thinking about religion categories at around 8 
years of age, while attendance at an integrated school may prevent stronger 
essentialist beliefs about religion categories from emerging.  Future research 
needs to examine whether educational context primarily influences children’s 
essentialist reasoning about religion categories in NI, or whether it is their 
parents’ essentialist reasoning and subsequent  choice of school driving this 
effect.   
In addition to this, it was discovered that children in NI appear to 
essentialise religion and gender categories in different ways; religion seems 
to be essentialised more strongly along the essentialist dimension of 
entitativity and gender seems to be more strongly essentialised along the 
essentialist dimension of naturalness.  This highlights the need for using 
different indices to measure essentialist thinking, as not all categories are 
essentialised to the same degree or in the same way.  A number of directions 
for future research have been identified from the current findings.  There is 
more work to be done in mapping the developmental trajectory of social 
essentialism in NI across the lifespan, as well as in exploring the 
mechanisms by which social and cultural input come to constrain the 
development of social essentialism in NI and across other national contexts.  
The potential usefulness of the current findings in developing future 
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prejudice-reduction interventions in NI has also been highlighted.  There is 
clearly room for a lot more research to be conducted within the field of social 
essentialism and within the Northern Ireland context.  The present case study 
examining the possible effect of educational context on the development of 
social essentialism in NI offers a valuable contribution the field, which can be 
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